Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (August 2009)

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deaths. Multiple fatality management across jurisdictional lines, such as

was needed in response to Hurricane Katrina, is nearly impossible under

current conditions, given the absence of medical expertise in some systems,

the absence of standards of performance, and the noninteroperability of

systems and procedures. The recent infusion of funds to the states through

the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Depart-

ment of Homeland Security (DHS) is of little assistance when there are no

competent systems able or willing to employ those funds. Uniform state-

wide and interstate standards of operation, consolidation of small systems,

regionalization of services, and standardization of staff training are needed

to assist in the management of interstate and cross-jurisdictional events. A

software program is needed that is universally usable and available, and its

use should be promulgated by ME/C systems for multiple fatality manage-

ment. (See also Chapter 11.)

FORENSIC PATHOLOGY RESEARCH

Currently, little research is being conducted in the areas of death in-

vestigation and forensic pathology in the United States. Individual ME/C

offices mainly utilize their databases for epidemiological retrospective re-

views. Individual forensic pathologists operating in any system carry heavy

caseloads and often have no dedicated time, expertise, facilities, or fund-

ing for research. Research is further limited because many offices operate

training programs independent of university medical schools. Occasionally,

a specific case may inspire “litigation research” directed to the elucidation

of a specific problem related to a case that is being litigated actively, but

this does not replace broad and systematic research of a forensic issue.

Few university pathology departments promote basic pathology research

in forensic problems such as time of death, injury response and timing, or

tissue response to poisoning. In general, research interest often is inspired

by a national goal that is funded through grants. A review of the forensic

literature for basic research in forensic pathology reveals that efforts are

originating largely from Europe, Scandinavia, and Japan. In other coun-

tries, universities house a department of legal medicine and/or departments

of forensic medicine and pathology where forensic pathologists have the

time, expertise, and funding needed to perform basic forensic research.

The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME)

requires forensic pathology training programs to provide fellows an oppor-

tunity for scholarly research or other scholarly activities.⁵⁷ These research

projects are usually small and limited in scope because of the constraints of

a one-year fellowship, legislation that does not permit most basic research

⁵⁷ Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education. Available at www.acgme.org/

acWebsite/downloads/RRC_progReq/310forensicpath07012004.pdf.

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on tissues that are available upon autopsy without the permission of next

of kin, lack of funding, and lack of space. Historically, the consent issue

derives from the fact that forensic autopsies are carried out for medicole-

gal purposes and thus do not require permission from the next of kin. But

without this permission, research that utilizes tissue from medical examiner

offices does not take place. The time constraints for the performance of

medicolegal autopsies make finding families and obtaining consent difficult.

Many projects consist of epidemiological reviews that while of interest are

not basic science.

Some U.S. universities may administer some forensic pathology fellow-

ship programs, while others may include forensic pathologists within their

departments of pathology. In these instances, the forensic pathologist usu-

ally supervises a departmental autopsy service that performs hospital and

forensic autopsies. A university connection usually provides the university

with the opportunity to rotate pathology residents and medical students

through an ME/C office for a brief period, usually several months, and

provides exposure to forensic pathology as part of an overall education

program for medical students or as required by ACGME for training resi-

dents in general pathology. Even in universities that have a department of

forensic science, research is limited to the forensic science disciplines, and

little or no research is devoted to forensic pathology or forensic medicine.

In some cases, there may be collaborative, ongoing epidemiological ac-

tivities, such as when forensic pathologists work with members of depart-

ments of trauma surgery to develop statistical studies or when a forensic

pathologist presents data at surgical or pediatric death review conferences.

Of the many impediments to academic research in forensic pathology in

the United States, the most significant are the lack of understanding of

forensic research challenges, the lack of a perceived need and national

goals, the lack of grant funding of any kind to support research, the lack

of forensic pathology researchers, and the lack of recognition for efforts

directed to forensic pathology research within the university community.

Grant funding drives research, but virtually no funding is available to en-

courage departments of pathology to make forensic pathology research a

focus, and there is little tradition of collaboration between academic and

forensic pathologists.

Translational research bridges the gap between basic science dis-

coveries and their practical applications. In the case of forensic pathol-

ogy/medicine, this means taking basic science research knowledge to the

autopsy table.⁵⁸ Given the large numbers of autopsies performed in the

⁵⁸NIH Roadmap for Medical Research: Re-engineering the Clinical Research Enterprise-

Translational Research. Available at http://nihroadmap.nih.gov/clinicalresearch/overview-

translational.asp.

MEDICAL EXAMINER AND CORONER SYSTEMS

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United States in medical examiner offices, there is a great need for new

knowledge that will filter down to the autopsy pathologist and for op-

portunities for practicing forensic pathologists to identify problems that

need basic research.

COMMON METHODS OF SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION

State statute determines the sample or collection of cases that ME/Cs

investigate and examine. The minimal data collected on each case is demo-

graphic and is entered on the certificate of death by the state division of vi-

tal records and death statistics, which also maintains the data. The data are

reported nationally each year to the National Center for Health Statistics.

ME/C offices with databases may keep records pertaining to their particular

jurisdiction and collect additional data on specific diagnoses, or classes, of

death. They collect useful death data through child fatality review teams,

adult fatality review teams, surveillance programs for family and intimate

partner violence, and the National Violent Death Review System.⁵⁹ None of

these data collection projects is federally mandated, and for small systems

there is no perceived benefit. ME/C reports are available to next of kin

and others as provided by statute. ME/C investigations recognize product

and equipment failures leading to death and report them to appropriate

agencies. Before 2005, when funding was withdrawn, CDC maintained the

Medical Examiner and Coroner Information Sharing Program (MECISP) to

receive reports of product-associated deaths, which allowed early recogni-

tion of problem products.⁶⁰ Originally, MECISP was established to obtain

data from all deaths investigated by ME/Cs and to share such information

with relevant agencies. The major goals of MECISP were to improve medi-

colegal death investigation and to facilitate the sharing of death investiga-

tion information.⁶¹ Many agencies depend on ME/C investigations and

autopsies to complete their work, such as the Occupational Health and

⁵⁹National Violent Death Reporting System. Available at www.cdc.gov/ncipc/profiles/nvdrs/

default.htm.

⁶⁰ Centers for Disease Control and Injury Prevention Medical Examiner Coroner Informa-

tion Sharing Project. Available at www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disse/nndss/contact.htm#mecisp.

⁶¹ MECISP was established in 1986 by CDC with goals that included improving the quality

of death investigation in the United States mainly by achieving uniformity and improving the

quality of information obtained during the investigation of deaths by ME/Cs. The program

was active and productive and very well received by medical examiners. It constituted the

major interface between the public health and the ME/C systems. Approximately 10 years

ago, CDC went through a period of internal reorganization and administratively began

decreasing the budget for MECISP. MECISP was moved from the CDC National Center for

Environmental Health to the CDC Epidemiology Program Office. The budget was eliminated

in 2004, despite the efforts of NAME. R. Hanzlick. 2006. Medical examiners, coroners, and

public health. Archives of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine 130:1247-1282.

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Safety Administration, social services agencies, victim witness compensation

programs, and workers compensation agencies.

Systems with in-house forensic pathologists may collect autopsy data,

but often the data are collected in a format that is different from the one

used for the underlying (proximate) cause of death data as listed on death

certificates. The reporter may use a pathology classification system such as

SNOMED (Systematized Nomenclature of Medicine) or an individually

devised system that tracks diseases or injuries of personal or system-specific

interest.⁶² There is no universally accepted or required system for collection

or maintenance of autopsy data by medical examiners and coroners. Analy-

sis of data may be local or regional, and it may be conducted by review

teams or by national organizations or agencies with interests in specific

classes of data.

Scientific interpretation and summaries of the results are included in the

reports generated by each ME/C office. Reports by medical death investi-

gators that describe the circumstances of death are descriptive and vary in

quality depending on the standards of the office. Pathologists produce the

autopsy reports and may or may not provide an interpretive summary of

findings. Reports vary from the academic pathology report that lists each

organ system and any deviations from normal to the problem-oriented

autopsy report that prioritizes diagnoses from the most important leading

to death followed by any contributory and then noncontributory pathol-

ogy of interest. Not all pathologists follow the NAME autopsy standards.

The general expectation, at least for the legal forum, is that each autopsy

will have documented the findings in sufficient detail through narrative

and photographs and that review by another pathologist will confirm the

adequacy of the examination.

Requiring the adoption of standards for death investigations and au-

topsies as well as accreditation of all ME/C offices would benefit all par-

ties, including the recipients of ME/C services. Because the credibility of

unaccredited offices is rarely challenged, implementing and enforcing stan-

dards will require major incentives as well as negative consequences for

nonadherence.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

ME/C systems function at varying levels of expertise, often with de-

ficiencies in facilities, equipment, staff, education, and training. And, un-

fortunately, most systems are under budgeted and understaffed. As with

other forensic science fields, there are no mandated national qualifications

or certifications required for death investigators. Nor is medical expertise

⁶² SNOMED. Available at www.snomed.org.

MEDICAL EXAMINER AND CORONER SYSTEMS

265

always required. In addition, there is no one recognized set of performance

standards or best practices for ME/C systems nor are there incentives to

implement one recognized set. Also lacking are universally accepted or

promulgated methods of quality control or quality assurance. It is clear

that the conversion of coroner systems to medical examiner systems as

recommended by many studies has essentially halted and requires federal

incentives to move forward.

The Model Post-Mortem Examination Act of 1954 needs to be revisited

and updated to include the elements of a progressive and responsive death

investigation law. The revised code should include standards for administra-

tion, staffing, and training. Any changes to the system will require federal

incentives to implement the changes in each state.

The shortage of forensic pathologists speaks to the need to provide

incentives for young physicians to train in forensic pathology. Systems with

authorized positions cannot fill them, because of this shortage and budget

deficits. The National Forensic Sciences Improvement Act (NFSIA) must be

fully funded to support the core needs of ME/C grantees for equipment and

facilities, training and education, and infrastructure.

Many ME/C systems do not utilize up-do-date technologies that would

help in making accurate medical diagnoses. Moreover, many are unable to

make use of advances in forensic technology because of staff educational

deficiencies, untrained staff, and budget stringencies. Basic and translational

forensic pathology research are nearly nonexistent.

Homeland security is compromised because operating units related to

forensic pathology are not standardized, and the multiplicity of systems

precludes meaningful communication among units. Surveillance for bio-

terrorism and chemical terrorism is not universal, and database systems

cannot operate across jurisdictional lines to share data or manage multiple

fatality incidents.

Although steps have been taken to transform the medicolegal death

investigation system, the shortage of resources and the lack of consistent

educational and training requirements prevent investigators from taking

full advantage of tools, such as CT scans and digital X-rays, that the health

care system and other scientific disciplines offer. In addition, more rigorous

efforts are needed in the areas of accreditation and adherence to standards.

Currently, requirements for practitioners vary from an age and residency

requirement to certification by the American Board of Pathology in forensic

pathology.

Funds are needed to assess and modernize the medicolegal death

investigation system, using as a benchmark the current requirements of

NAME related to professional credentials, standards, and accreditation.

As it now stands, ME/Cs are essentially ineligible for direct federal fund-

ing and cannot receive grants from DHHS (including the National Insti-

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tutes of Health [NIH]) and the Department of Justice or DHS. The Paul

Coverdell NFSIA is the only federal grant program that names ME/Cs

as eligible for grants. However, ME/Cs must compete with public safety

agencies for Coverdell grants; as a result, the funds available to ME/Cs

have been significantly reduced. NFSIA is not funded sufficiently to pro-

vide significant improvements in ME/C systems. In addition to more direct

funding, other initiatives could be pursued to improve medicolegal death

investigation practices.

AAMC and other appropriate professional organizations might or-

ganize collaborative activities in education, training, and research to

strengthen the relationship between the medical examiner community

and its counterparts in the larger academic medical community. Medical

examiner offices with training programs affiliated with medical schools

should be encouraged to compete for funds. Funding should be available

to support pathologists who are seeking forensic fellowships. In addition,

forensic pathology fellows could apply for medical school loan forgive-

ness if they stay full time at a medical examiner’s office for a reasonable

period of time.

Additionally, the proposed National Institute of Forensic Science

(NIFS) should seek funding from Congress to allow it, CDC, and DHS,

jointly, to design programs of interest to medical examiners and medi-

cal examiner offices in national disaster planning, preparedness, and

consequence management. Uniform statewide and interstate standards

of operation would be needed to assist in the management of cross-

jurisdictional and interstate events. NIFS also might consider whether

to support a federal program underwriting the development of software

for use by ME/C systems for the management of multisite, multistate, or

multiple fatality events.

NIFS also could work with groups such as the National Conference of

Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the American Law Institute, and

NAME, in collaboration with other appropriate professional groups, to up-

date the 1954 Model Post-Mortem Examinations Act and draft legislation

for a modern model death investigation code. An improved code might, for

example, include the elements of a competent medical death investigation

system and clarify the jurisdiction of the medical examiner with respect to

organ donation. Although these ideas must be developed in greater detail

before any concrete plans can be pursued, the committee makes a number

of specific recommendations, which, if adopted, will help to modernize and

improve the medicolegal death investigation system. These recommenda-

tions deserve the immediate attention of NIFS and Congress.

MEDICAL EXAMINER AND CORONER SYSTEMS

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Recommendation 11:

To improve medicolegal death investigation:

(a)

Congress should authorize and appropriate incentive funds

to the National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) for

allocation to states and jurisdictions to establish medical

examiner systems, with the goal of replacing and eventu-

ally eliminating existing coroner systems. Funds are needed

to build regional medical examiner offices, secure neces-

sary equipment, improve administration, and ensure the

education, training, and staffing of medical examiner of-

fices. Funding could also be used to help current medical

examiner systems modernize their facilities to meet current

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention-recommended

autopsy safety requirements.

(b)

Congress should appropriate resources to the National

Institutes of Health (NIH) and NIFS, jointly, to support

research, education, and training in forensic pathology.

NIH, with NIFS participation, or NIFS in collaboration

with content experts, should establish a study section to

establish goals, to review and evaluate proposals in these

areas, and to allocate funding for collaborative research

to be conducted by medical examiner offices and medical

universities. In addition, funding, in the form of medical

student loan forgiveness and/or fellowship support, should

be made available to pathology residents who choose fo-

rensic pathology as their specialty.

(c)

NIFS, in collaboration with NIH, the National Association

of Medical Examiners, the American Board of Medicolegal

Death Investigators, and other appropriate professional

organizations, should establish a Scientific Working Group

(SWG) for forensic pathology and medicolegal death inves-

tigation. The SWG should develop and promote standards

for best practices, administration, staffing, education, train-

ing, and continuing education for competent death scene

investigation and postmortem examinations. Best practices

should include the utilization of new technologies such as

laboratory testing for the molecular basis of diseases and

the implementation of specialized imaging techniques.

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(d) All medical examiner offices should be accredited pursu-

ant to NIFS-endorsed standards within a timeframe to be

established by NIFS.

(e) All federal funding should be restricted to accredited of-

fices that meet NIFS-endorsed standards or that demon-

strate significant and measurable progress in achieving

accreditation within prescribed deadlines.

(f) All medicolegal autopsies should be performed or super-

vised by a board certified forensic pathologist. This re-

quirement should take effect within a timeframe to be

established by NIFS, following consultation with govern-

ing state institutions.

Automated Fingerprint

Identification Systems

In the late 1970s and early 1980s law enforcement agencies across

the Nation began adopting Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems

(AFIS) to improve their efficiency and reduce the amount of time it took to

identify (or not exclude) a given individual from a fingerprint or to conduct

a background investigation. AFIS introduced an enormous improvement in

the way local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies managed finger-

prints and identified people. Before the use of AFIS, the fingerprint identi-

fication process involved numerous clerks and fingerprint examiners sifting

through thousands of tediously classified and cataloged paper fingerprint

cards, while dealing with delays and challenges caused by the realities of

exchanging information with other agencies by mail, fax, or other means.

With AFIS, fingerprint examiners use computer workstations to mark the

features of a scanned fingerprint image (e.g., ridge endings, bifurcations),

encode the resulting data in a machine-readable format, and then search

for similar fingerprints in an associated database of known fingerprints and

records. AFIS searches are fast, and they often allow examiners to search

across a larger pool of candidates. Although challenging cases can be time

consuming, depending on the size of the database being searched and the

system’s workload, AFIS often can return results to the examiner within

minutes.

AFIS searches today fall into two distinct categories:

10-print searches, which typically involve comparing relatively high-

quality, professionally obtained fingerprint images—for example, prints

taken during an arrest or booking or as part of a background check—

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with fingerprint records in an agency database, such as the FBI’s Inte-

grated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) or a state’s

criminal fingerprint database; and

Latent print searches, which are considerably more complicated than

10-print searches. In a latent print search, a fingerprint examiner at-

tempts to identify an individual by comparing a full or partial latent

fingerprint from a crime scene with the records contained in an AFIS

database. Latent prints are regularly of poor quality and may be only a

partial print, and often fingerprint examiners may not even know from

which finger a given latent print came.

A third category (albeit one that includes elements of both categories

listed above) might also be called “unidentified burned, decomposed, or

fragmented prints,” which may be either a complete 10-print card to be

compared with known prints on file to confirm identity or partial prints

recovered from the skin or dermis of damaged fingers of an unknown de-

cedent to determine identity. This third category can include prints from

single individuals recovered from a small single event or victims of a mass

casualty event resulting from naturally occurring catastrophes or terrorism.

In either case, AFIS systems have reduced the time required to accomplish

many identifications from weeks to hours.

Today, the process of populating AFIS systems with records is man-

aged primarily by uploading 10-print records from police bookings and

background checks. Because images from these sources are generally of

good quality (indeed, poor-quality 10-print records are normally redone at

the time they are taken), an automated algorithm is adequate for extract-

ing the features used to index an image for retrieval. Computer algorithms

work well for performing comparisons of 10-print records (e.g., to see if

the prints taken when one applies for a security clearance match the prints

taken during a previous background check). However, submitting a latent

print for comparison is a more customized process, requiring fingerprint

examiners to mark or adjust the features manually to retrieve stored prints

with the same features in analogous places. Because latent print images

normally are not as clear or as complete as images from a 10-print card,

the image processing algorithms used for 10-prints are not as good as the

human eye in spotting features in poor images.

AFIS has been a significant improvement for the law enforcement com-

munity over the past decades, but AFIS deployments today are still far from

optimal. Many law enforcement AFIS implementations are stand-alone

systems or are part of relatively limited regional networks with shared

databases or information-sharing agreements—the Western Identification

AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS

271

Box 10-1

The Western Identification Network

WIN was formed in May 1988 to facilitate the creation of a multistate AFIS

implementation. A year later, the state legislatures of Alaska, California, Idaho,

Oregon, Nevada, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming appropriated the necessary

funding to begin work on the system.

The initial WIN AFIS was installed in Sacramento, California, with remote

subsystems in Cheyenne, Wyoming; Salt Lake City, Utah; Boise, Idaho; Carson

City, Nevada; and Salem and Portland, Oregon. Booking terminals also were

installed in numerous locations throughout these states, and existing similar

stand-alone systems in Alaska, California, and Washington were connected to

WIN in 1990 to complete the initial network. At first, WIN’s centralized automated

database included 900,000 fingerprint records, but after connecting to Alaska,

California, and Washington, the number of searchable fingerprint records in-

creased to more than 14 million. Today, WIN members have access to more than

22 million fingerprint records from the western United States.

NOTE: For information about WIN, see www.winid.org/winid/who/documents/WINService

StrategyJanuary2008.pdf.

Network (WIN) is one example of such a regional network (for more in-

formation on WIN, see Box 10-1).

Today, AFIS systems from different vendors most often cannot interop-

erate with one another. Indeed, different versions of similar systems from

the same vendor sometimes cannot share fingerprint data with one another.

In addition, many law enforcement agencies also access the FBI’s IAFIS da-

tabase¹ through an entirely separate stand-alone system—a fact that often

forces fingerprint examiners into entering fingerprint data for one search

multiple times (at least once for each system being searched).

There is no doubt that much good work has been done in recent years

aimed at improving the interoperability of AFIS implementations and da-

tabases (see Box 10-2), but the committee believes that, given the potential

benefits of more interoperable systems, the pace of these efforts to date has

been too slow, and greater progress needs to be made toward achieving

meaningful, nationwide AFIS interoperability.

¹ See www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis.htm.

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Box 10-2

Working Toward AFIS Interoperability

As early as 1986, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the

National Bureau of Standards (now known as the National Institute of Standards

and Technology, or NIST) were working on ways to facilitate the exchange of fin-

gerprint data. Their collaboration produced a standard defining minutiae data and

both low- and high-resolution fingerprint images. The standard was not successful,

however, because of conflicts with proprietary systems.

In 1993, ANSI and NIST teamed up again to create another fingerprint data

standard, a standard later updated in 1997. It defined standards for minutiae data

and low- and high-resolution fingerprint images in both binary and grayscale for-

mat, as well as methods for compressing and decompressing image data.

In the late 1990s, the International Association for Identification’s AFIS Com-

mittee successfully demonstrated a method of conducting remote fingerprint

searches across jurisdictions and across equipment from different vendors.^a

In 2003, the ANSI/NIST standard was updated again. It grew to include 16

record types in total, with the addition of standards for such things as palm print

data and latent print data.^b The standard was recently updated once more and

has subsequently been approved by ANSI’s Board of Standards Review as an

ANSI standard.^c

The NIST-sponsored Minutiae Interoperability Exchange Test (MINEX) pro-

gram is an ongoing series of coordinated development efforts aimed at improving

the performance and interoperability of fingerprint minutiae standards. In 2004,

the original project undertook to determine the feasibility of using minutiae data

(rather than image data) as the interchange medium for fingerprint information

between different fingerprint matching systems.^d

^a The committee’s final report is available at www.onin.com/iaiafis/IAI_AFIS_071998_Report.

pdf.

^b For more information on the ANSI/NIST standards, see P. Komarinski. 2005. Automated

Fingerprint Identification Systems. Boston: Elsevier Academic Press, pp. 162-166.

^c This approved revision of the ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2000 standard is now available as NIST

Special Publication 500-271: Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial, & Other

Biometric Information-Part 1 (ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007) at http://fingerprint.nist.gov/standard/

Approved-Std-20070427.pdf.

^dMore information about the work of the MINEX series is available at http://fingerprint.nist.

gov/minexII/.

INTEROPERABILITY CHALLENGES

Despite the work done to date to achieve broader AFIS interoperability

and its potential benefits (i.e., more crimes solved, quicker and more effi-

AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS

273

cient searches, and better use of limited law enforcement resources), several

persistent challenges to reaching this goal remain.

Technical Challenges

The technical challenges to AFIS interoperability involve both those

that are encountered and addressed by the information technology commu-

nity in other disciplines (such as data sharing and algorithmic performance)

and those that are specific to AFIS and the sharing of fingerprint informa-

tion (e.g., feature identification, reliability of latent print comparisons). In

addition, systems will need to be designed with the flexibility to handle

other kinds of biometric data in the future (e.g., iris and palm scans and

possibly genomic data). As these latter challenges are addressed, retrieval

algorithms within proprietary AFIS systems also may tend to converge,

which could simplify the broader interoperability challenges.

Creating useful technical standards is never a simple undertaking, es-

pecially given a diverse array of stakeholders, proprietary systems, and

ever-advancing technological capabilities (e.g., improved pattern recogni-

tion, better hardware, increased data compression). However, the successful

interoperability of other distributed information networks—such as modern

banking systems (e.g., ATM machines²), information sharing networks in

the real estate world,³ the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s

Public Health Information Network,⁴ and even the Internet itself, each of

which functions only by reliance on a number of finely crafted and agreed

standards and protocols—is proof that efforts to develop and implement

standards pay off in the end by allowing greater collaboration and sharing

of information.

One other major area of technical challenge to achieving AFIS interop-

erability involves the algorithms that systems use to identify features in fin-

gerprint images (e.g., how a system determines that a given pattern of pixels

corresponds to a true ridge ending or bifurcation and how it infers what

type of feature those pixels actually represent). To date, these algorithms

² Indeed, financial card transactions are facilitated by their own ISO standard

(ISO

8583-1:2003). For more information, see www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/

catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=31628.

³ See, e.g., the Metropolitan Regional Information System (MRIS) at www.mris.com/about/

WhoWeAre.cfm.

⁴ CDC’s Public Health Information Network is a national initiative to improve the capacity

of the public health community to use and exchange information electronically by promoting

the use of standards and defining functional and technical requirements. The network employs

a messaging system (PHINMS) to rapidly and securely share sensitive health information

among CDC and other local, state, and federal organizations over the Internet—information

such as HIV records, pandemic information, and information on bioterrorism. Complete

information about PHIN and PHINMS is available at www.cdc.gov/phin/.

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have been largely proprietary and vendor specific (i.e., different for each

type of system). In fact, experienced latent print examiners have found that

different systems will retrieve different stored prints in response to a given

input map of features, and they have learned system-specific ways of an-

notating features on a latent print in order to maximize the success of each

system’s (inferred) search algorithms. However, achieving broad-based AFIS

interoperability will require baseline standards for these algorithms, so that

fingerprint examiners can be assured of consistent feature mapping across

systems. As mentioned previously, fingerprint examiners have learned by

experience to provide different inputs to different vendors’ systems, often

purposely leaving out information—knowing that the added input will

degrade the search quality:

The examiner does not necessarily encode every point he can find in the

latent print. LPU [latent print unit] examiners have learned through ex-

perience with the IAFIS program which types of points are most likely to

yield a correct match. LPU Unit Chief Meagher told the OIG [Office of

Inspector General] that examiners are taught to avoid encoding points in

areas of high curvature ridge flow, such as the extreme core of a print. Unit

Chief Wieners and Supervisor Green told the OIG that IAFIS does not do

well when asked to search prints in which points have been encoded in

two or more clusters separated by a gap. One reason is that IAFIS gives

significant weight to the ridge count between points. If the ridge count

between two clusters of points in a latent is unclear, IAFIS may fail to

retrieve the true source of the print. Thus, an examiner will not necessar-

ily encode every point that can be seen in a latent fingerprint, but rather

may limit his encoding to points in a defined area in which the ridge count

between points is clear.⁵

The fact that today’s systems often do not effectively utilize most of the

available feature information and require substantial input from fingerprint

examiners suggests that there is significant room for improvement. An ideal,

comprehensive AFIS, for example, would be capable of automated:

• reading of latent prints;

• encoding of most features of usable quality, including those fea-

tures identified as Level 1 (fingerprint classes such as whorl, arch),

Level 2 (minutiae), Level 3 (pores, cuts), and ridge paths, together

with a provision for including other features that could be defined

by the vendor/user;

⁵ Office of the Inspector General, Oversight and Review Division, U.S. Department of Jus-

tice. 2006. A Review of the FBI’s Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case, p. 119.

AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS

275

• recognizing absent, blurred, double/multioverlap, poor-quality sec-

tions of an observed print and encoding the system to downweight,

or omit entirely, during the search process;

• recognizing any orientation information;

• conducting database searches;

• providing “best matches”; and

• collecting statistical data based on the quality of the print and

numbers/types of features.

Other technical challenges might include the development and use of

a secure Web interface (or an analogous system) that would permit autho-

rized latent print examiners in any jurisdiction to submit queries to IAFIS

and other federated AFIS databases, as well as the development of standard

procedures for maintaining AFIS databases securely, removing redundan-

cies, ensuring that fingerprint data are entered properly, and conducting

quality control and validation of searches (i.e., ensuring that queries are

actually searching an entire database). Although some of the capabilities

mentioned here are present in today’s commercially available systems, sig-

nificant improvement still can be realized.

Support from Policymakers

Given the complexity of the AFIS interoperability challenge and the

large number of players whose contributions and cooperation will be nec-

essary to meet that challenge, it is clear that no effort aimed at nation-

wide interoperability will succeed without strong, high-level support from

policymakers in federal and state government. Resources available to law

enforcement agencies for the deployment, use, and maintenance of AFIS

systems vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and the considerable

expenses associated with purchasing, maintaining, training for, operating,

and upgrading an AFIS implementation—which can easily cost millions of

dollars⁶—must be well thought out and weighed against other competing

costs and interests facing law enforcement.

The committee hopes that this report will help convince policymakers

of the benefits to nationwide interoperability and move them to provide

much-needed support to law enforcement agencies, vendors, and research-

ers to help them achieve this goal. Indeed, the committee believes that true

AFIS interoperability can be achieved in a timely manner only if policymak-

ers provide a strong, clear mandate and additional funding from federal

and state governments—both to support the research and development

⁶ See P. Komarinski. 2005. Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems. Boston: Elsevier

Academic Press, p. 145.

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STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

work necessary to achieve truly interoperable systems and to assist law

enforcement agencies in purchasing, implementing, and managing systems

and training personnel.

Vendors

As suggested above, AFIS equipment and service vendors must coop-

erate to ensure nationwide AFIS interoperability. However, to date—and

as one could reasonably expect in a technology sector in which product

differentiation and the maintenance of competitive advantages are prime

concerns—vendors have had little incentive to design their systems to en-

able them to share information with competitors’ systems. The committee

believes that increased cooperation among AFIS vendors is a key to achiev-

ing meaningful interoperability. For example, one can imagine how it might

prove useful if AFIS vendors could collaborate (perhaps through work

facilitated by the proposed National Institute of Forensic Science [NIFS])

on developing standard (or baseline) retrieval algorithms. Such a step con-

ceivably could make it less time consuming for fingerprint examiners to run

searches on many different systems because they would not have to manu-

ally tune their searches to work on the systems of different vendors.

Administrative, Legal, and Policy Issues

As noted earlier, most AFIS implementations are either stand-alone

systems or are part of relatively limited regional databases. To achieve

truly interoperable systems, jurisdictions must work more closely together

to craft acceptable agreements and policies to govern the routine sharing

of fingerprint information. NIFS can facilitate the development of standard

agreements along these lines, which could include issues such as the extent

of system access to other jurisdictions, the management of search priorities,

and the recovery of costs associated with processing the requests from out-

side agencies. In addition, many jurisdictions also might want assurances

that they will not be held responsible for any possible misuse of fingerprint

information that is provided to other law enforcement agencies.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

Great improvement is possible with respect to AFIS interoperability.

Many crimes no doubt go unsolved today simply because investigating

agencies cannot search across all the individual databases that might hold

a suspect’s fingerprints or contain a match for an unidentified latent print

from a crime scene. It is possible that some perpetrators have gone free

because of the limitations on fingerprint searches.

AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS

277

The committee believes that, in addition to the technical challenges

noted above, a number of other critical obstacles to achieving nationwide

AFIS interoperability exist involving issues of practical implementation.

These include (1) convincing federal and state policymakers to mandate

nationwide AFIS interoperability; (2) persuading AFIS equipment vendors

to cooperate and collaborate with the law enforcement community and re-

searchers to create and use baseline standards for sharing fingerprint image

and minutiae data and interfaces that support all searches; (3) providing

law enforcement agencies with the resources necessary to develop interoper-

able AFIS implementations; and (4) coordinating jurisdictional agreements

and public policies that would allow law enforcement agencies to share

fingerprint data more broadly.

Given the disparity in resources and information technology expertise

available to local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, the relatively

slow pace of interoperability efforts to date, and the potential gains that

would accrue from increased AFIS interoperability, the committee believes

that a new emphasis on achieving nationwide fingerprint data interoper-

ability is needed.

Recommendation 12:

Congress should authorize and appropriate funds for the National

Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) to launch a new broad-based

effort to achieve nationwide fingerprint data interoperability. To

that end, NIFS should convene a task force comprising relevant

experts from the National Institute of Standards and Technology

and the major law enforcement agencies (including representatives

from the local, state, federal, and, perhaps, international levels) and

industry, as appropriate, to develop:

(a) standards for representing and communicating image and

minutiae data among Automated Fingerprint Identifica-

tion Systems. Common data standards would facilitate

the sharing of fingerprint data among law enforcement

agencies at the local, state, federal, and even international

levels, which could result in more solved crimes, fewer

wrongful identifications, and greater efficiency with respect

to fingerprint searches; and

(b) baseline standards—to be used with computer algorithms—

to map, record, and recognize features in fingerprint

images, and a research agenda for the continued improve-

ment, refinement, and characterization of the accuracy of

these algorithms (including quantification of error rates).

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STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

These steps toward AFIS interoperability must be accompanied by the

provision of federal, state, and local funds to support jurisdictions in up-

grading, operating, and ensuring the integrity and security of their systems;

the retraining of current staff; and the training of new fingerprint examiners

to gain the desired benefits of true interoperability. Additionally, greater

scientific benefits can be realized through the availability of fingerprint

data or databases for research purposes (using, of course, all the modern

security and privacy protections available to scientists when working with

such data). Once created, NIFS might also be tasked with the maintenance

and periodic review of the new standards and procedures.

Homeland Security and the

Forensic Science Disciplines

In its charge to the committee, Congress raised the question of the role

of forensic science in homeland security. The committee recognized that, to

address this issue thoroughly, it would need additional expertise and more

time to fully undertake an analysis of the role that forensic science currently

plays and could possibly play in the future. Such an analysis would require

serious study of the current configuration of the Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) and its relationships with the forensic science community,

law enforcement, and national security. Indeed, as the committee began to

explore this issue it became clear that the question of the role of forensic

science in homeland security is a study unto itself. Not wanting to ignore

this issue, the committee limited its analysis to the presentations made to

the committee and the expertise of its membership. Consequently, this

chapter should be viewed as a first step in addressing the role of forensic

science in homeland security.

The development and application of the forensic science disciplines to

support intelligence, investigations, and operations aimed at the prevention,

interdiction, disruption, attribution, and prosecution of terrorism has been

an important component of what is now termed “homeland security” for

at least two decades. Major terrorist bombings in the United States and

abroad in the 1980s and 1990s influenced the U.S. government to enhance

federal investigative and forensic science entities to be able to respond

more effectively. For example, forensic science played an important role in

investigating the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 (1988), the first bombing

of the World Trade Center in New York City (1993), the Oklahoma City

bombing (1995), the suspected attack or sabotage of Trans World Airline

279

280

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

Flight 800 (1996), the bombing of the USS Cole (2000), and the bombings

of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998). And even though the

identification of the Unabomber (1996) occurred as a result of the coop-

eration of his brother with the authorities, the forensic evidence against

Theodore Kaczynski was substantial and crucial to the case.

The nature of homeland security requires the integration of forensic

science into the investigative process much earlier than is the case for

criminal justice. That is, for homeland security, forensic science plays not

only its traditional role of inferring what happened at a crime scene and

who was involved, but also contributes more intensively to generating in-

vestigative leads and testing, directing, or redirecting lines of investigation.

In this role, forensic science contributes to the gathering of effective and

timely intelligence and investigative information on terrorists and terrorist

groups. This requires both traditional forensic science tools and enhanced

and specialized forensic analysis and information sharing—new tools that

are being developed primarily by the intelligence and defense communities

in the United States, with each community tailoring the new tools to its

specialized needs and missions.

The intelligence and investigative capabilities thus build on a founda-

tion of traditional forensic science expertise that exists in the military and

the FBI. The Department of Defense (DOD), for example, includes the

U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory, which, with its 137-member

staff, carries out criminal investigations. It also conducts research activi-

ties to develop specialized techniques needed by the military. Some of the

nontraditional forensic science capabilities available within that laboratory

include methods suited to intelligence gathering and counter-intelligence

and the ability to make inferences about foreign language documents. Plans

for the future include developing capabilities such as increased integration

of biometrics (used for security) and forensic science and improved accident

investigation and reconstruction.¹

Other DOD forensic science capabilities are found in the Armed Forces

Institute of Pathology (with a staff of 25), the Cyber Crime Center (with

a staff of approximately 190), the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command

Central Identification Laboratory (more than 46 staff members), and the

Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory (with staff of approximately

138).² The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command Central Identification

Laboratory bills itself as the largest forensic anthropology laboratory in

the world.³ Also contributing to DOD’s forensic science capabilities is its

¹ L.C. Chelko, Director, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory. “Department of

Defense Forensic Capabilities.” Presentation to the committee. September 21, 2007.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

HOMELAND SECURITY

281

Biometrics Task Force, which leads in the development and implementa-

tion of biometric technologies for combatant commands, military services,

and other DOD agencies.⁴ The DOD forensic science capabilities are not

centrally managed.⁵

DOD has a particular interest in DNA identification, both of its own

people and of enemies. The department has a repository of five million

DNA samples, primarily from military service members, intended mostly

for casualty identification. DOD also pools data with intelligence and law

enforcement programs to build and maintain the Joint Federal Agencies

Intelligence DNA Database, a searchable database of DNA profiles from

detainees and known or suspected terrorists.⁶

The DOD forensic science laboratories are relatively well resourced,

according to the Director of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Labora-

tory, and DOD personnel are active in professional forensic science organi-

zations, national certification/accreditation bodies, and national scientific

working groups. Of particular note is that all of DOD’s institutional labo-

ratories are nationally accredited,⁷ unlike many civilian law enforcement

laboratories.

An example of federal efforts to develop forensic science methods of

importance to homeland security is the relatively new National Biodefense

Forensic Analysis Center, established by DHS in 2004. The center’s mis-

sion is to provide a national capability to conduct and coordinate forensic

analyses of evidence from biocrime and bioterror investigations. It is sup-

ported by DHS research to fill short- and long-term capabilities gaps, but

the center itself is devoted to actual casework. Before its establishment, the

Nation had no dedicated biocontainment laboratories, staff, or equipment

to conduct bioforensic analysis. It had no methods to enable the handling

of biothreat agent powders, no methods to support traditional forensic

analyses of evidence contaminated with a biothreat agent, and no place in

which to receive large quantities or large pieces of evidence contaminated

with a biothreat agent. There were no established methods for handling

evidence and conducting analysis, no quality guidelines or peer review of

methodologies, and no central coordination for bioforensic analyses. These

gaps became very apparent during the Nation’s response to the anthrax

attacks of 2001.⁸

⁴ T. Cantwell, Senior Forensic Analyst, Biometric Task Force and Leader, Forensic Integrated

Product Team, Department of Defense, “Latent Print Analysis.” Presentation to the commit-

tee. December 6, 2007.

⁵ Chelko, op. cit.

⁶ Ibid.

Ibid.

⁸ J. Burans, Director, National Bioforensics Analysis Center. “The National Biodefense Anal-

ysis and Countermeasures Center.” Presentation to the Committee. September 21, 2007.

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STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

Bioforensics, which is sometimes referred to as microbial forensics, or

as forensic microbiology, is a developing interdisciplinary field of microbi-

ology devoted to the development, assessment, and validation of methods

for fully characterizing microbial samples for the ultimate purpose of high-

confidence comparative analyses. It supports attribution investigations in-

volving pathogens or toxins of biological origin used in a biological attack.

The bioforensics toolkit includes diagnostic assay systems that can identify

infectious agents rapidly, as well as organic and inorganic analytical chem-

istry, electron microscopy, and genetic engineering. Much of the work must

be conducted according to stringent safety and containment protocols, and

dedicated laboratories are now under construction. The center’s capabilities

enable the identification and/or characterization of biological threats, physi-

cal and chemical analyses, and the generation of data that can help in inves-

tigations and ultimate attribution. In addition to conducting casework, the

center aims to develop and evaluate assays for high-consequence biological

agents that threaten humans, animals, and plants, achieve accreditation for

bioforensic casework and then continue to expand the scope of accredita-

tion for newly established capabilities, and establish and maintain reference

collections of biological agents for comparative forensic identifications.⁹

Another component of forensic science for homeland security is found

in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which coordinates

the various elements of the intelligence community. Within that office is a

National Counterproliferation Center that also carries out work in biofo-

rensics.¹⁰ The considerable threat of the acquisition, development, and use

of weapons of mass destruction (WMD; chemical, biological, radiological,

and nuclear weapons) has led U.S. government agencies to develop new

forensic science capabilities. In 1996, this development was begun with the

establishment of a specialized forensic hazardous materials unit in the FBI

Laboratory, which came at a time of greater awareness of and concern over

WMD in the hands of terrorists and in preparing for the 1996 Olympic

Games in Atlanta. Interest and investment in this type of capability has

diversified and expanded since that time in the FBI as well as in DOD, the

Department of Energy, the Intelligence Community, and DHS. The pro-

grams described above are visible evidence of the government’s commitment

to forensic science and infrastructure as integral components of homeland

security. At the time of this writing, the importance of forensic science and

its potential for improving the attribution of WMD are also active topics

in discussions internationally.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ C.L. Cooke Jr., Office of the Deputy Director for Strategy & Evaluation, National Coun-

terproliferation Center. “Microbial Forensics: Gaps, Opportunities and Issues.” Presentation

to the committee. September 21, 2007.

HOMELAND SECURITY

283

The traditional U.S. forensic science community generally has not been

included directly in planning, preparedness, resourcing, response, training,

and the exercising of large-scale or specialized forensic science capabilities

for terrorism and homeland security, although the FBI Laboratory provides

a link between homeland security applications of forensic science and tradi-

tional uses in criminal justice. One reason for this segmentation is that the

traditional community has heavy commitments to day-to-day law enforce-

ment requirements, timelines, and backlogs. Also, many of the homeland

security applications of forensic science require specialized expertise and

infrastructure that are not widespread, and they might require access to

information that is protected by security classification. Although major

metropolitan law enforcement agencies and forensic laboratories, such as

those in New York City and Los Angeles, have developed some specialized

tactical capacities of these types, most of the U.S. forensic science enterprise

does not and will not legitimately invest in such capacities and will rely

instead on agencies such as the FBI and those who are part of the FBI-led

Joint Terrorism Task Forces¹¹ in some 100 U.S. cities.

For the most part, the specialized capacities and capabilities needed for

homeland security are not warranted for most civilian forensic science labo-

ratories and medical examiner offices, although there are exceptions, and

some of the skills embodied in these new forensic efforts may have direct

applicability to traditional forensic science disciplines. However, the skills

embodied within the traditional forensic science and medical examiners

communities are potentially an important asset for assisting in homeland

security. The geographic dispersion of those communities is an additional

asset, because a security event or natural disaster can occur anywhere,

beyond the quick reach of specialized federal capabilities. In addition, to

the extent that members of the forensic science and medical examiners

communities might respond to WMD attacks before specialized experts

can, it is important to train those local responders sufficiently so that they

can properly preserve critical evidence while protecting themselves from

harmful exposure. More generally, there would be value in strengthening

the links between civil forensic scientists and those affiliated with DOD and

DHS, so that all sectors can pool their knowledge.

The medical examiner community, in particular, could be viewed as a

geographically distributed and rapidly deployable “corps” that can aug-

ment federal experts in efforts to monitor emerging public health threats or

respond to catastrophes. When a catastrophic event takes place, whether it

is the result of nature or terrorism, a large contingent of medical examin-

¹¹ Protecting America Against Terrorist Attack: A Closer Look at the FBI’s Joint Terror-

ism Task Forces. Federal Bureau of Investigation. December 2004. Available at www.fbi.

gov/page2/dec04/jttf120114.htm.

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ers is sometimes needed on short notice. Yet medical examiners have not

been appropriately funded or trained in the management of mass fatality

incidents. (See Chapter 9 for a more complete discussion of the medical

examiner’s role in homeland security.) Plans and policies must be developed

that enable this contingent use of medical examiners.

In written input to the committee, Barry A.J. Fisher, Director of the

Scientific Services Bureau of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department,

stated the needs and opportunities as follows:

[C]onsider a situation where there are multiple events in the US and

aboard occurring simultaneously. Resources could be stretched to the

breaking point, not to mention the concept of surge capacity. There is not

an unlimited supply of forensic scientists available to the FBI. But there

are probably 5,000+ public forensic scientists at State and local crime labs

who could be enlisted to help. Some jurisdictions have plans in place to use

local talent. Others do not. It varies from region to region.

Forensic scientists are often called to crime scenes to assist in the collection

of evidence. Yet few would recognize that they were looking at a potential

improvised explosive lab. There is little training available at the national

level. Much of the information is classified. State and local forensic sci-

entists have no need for security clearances but often go through law en-

forcement background checks. This creates a classic ‘Catch 22’ situation.

State and local forensic personnel can’t be given classified information to

recognize terrorist devices which they might be able to disable before they

and others are injured.

The identification of victims in mass casualties is another area where

State and local forensic labs could play a part. (They could, for example,

provide fingerprint identification services.) While few labs have the capac-

ity to mount a major DNA testing effort, personnel are knowledgeable

in evidence collection and can assist in such efforts. Again there are no

consistent plans for using local or regional resources.

Medical examiners and coroners use a system of volunteers called D-MORT

(Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team) to assist in mass casualty

events whether natural or caused by terrorist incidents. A similar program

could be considered to enlist State and local forensic scientist to assist in

major incident situations.¹²

This chapter illustrates the overlap between the capabilities of forensic

science and the needs of homeland security, but ideally, the forensic science

community and homeland security communities should be more integrated

with better communication. However, the committee limited its recom-

¹² B.A.J. Fisher. June 12, 2007. “Contemporary Issues in Forensic Science,” unpublished

paper submitted to the committee.

HOMELAND SECURITY

285

mendations on this matter because it recognized two critical factors: (1)

the forensic science system is in need of a major overhaul (see Chapters 2

through 8), and until these issues are addressed it makes little sense to ex-

pand the efforts of state and local forensic scientists into homeland security

operations and (2) many issues that would arise from such integration (e.g.,

federal jurisdiction, national security issues, restrictions on sharing of infor-

mation) go beyond the charge and principal focus of the committee.¹³

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION

Good forensic science and medical examiner practices are of clear

value from a homeland security perspective because of their roles in bring-

ing criminals to justice and in dealing with the effects of natural and hu-

man-made mass disasters. Forensic science techniques (e.g., the evaluation

of DNA fragments) enable the thorough investigations of crime scenes.

Routine and trustworthy collection of digital evidence, and improved tech-

niques and timeliness for its analysis, can be of great potential value in iden-

tifying terrorist activity. Therefore, a strong and reliable forensic science

community is needed to maintain homeland security. However, to capitalize

on this potential, the forensic science and medical examiner communities

must be well interfaced with homeland security efforts, so that they can

contribute when needed. To be successful, this interface will require: (1)

the establishment of good working relationships among federal, state, and

local jurisdictions; (2) the creation of strong security programs to protect

data transmittals across jurisdictions; (3) the development of additional

training for forensic scientists and crime scene investigators; and (4) the

promulgation of contingency plans that will promote efficient team efforts

on demand. Although policy issues relating to the enforcement of homeland

security are beyond the scope of this report, it is clear that improvements

in the forensic science community and the medical examiner system could

greatly enhance the capabilities of homeland security.

Recommendation 13:

Congress should provide funding to the National Institute of Fo-

rensic Science (NIFS) to prepare, in conjunction with the Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, forensic scientists and crime scene investigators for

their potential roles in managing and analyzing evidence from

¹³ See Institute of Medicine. 2008. Research Priorities in Emergency Preparedness and

Response for Public Health Systems and workshop summaries of the Disasters Roundtable,

dels.nas.edu/dr/

Appendix A

Biographical Information of

Committee and Staff

Harry T. Edwards (Co-chair) was appointed to the United States Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by President Carter in 1980.

He served as Chief Judge from September 15, 1994, until July 16, 2001.

Judge Edwards graduated from Cornell University, B.S., 1962, and the

University of Michigan Law School, J.D., 1965, with distinction and hon-

ors. He was a member of the Michigan Law Review and was elected to the

Order of the Coif. Before joining the bench, Judge Edwards practiced law

in Chicago from 1965 to 1970. Between 1970 and 1980, he was a tenured

Professor of Law at the University of Michigan and at Harvard Law School.

He also served as Visiting Professor at the University of Brussels and as

a member of the faculty at the Institute for Educational Management at

Harvard University. Since joining the bench, he has taught at numerous law

schools, including Duke, Georgetown, Harvard, Pennsylvania, Michigan,

and New York University, where he has been a member of the faculty since

1990. Judge Edwards is currently a Visiting Professor of Law at the New

York University School of Law. During his years as Chief Judge of the D.C.

Circuit, Judge Edwards directed numerous automation initiatives at the

Court of Appeals; oversaw a complete reorganization of the Clerk’s Office;

implemented case management programs that helped to cut the court’s case

backlog and reduce case disposition times; successfully pursued congres-

sional support for the construction of the William B. Bryant Annex to the

E. Barrett Prettyman U.S. Courthouse; presided over the court’s hearings

in United States v. Microsoft; established programs to enhance communi-

cations with the lawyers who practice before the court; and received high

praise from members of the bench, bar, and press for fostering collegial

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APPENDIX A

relations among the members of the court. Judge Edwards’ many positions

have included Chairman of the Board of Directors of AMTRAK; member

of the Board of Directors of the National Institute for Dispute Resolution;

member of the Executive Committee of the Order of the Coif; member of

the Executive Committee of the Association of American Law Schools, and

Chairman of the Minority Groups Section; Vice President of the National

Academy of Arbitrators; and member of the President’s National Commis-

sion on International Women’s Year. He also has received many awards for

outstanding service to the legal profession and numerous Honorary Doctor

of Laws degrees. Judge Edwards is a member of the American Law Insti-

tute; the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; the American Judicature

Society; the American Bar Foundation; the American Bar Association; and

the Supreme Court Historical Society. He is director/mentor at the Unique

Learning Center in Washington, D.C., a volunteer program to assist dis-

advantaged inner city youth. Judge Edwards is the coauthor of five books.

His most recent book, coauthored by Linda A. Elliot, Federal Courts—

Standards of Review: Appellate Court Review of District Court Decisions

and Agency Actions, was published in 2007. He has also published scores

of law review articles dealing with labor law, equal employment opportu-

nity, labor arbitration, higher education law, alternative dispute resolution,

federalism, judicial process, comparative law, legal ethics, judicial admin-

istration, legal education, and professionalism. One of his most significant

publications, “The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the

Legal Profession,” published in the Michigan Law Review in 1992, has

been the source of extensive comment, discussion, and debate among legal

scholars and practitioners in the United States and abroad.

Constantine Gatsonis (Co-chair) is Professor of Biostatistics at Brown Uni-

versity and the founding Director of the Center for Statistical Sciences. He

is a leading authority on statistical methods for the evaluation of diagnostic

tests and biomarkers and has extensive involvement in research in Bayesian

biostatistics, meta-analysis, and statistical methods for health services and

outcome research. He is Network Statistician of the American College of

Radiology Imaging Network, a National Cancer Institute-funded national

collaborative group conducting multicenter studies of imaging in cancer

diagnosis and therapy. Dr. Gatsonis has served on numerous review and

advisory panels, including the Immunization Safety Review Committee of

IOM, the Committee on Applied and Theoretical Statistics of NAS, pan-

els of the Center for Devices and Radiological Health of U.S. Food and

Drug Administration, the HSDG Study Section of the Agency for Health

Care Policy Research, the Commission of Technology Assessment of the

American College of Radiology, the Data Safety and Monitoring Boards

for the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke and the

APPENDIX A

289

U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, and several National Institutes of

Health grant review panels. He is co-convener of the Screening and Diag-

nostic Tests Methods Working Group of the Cochrane Collaboration and

a member of the steering group of the Cochrane Diagnostic Reviews initia-

tive to develop systematic reviews of diagnostic accuracy for the Cochrane

Library. Dr. Gatsonis is the founding editor-in-chief of Health Services and

Outcomes Research Methodology and serves as Associate Editor of the An-

nals of Applied Statistics, Clinical Trials and Bayesian Analysis. Previous

editorial positions include membership of the editorial board of Statistics

in Medicine, Medical Decision Making, and Academic Radiology. He was

elected fellow of the American Statistical Association and the Association

for Health Services Research.

Margaret A. Berger received her A.B. from Radcliffe College and her J.D.

from Columbia University School of Law. She is widely recognized as one

of the nation’s leading authorities on scientific evidentiary issues and is a

frequent lecturer across the country on these topics. Professor Berger is

the recipient of the Francis Rawle Award for outstanding contribution to

the field of postadmission legal education by the American Law Institute/

American Bar Association for her role in developing new approaches to

judicial treatment of scientific evidence and in educating legal and science

communities about ways in which to implement these approaches. Professor

Berger served as the Reporter for the Working Group on Post-Conviction

Issues for the National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence. She

has been called on as a consultant to the Carnegie Commission on Sci-

ence, Technology, and Government and has served as the Reporter to the

Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence. She is the author of

numerous amicus briefs, including the brief for the Carnegie Commission

on the admissibility of scientific evidence in the landmark case of Daubert

v. Merrell Pharmaceutical, Inc. She also has contributed chapters to both

editions of the Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual on Scientific Evi-

dence (1994, 2000). Professor Berger has been a member of the Brooklyn

Law School faculty since 1973. She has served on the following National

Academies committees: the Committee on Tagging Smokeless and Black

Powder; the Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science: An Up-

date; and the IOM Committee on Evaluation of the Presumptive Disability

Decision-Making Process for Veterans. She currently serves as a member

of the National Academies Committee on Science, Technology, and Law,

on the Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, and on the

Committee on Ensuring the Utility and the Integrity of Research Data.

Joe S. Cecil is a Senior Research Associate and Project Director in the Divi-

sion of Research at the Federal Judicial Center. Currently, he is directing

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the center’s Program on Scientific and Technical Evidence. As part of this

program, he serves as principal editor of the Center’s Reference Manual

on Scientific Evidence. He has published several articles on the use of

court-appointed experts and is currently examining changes in summary

judgment practice in federal district courts over the past 30 years. Dr. Cecil

received his J.D. and a Ph.D. in psychology from Northwestern University.

He serves on the editorial boards of social science and legal journals. He

has served as a member of several panels of NAS, and currently is serving

as a member of the National Academies Committee on Science, Technology,

and Law. Other areas of research interest include federal civil and appellate

procedure, jury competence in complex civil litigation, claim construction

in patent litigation, and judicial governance.

M. Bonner Denton is a Professor of Chemistry and a Professor of Geo

sciences at the University of Arizona. He received his B.S. and B.A. in 1967

from Lamar State College of Technology. In 1972, he received his Ph.D.

from the University of Illinois. He is the recipient of the American Chemi-

cal Society Division of Analytical Chemistry Award in Spectrochemical

Analysis, 2001; the Pittsburgh Spectroscopy Award, 1998; the University

of Arizona Excellence in Teaching Award, 1993; and the SAS Lester Strock

Award, 1991. Dr. Denton has served as the editor of four texts on scientific

optical imaging and has authored more than 190 peer-reviewed manu-

scripts. He has served as President of the Society of Applied Spectroscopy;

Chair of the Analytical Division of the American Chemical Society; a Gali-

leo Fellow, College of Science, University of Arizona, 2004; Fellow, Royal

Society of Chemistry, 2004; Fellow, Society for Applied Spectroscopy, 2006;

and Fellow, National Association of the Advancement of Science, 2006. His

research interests include analytical instrumentation and spectroscopy and

mass spectrometry.

Marcella F. Fierro served as Chief Medical Examiner for the Common-

wealth of Virginia, and Professor of Pathology and Professor and Chair of

the Department of Legal Medicine at Virginia Commonwealth University

from 1994 to 2008. Dr. Fierro oversaw the medical examiner investi-

gations of all violent, suspicious, and unnatural deaths in Virginia. She

teaches forensic pathology to medical schools, law students, law enforce-

ment agencies, the Commonwealth’s attorneys, and other interested groups.

She received a B.A. in biology cum laude from D’Youville College, Buffalo,

New York, and earned her M.D. from the State University of New York

at Buffalo School of Medicine. She completed residency training in pathol-

ogy at the Cleveland Clinic and the Medical College of Virginia, Virginia

Commonwealth University. She was a fellow in forensic pathology and

legal medicine at Virginia Commonwealth University and the Office of the

APPENDIX A

291

Chief Medical Examiner in Richmond, Virginia. Dr. Fierro is certified by the

American Board of Pathology in anatomical, clinical, and forensic pathol-

ogy. After serving as Deputy Chief Medical Examiner for Central Virginia

for 17 years, Dr. Fierro accepted a position as Professor of Pathology at

East Carolina University School of Medicine, where she served as a Profes-

sor of Pathology in the division of forensic pathology and taught general

and forensic pathology until she returned to Virginia in 1994 as Chief. Dr.

Fierro has been active in professional organizations as a member of the

Forensic Pathology Council of the American Society of Clinical Pathologists

and Chair of the Forensic Pathology Committee of the College of American

Pathologists. She is past president of the National Association of Medical

Examiners and served on the board of directors and the executive committee

of that organization and currently serves on several committees. Dr. Fierro

is a Fellow of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, was a member

of the Forensic Science Board for the Commonwealth, and has served as a

consultant to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the National Crime

Information Center Unidentified and Missing Persons Files and on federal

panels and committees that are developing best practices in mass fatality

management. Dr. Fierro has been active in the legislative process, serving

as a resource and advocate in Virginia for matters related to forensic and

medical examiner issues. Recent activities include establishing child and

maternal mortality review teams and the National Violent Death Reporting

System and Family and Interpersonal Violence surveillance programs for

Virginia. Dr. Fierro has published in professional journals, edited a text-

book, contributed chapters to several books, and presented at international

meetings. Dr. Fierro served as a reviewer for the American Journal of Fo-

rensic Medicine and Pathology. She received Virginia’s Public Health Hero

Award and the National Association of Medical Examiners Service award,

and she was elected to Alpha Omega Alpha as a distinguished alumna of

the School of Medicine, State University of New York at Buffalo.

Karen Kafadar is Rudy Professor of Statistics and Physics at Indiana Uni-

versity. She received her B.S. and M.S. degrees from Stanford and her

Ph.D. in statistics from Princeton under John Tukey. Her research focuses

on exploratory data analysis, robust methods, characterization of uncer-

tainty in quantitative studies, and analysis of experimental data in the

physical, chemical, biological, and engineering sciences. Previously, she

was Professor and Chancellor’s Scholar in the Departments of Mathemati-

cal Sciences and Preventive Medicine & Biometrics at the University of

Colorado-Denver; Fellow at the National Cancer Institute (Cancer Screen-

ing section); and Mathematical Statistician at Hewlett Packard Company

(R&D laboratory for RF/Microwave test equipment) and at the National

Institute of Standards and Technology (where she continues as Guest Fac-

292

APPENDIX A

ulty Visitor on problems of measurement accuracy, experimental design,

and data analysis). Previous engagements include consultancies in industry

and government, as well as visiting appointments at the University of Bath,

Virginia Tech, and Iowa State University. She has served on previous NRC

committees and also on the editorial review boards for several professional

journals as editor or associate editor and on the governing boards for the

American Statistical Association, the Institute of Mathematical Statistics,

and the International Statistical Institute. She is an Elected Fellow of the

American Statistical Association and the International Statistical Institute,

and she has authored more than 80 journal articles and book chapters and

has advised numerous M.S. and Ph.D. students.

Peter M. Marone is the Executive Director of the Virginia Department of

Forensic Sciences. He joined the department in 1978 and served as Central

Laboratory Director from 1998 until 2005, when he was named Director of

Technical Services. Mr. Marone began his forensic career at the Allegheny

County Crime Laboratory in 1971 and remained in Pittsburgh until 1978.

Mr. Marone is a member of the American Society of Crime Laboratory

Directors (ASCLD), the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, the Mid-

Atlantic Association of Forensic Scientists, and the International Associa-

tion for Chemical Testing and the Forensic Science Society. He has served

on the ASCLD’s DNA Credential Review Committee (for DNA) and was

Co-chair of the Undergraduate Curriculum Committee of the Technical

Working Group for Forensic Science Training and Education. He is a past

chair of the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors Laboratory

Accreditation Board, a member of the Forensic Education Program Accredi-

tation Commission for the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, and

the chair of the Board of Directors of the Consortium of Forensic Science

Organizations. Mr. Marone received his B.S. and M.S. in chemistry from

the University of Pittsburgh.

Geoffrey S. Mearns is the Dean of the Cleveland-Marshall College of

Law at Cleveland State University. Before his appointment in July 2005,

Dean Mearns was a practicing lawyer. His practice focused on federal

criminal investigations and prosecutions and complex commercial litiga-

tion. While in private practice, he was also actively involved in pro bono

work. Before commencing private practice in 1998, Dean Mearns had a

distinguished nine-year career as a prosecutor with the U.S. Department of

Justice. During his tenure with the Justice Department, he was an Assistant

United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, where he was

Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. In that position,

he was responsible for investigating, prosecuting, and supervising cases

against members and associates of organized crime families charged with

APPENDIX A

293

racketeering, murder, extortion, bribery, and obstruction of justice. Dean

Mearns also was the First Assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern

District of North Carolina. From 1997 to 1998, as Special Assistant to the

United States Attorney General, he participated in the prosecution of Terry

Nichols, one of two men convicted for bombing the Oklahoma City Fed-

eral Building. Dean Mearns received his undergraduate degree from Yale

University in 1981, and he received his law degree from the University of

Virginia in 1987. After graduating from law school, he clerked for the Hon-

orable Boyce F. Martin, Jr., of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit. Dean Mearns has been active in professional and community

service. Among other activities, he was twice Chair of the Merit Selection

Committee on Bankruptcy Judgeships for the Northern District of Ohio;

he was Chair of the Merit Selection Committee on United States Magis-

trate Judgeship for the Northern District of Ohio; and he was Chair of the

Board of Trustees of Applewood Centers, Inc. He is a trustee of Wingspan

Care Group, Inc., of the Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, and of

the Sisters of Charity Foundation of Cleveland. Dean Mearns has been an

adjunct professor at Case Western Reserve University School of Law and

New York Law School. He has published articles on criminal litigation, and

he is a frequent speaker and commentator on various criminal law issues,

including counterterrorism.

Randall S. Murch is the Associate Director, Research Program Develop-

ment, Research Division, National Capital Region, Virginia Tech. He holds

Adjunct Professorships in the School of Public and International Affairs,

College of Architecture and Urban Studies, and the Department of Plant

Pathology, College of Agriculture and Life Sciences. He is also a Visit-

ing Professor, Department of War Studies, King’s College London, United

Kingdom. Dr. Murch received his B.S. in biology from the University of

Puget Sound, Tacoma, Washington, his M.S. in botanical sciences from the

University of Hawaii in 1976, and his Ph.D. in plant pathology from the

University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign in 1979. He has extensive strat-

egy, analysis, and leadership experience in the design, development, and

implementation of advanced forensic capabilities for intelligence, counter-

terrorism. and other national security applications and purposes. Following

brief service in the U.S. Army Reserve, Dr. Murch’s first career was with the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), where he was a Special Agent. He

was assigned to the Indianapolis and Los Angeles Field Offices, where he

performed counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and other investigations.

During his career, Dr. Murch was assigned to the FBI Laboratory as a fo-

rensic biologist, research scientist, department head, and deputy director,

at various times. Interdispersed with his Laboratory assignments were four

assignments in the bureau’s technical investigative program: as a program

294

APPENDIX A

manager for complex operations planning, Intelligence Division; unit chief

for a technology development and deployment group, Technical Services

Division; squad supervisor, New York Field Office; and Deputy Director,

Investigative Technology Division (formally Technical Services Division).

Between his last Laboratory assignment and his last technical investiga-

tive program assignment, he was detailed to the Defense Threat Reduction

Agency, Department of Defense, where he was the director of the Advanced

Systems and Concepts Office and led advanced studies on complex current

and future challenges dealing with weapons of mass destruction. He cre-

ated the FBI’s WMD forensic investigative program, served as the Bureau’s

science advisor to the 1996 Olympic Games, led forensic investigative as-

pects of a number of major terrorism cases, and initiated a number of new

programs for both the FBI Laboratory and technical investigative program.

In 1996, Dr. Murch created the FBI’s Hazardous Materials Response Unit,

the Nation’s focal point for the forensic investigation of WMD threats,

events and hoaxes. Throughout his FBI career, he also was involved with

extensive liaison at the national and international levels in furthering sci-

ence and technology for law enforcement, counterterrorism, and national

security purposes. Dr. Murch retired from the FBI in November 2002, after

nearly 23 years of service. From December 2002 through December 2004,

Dr. Murch was employed as a Research Staff Member, Institute for Defense

Analyses, a leading Federally Funded Research and Development Center,

where he led and participated in studies for the defense, intelligence, and

homeland security communities. He is still an adjunct staff member at the

institute. He joined Virginia Tech in December 2004, where he now works

in the areas of life science research program development, systems biology,

microbial systems biology, microbial forensics, and biosecurity and uni-

versity strategic planning. He has served or still serves on several advisory

boards, including the Board of Life Sciences, NRC; the Defense Threat

Reduction Agency’s Threat Reduction Advisory Committee; the Defense

Intelligence Agency’s BioChem 2020; the FBI’s Scientific Working Group on

Microbial Genomics and Forensics, and a new standing committee of NAS

for the Department of Homeland Security’s National Biodefence Analysis

and Countermeasures Center. He has also been a member of or advised

study committees of NRC, NAS, IOM, the Defense Science Board, and the

Threat Reduction Advisory Committee. Dr. Murch has been a member of

the American Academy of Forensic Sciences and the American Society of

Crime Laboratory Directors; has served on the Board of Directors, Ameri-

can Society of Crime Laboratory Directors; and has been a member of the

National Institute of Justice DNA Proficiency Testing Panel. He also served

as the Designated Federal Employee on the DNA Advisory Board.

APPENDIX A

295

Channing Robertson received his in B.S. in chemical engineering from the

University of California, Berkeley; his M.S. in chemical engineering from

Stanford University; and his Ph.D. in chemical engineering, with an empha-

sis on fluid mechanics and transport phenomena, from Stanford University.

Professor Robertson began his career at the Denver Research Center of the

Marathon Oil Company and worked in the areas of enhanced oil recovery,

geophysical chemistry, and polyurethane chemistry. Since 1970, he has been

on the faculty of Stanford’s Department of Chemical Engineering and has

educated and trained more 40 doctoral students, holds 7 patents, and has

published more than 140 articles. He is Director of the Stanford-National

Institutes of Health Graduate Training Program in Biotechnology. He was

Co-director of the Stanford initiative in biotechnology known as BioX,

which in part includes the Clark Center for Biomedical Engineering and

Sciences. He directed the summer Stanford Engineering Executive Program.

Dr. Robertson received the 1991 Stanford Associates Award for service

to the university, the 1991 Richard W. Lyman Award, and the Society of

Women Engineers Award for Teacher of the Year 2000 at Stanford. He is

a Founding Fellow of the American Institute of Medical and Biological

Engineering. Dr. Robertson serves on the Scientific Advisory Committee on

Tobacco Product Regulation of the World Health Organization and on the

Panel on Court-Appointed Scientific Experts of the American Association

for the Advancement of Science. Because of his interests in biotechnology,

he has consulted widely in the design of biomedical diagnostic devices. Dr.

Robertson has also served as an expert witness in several trials, including

the Copper-7 intrauterine contraceptive cases (United States and Australia),

the Stringfellow Superfund case, and, most recently, the Minnesota tobacco

trial.

Marvin E. Schechter has been a solo practitioner, specializing in criminal

defense matters before state, federal, and appeals courts, since 1994. Mr.

Schechter has held several positions with the Legal Aid Society of New

York, including Deputy Attorney-in-Charge, Criminal Defense Division,

Kings County. He is currently a member of the Board of Directors of the

National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys, a member of the Ex-

ecutive Committee of the Criminal Justice Section of the New York State

Bar Association, and a past president of the New York State Association of

Criminal Defense Attorneys. Mr. Schechter co-founded Getting Out/Staying

Out, a program that provides 18- to 22-year-old Rikers Island Correctional

Facility inmates with the opportunity to earn a GED and receive job coun-

seling, employment, and housing. He has taught at the National Institute

for Trial Advocacy programs at Hofstra University and Cardoza Law

School and has been an adjunct professor for trial advocacy at Fordham

University Law School. He received his J.D. from Brooklyn Law School.

296

APPENDIX A

Robert Shaler received his Ph.D. from Pennsylvania State University in

1968 and has had academic appointments at the University of Pittsburgh

School of Medicine, the University of Pittsburgh School of Pharmacy, the

City University of New York, New York University School of Medicine,

and, most recently, at Pennsylvania State University. He joined the scientific

staff of the Pittsburgh and Allegheny County Crime Laboratory in 1970,

where, as a criminalist, he practiced forensic science, testified in court,

and investigated crime scenes. He joined the Aerospace Corporation staff

in 1977 and managed four Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

contracts, one of which resulted in setting the bloodstain analysis standard

for the Nation’s crime laboratories until the mid 1980s. In 1978, he joined

the staff of the New York City Medical Examiner’s Office as the head of

its serology laboratory, a position he held until 1987, when he moved to

the Lifecodes Corporation, the Nation’s first forensic DNA typing labora-

tory. As the Director of Forensic Science and Business Development, he

introduced “DNA Fingerprinting” to the Nation’s legal and law enforce-

ment communities, through a series of nationwide, informational lectures.

Dr. Shaler returned to the Medical Examiner’s Office in 1990, where he

created a modern Department of Forensic Biology, designed its current

300,000 square foot modern building, and established the city’s first crime

reconstruction team, which still operates from within the Medical Exam-

iner’s Office. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center,

he assumed responsibility for the DNA identification effort, designing the

testing strategy and coordinating the work of six different laboratories.

In 2005, he published a book, Who They Were—Inside the World Trade

Center DNA Story: The Unprecedented Effort to Identify the Missing, that

told the story of the people working behind the scenes of the DNA work

done at the Medical Examiner’s Office in New York City. In July 2005, he

retired from the Medical Examiner’s Office and accepted a professorship

at Pennsylvania State University, where he is the director of the university’s

forensic science program. His crime scene investigation course has attracted

national attention, and his research interests are broad, focusing on apply-

ing science and technology to crime scene investigation and quantifying the

biological response to trauma and stress. He has taught several workshops

to working law enforcement professionals in crime scene investigation,

crime reconstruction, and bloodstain pattern analysis.

Jay A. Siegel is Professor and Director of the Forensic and Investigative

Sciences Program at Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis.

He was Director of the Forensic Science Program at Michigan State Uni-

versity. He was Professor of Chemistry at Metropolitan State College in

Denver, Colorado, and he spent three years as a forensic chemist with the

Virginia Bureau of Forensic Sciences, where he analyzed illicit drugs and

APPENDIX A

297

trace evidence. Dr. Siegel has testified as an expert witness more than 200

times in 7 states, as well as in federal and military courts. Dr. Siegel is a

Fellow with the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, where he was

awarded the Paul Kirk Award for outstanding service to the Criminalistics

section in 2005. He is also a member of the American Chemical Society, the

Midwest Association of Forensic Scientists, and the Forensic Science Society

(United Kingdom). He is a member of the International Association for

Identification and an Academic Affiliate member of the American Society

of Crime Lab Directors. Dr. Siegel is an active researcher in forensic sci-

ence, with many scientific publications. He currently serves as the principal

investigator on a research grant from the National Institute of Justice on

ink analysis, his second grant for this work. He also is the author of two

textbooks in forensic science and is the editor in chief of the Encyclopedia

of Forensic Sciences.

Sargur Srihari received a B.Sc. in physics and mathematics from the Ban-

galore University in 1967, a B.E. in electrical communication engineering

from the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, in 1970, and a Ph.D. in

computer and information science from the Ohio State University, Colum-

bus, in 1976. Dr. Srihari is a State University of New York Distinguished

Professor at the University of Buffalo in the Department of Computer

Science and Engineering. He is the founding director of the Center of

Excellence for Document Analysis and Recognition. He has supervised 30

completed doctoral dissertations. Dr. Srihari is a member of the Board of

Scientific Counselors of the National Library of Medicine. He is chairman

of CedarTech, a corporation for university technology transfer. Dr. Srihari

has been general chairman of several international conferences and work-

shops: the Third International Workshop on Handwriting Recognition held

in Buffalo, New York, in 1993, the Second International Conference on

Document Analysis and Recognition, in Montreal, Canada, 1995, the Fifth

International Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition, 1999,

held in Bangalore, India, and the Eighth International Workshop on Hand-

writing Recognition, 2002, held in Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario, Canada.

Dr. Srihari has served as chairman of TC-11 (technical committee on Text

Processing) of the International Association for Pattern Recognition. He is

currently Chair of the International Association for Pattern Recognition’s

Publicity and Publications Committee. Dr. Srihari received a New York

State/United University Professions Excellence Award for 1991. He became

a Fellow of the Institute of Electronics and Telecommunications Engineers

(India) in 1992, a Fellow of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics En-

gineers in 1995, and a Fellow of the International Association for Pattern

Recognition in 1996. He was named a distinguished alumnus of the Ohio

State University College of Engineering in 1999.

298

APPENDIX A

Sheldon M. Wiederhorn (NAE) received his B.S. in chemical engineering

from Columbia University in 1956 and his M.S. and Ph.D. from the Uni-

versity of Illinois, also in chemical engineering, with a minor in solid state

physics. His Ph.D. topic was high pressure physics, with an emphasis on

phase transformations in alkali halides. After finishing graduate school,

he worked at DuPont at the Research Station in Wilmington, Delaware,

during which time his research and scientific interests gradually changed

toward materials science with a specialization in the mechanical behavior of

ceramic materials. After three years, he began work at the National Bureau

of Standards, where he carried out an independent research program on

the mechanical behavior of glasses and ceramic materials. At the National

Bureau of Standards, now the National Institute of Standards and Technol-

ogy, Dr. Wiederhorn carried out a program on the mechanical reliability of

brittle materials. He was one of the first to apply fracture mechanics tech-

niques to study the fracture of ceramic materials. A result of his research

was the development of techniques to assure the structural reliability of

brittle ceramic materials. Techniques pioneered by Dr. Wiederhorn are now

used to assure the reliability of glass windows in airplanes and in space

vehicles. Dr. Wiederhorn is best known for the experiments he developed

to study and to characterize subcritical crack growth in glasses. The results

of these studies illustrated the complexity of subcritical crack growth, and

a natural conclusion of his study was that the failure of glass was caused

by the slow growth of cracks to a critical size, which determined the time-

to-failure. In addition to his work on the fracture of glass, Dr. Wiederhorn

directed a program to measure the deformation of structural ceramics at

very high temperatures. The objective of this work was to develop ceramic

materials that could be used as turbine blades in power turbines used for

more efficient production of electricity. The program has resulted in the

development of new measurement techniques for characterizing creep at

elevated temperatures. A new mechanism of creep has also been discov-

ered by Dr. Wiederhorn and his group, and ways have been suggested to

improve the creep behavior of nonoxide materials at high temperatures.

Dr. Wiederhorn has received many awards for his research and leadership

at the National Institute of Standards and Technology. These include both

a Silver and Gold Medal awarded by the Department of Commerce and

the Samuel Wesley Stratton Award by the National Bureau of Standards.

He is also a Fellow of the American Ceramic Society and has received a

number of important awards for his research from this society, including

the Jeppson Award for outstanding research on ceramic materials. He is

now a Distinguished Lifetime Member of the American Ceramic Society.

In 1991, Dr. Wiederhorn was elected a member of the National Academy

of Engineering. At the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Dr.

Wiederhorn is now a Senior Fellow and continues to carry out a research

APPENDIX A

299

program on the mechanical properties of ceramic materials. His current in-

terests are to use the Atomic Force Microscope to investigate the atomistics

of crack growth in glasses and ceramic materials, with the hope of learn-

ing more about the crack growth process and the relation between crack

growth and the microstructure of glass.

Ross E. Zumwalt is Chief Medical Investigator of the State of New Mexico.

He received his undergraduate education from Wabash College in Craw-

fordsville, Indiana. Dr. Zumwalt graduated from the University of Illinois

College of Medicine. He completed a rotating internship and one year of

pathology residency at the Mary Imogene Bassett Hospital in Cooperstown,

New York. Dr. Zumwalt then completed his pathology residency at the

Southwestern Medical School and Parkland Hospital in Dallas. He received

his forensic fellowship training at the Dallas County Medical Examiner’s

Office. Dr. Zumwalt served in the United States Navy as director of labo-

ratories at the Navy Regional Medical Center in Camp Lejeune, North

Carolina. He spent two years as deputy coroner in Cleveland, Ohio, and six

years as deputy coroner in Cincinnati, Ohio, before coming to the Office of

the Medical Investigator in 1987. Dr. Zumwalt is certified in anatomic and

forensic pathology by the American Board of Pathology. He was a trustee

of the American Board of Pathology from 1993 to 2004. He is currently a

member of the Residency Review Committee for Pathology. Dr. Zumwalt

has served as president of the National Association of Medical Examiners

and is a member of the following professional organizations: The National

Association of Medical Examiners; the American Academy of Forensic

Sciences; the College of American Pathologists; the American Society of

Clinical Pathologists; the United States and Canadian Academy of Pathol-

ogy; the American Medical Association; and the American Association for

the Advancement of Science.

Staff

Anne-Marie Mazza is Director of the Committee on Science, Technology

and Law. She joined the National Academies in 1995. She has served as

Senior Program Officer with both the Committee on Science, Engineer-

ing, and Public Policy and the Government-University-Industry Research

Roundtable. In 1999 she was named the first director of the Committee on

Science, Technology, and Law, a newly created program designed to foster

communication and analysis among scientists, engineers, and members of

the legal community. In 2007, she became the director of the Christine

Mirzayan Science and Technology Graduate Policy Fellowship Program. Dr.

Mazza has been the study director on numerous Academy reports, includ-

ing Science and Security in a Post 9-11 World, 2007; Reaping the Benefits

300

APPENDIX A

of Genomic and Proteomic Research, 2005; Intentional Human Dosing

Studies for EPA Regulatory Purposes: Scientific and Ethical Issues, 2004;

The Age of Expert Testimony: Science in the Courtroom, 2002; Issues for

Science and Engineering Researchers in the Digital Age, 2001; and Obser-

vations on the President’s Fiscal Year 2000 Federal Science and Technology

Budget, 1999. Between October 1999 and October 2000, she divided her

time between the Committee on Science, Technology, and Law and the

White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, where she served as a

Senior Policy Analyst responsible for issues associated with the government-

university research partnership. Before joining the Academy, Dr. Mazza was

a Senior Consultant with Resource Planning Corporation. She received a

B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. from The George Washington University.

Scott T. Weidman is the Director of NRC’s Board on Mathematical Sci-

ences and Their Applications. He joined NRC in 1989 with the Board on

Mathematical Sciences and moved to the Board on Chemical Sciences and

Technology in 1992. In 1996, he established a new board to conduct annual

peer reviews of the Army Research Laboratory, which conducts a broad ar-

ray of science, engineering, and human factors research and analysis, and he

later directed a similar board that reviews the work of the National Institute

of Standards and Technology. He has worked full time with the Board on

Mathematical Sciences and Their Applications since June 2004. During

his NRC career, he has staffed studies on a wide variety of topics related

to mathematical, chemical, and materials sciences; laboratory assessment;

and science and technology policy. His current focus is on building NRC’s

capabilities and portfolio related to all areas of analysis and computational

science. He holds bachelor degrees in mathematics and materials science

from Northwestern University and an M.S. and Ph.D. in applied mathemat-

ics at the University of Virginia. Before joining NRC, he held positions with

General Electric, General Accident Insurance Company, Exxon Research

and Engineering, and MRJ, Inc.

David Padgham is Policy Director at the High Performance Computing

Initiative Council on Competitiveness. Before joining the council, he was an

associate program officer at the Computer Science and Telecommunications

Board of NRC. His work there comprised a robust mix of writing, research,

and project management, and he was involved in the production of numer-

ous reports, including, most recently, Software for Dependable Systems:

Sufficient Evidence?; Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in

a Digital Age; and Renewing U.S. Telecommunications Research. Before

joining the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board in 2006, Mr.

Padgham was a policy analyst for the Association for Computing Machin-

ery, where he worked closely with its public policy committee, USACM, to

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