НАК „НАФТОГАЗ УКРАЇНИ“. Річний звіт англійською (2017 рік) - 3

 

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НАК „НАФТОГАЗ УКРАЇНИ“. Річний звіт англійською (2017 рік) - 3

 

 

OUR MARKET AND REFORMS

ANNUAL REPORT 2017

37

36

At the same time, 2017 

demonstrated a record low 

capacity of new discovered 

oil reserves, with the average 

capacity of about 550 million 

barrels of oil equivalent per 

month

19

. Most alarming is 

the fact that the reserve 

replacement ratio

20

 (for oil and 

gas) reached only 11% in 2017 

compared to more than 50% 

19 

Rystad Energy  https://www.rystadenergy.
com/newsevents/news/press-releases/
all-time-low-discovered-resources-2017/

20 

The reserve replacement ratio is the ration 
of the number of reserves discovered during 
the year to the global hydrocarbon production 
during the year.

in 2012. Such a low reserve 

replacement level can have a 

negative impact on the supply 

side over the next decade, 

which will accordingly affect 

world energy prices.

Overall, a steady trend towards 

rising prices on the oil market 

was observed in 2017, which 

is primarily due to the freezing 

of oil production volumes 

by OPEC countries. The 

current high oil prices make 

investments in oil production 

more attractive, including in 

Ukraine. However, since Ukraine 

is a net importer of oil and 

oil refining products, Ukraine 

is forced to spend additional 

currency resources for their 

purchase. For instance, in 2017 

alone, the total expenditures 

of the country on oil and 

petroleum product imports  

increased by 33%. In case of 

further growth of the world oil 

prices and without building up 

domestic production of oil and 

petroleum products in Ukraine, 

this trend will negatively affect 

the balance of payments of 

the country and can lead to a 

reduction in GDP. 

Major events that impacted the price situation on the oil market in 2017    

70

65

60

55

50

45

40

January

February

March

April

May

June

July

August September October November December

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1.  For most of the first quarter of 2017, prices were stable against the background of the agreement reached by 

OPEC member countries at the end of 2016 on "freezing" the level of oil production.

2.  Prices began to decline in March 2017 after the publication of several consecutive reports of the US Energy 

Information Administration on increases in the US commercial reserves of oil.

3.  As a result of the shutdown of a number of major refineries in the United States and other parts of the world for 

maintenance, another fall in prices occurred in May 2017 and buildup of commercial crude oil reserves in the 

United States.

4.  In June 2017, prices began to increase based on the expectations of market participants for further reduction of oil 

production by OPEC member countries in order to balance the market.

5.  The market response to the OPEC decision to maintain oil production at the current level was a rapid drop in 

prices in July 2017.

6.  Since the beginning of the third quarter of 2017, there has been evidence that proved the effectiveness of 

the OPEC member states agreement on the oil output cut. In addition, a high level of loading of refineries and 

demand for refined products was observed. The level of loading of European refineries grew from 89% in Q2 2017 

to 92% in Q3 2017; overall the global oil increase in Q3 was 1.1%.

7.  In November 2017, OPEC member states at their regular meeting decided to extend the decision to restrict oil 

production until the end of 2018.

European market for oil and petroleum products

2017 can be considered a success 

for European refineries. Due to 

the oil refining margin, which was 

higher than in 2016, the European 

refineries utilization rate was 

stable during 2017

21

.

European oil refining capacities 

dropped by 15% between 2010 

and 2017 (from 865 million t/ year 

to 740 million t/year)

22

 and in 

2017 they comprised about 14% 

of global capacity. In view of 

world trends, further reduction in 

production capacities is possible 

in the period to 2025 due to:

– an increase in petroleum 

products and construction 

21 

Monthly OPEC Report (2017), IEA Global Margin 
Conversion Indicator

22 

International Refining and Petrochemical 
Conference (IRPC) in Europe in 2017 (from the 
speech of Manfred Litner, member of executive 
board of OMV AG)

of new oil refineries on other 

continents

23

;

– an increase in the share of 

imports of finished petroleum 

products in Europe against the 

background of reduction of 

emission quotas for harmful 

substances. 

One of the factors that positively 

impacted the operations of the 

European refineries was the 

decrease in production and in 

excess supply on the market after 

the 2017 agreement between 

the OPEC member states was 

reached. This factor operates 

in a way that the reduction of 

production was mainly due to 

heavy grades of oil, which are 

usually processed by refineries 

with a high level of complexity 

23  

Global Data

and located outside of Europe. 

The European oil refineries 

process lightweight petroleum, 

which is logistically available for 

delivery (oil from Kazakhstan, 

Azerbaijan, Libya and Nigeria 

is not within the scope of 

petroleum output cut agreed by 

the OPEC member countries).

In Q3 and Q4 2017, the 

petroleum products price 

trend in Europe was much 

slower than the global oil price 

trend. For instance, the oil 

price growth during August-

December 2017 amounted to 

about 30% (from 49 to 64 USD/

barrel), while the petroleum 

products price growth in 

European countries amounted 

to about 10% for gasoline and 

diesel fuel, which impacted the 

oil refining margin curve for 

European refineries.

  Gas             Liquids            Year average

  Global conventional discoveries, billion boe

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

January 

April 

July 

Oct

ober 

January 

April 

July 

Oct

ober 

January 

April 

July 

Oct

ober 

January 

April 

July 

Oct

ober 

January 

April 

July 

Oct

ober 

January 

April 

July 

Oct

ober 

2012

2013

2015

2014

2016

2017

TOTAL VOLUME 

PER YEAR

30

16

15

15

8

6�7

2�5

1�3

1�3

0�6

0�6

1�3

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

OUR MARKET AND REFORMS

ANNUAL REPORT 2017

39

38

Overall, we expect that the more 

stringent norms and targets for 

carbon monoxide and higher 

biofuel quotas in the short and 

medium run will have a significant 

impact on European refineries. A 

new restriction on the use of high 

sulfur fuels from 1 January 2020, 

introduced by the International 

Maritime Organization (IMO) to 

decrease sulfur oxide emissions 

from ships to reduce air pollution 

and protect the environment, 

prompts European refineries to 

upgrade their production facilities, 

change the configuration of 

refinery technological processes, 

and start processing crude oil 

with lower sulfur content (light 

crude oils). All the above listed 

factors will undoubtedly increase 

the capital and operating costs 

of the refineries and accordingly 

increase the cost and price of 

petroleum products for end users. 

Given the fact that the import 

purchasing and domestic 

wholesale prices for petroleum 

products in Ukraine are formed 

based on the European 

quotations for petroleum 

products, the European refineries 

utilization level and, accordingly, 

the sufficient supply of petroleum 

products in the European 

market directly affects the level 

US

D/barr

el

%

94
92
90
88
86
84
82
80
78

65

60

55

50

45

40

35

30

25

   EU-16 refineries capacity utilization level, Brent price

Q1 2015

D2 2015

Q3 2015

Q4 2015

Q1 2016

Q2 2016

Q3 2016

Q4 2016

Q1 2017

Q2 2017

Q3 2017

Q4 2017

  EU-16 refineries capacity utilization level (right axis)
  Brent oil price (left axis)

%

US

D/barr

el

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

94
92

90
88
86
84
82
80

78

   EU-16 refineries capacity utilization level, refining margin

Q1 2015

D2 2015

Q3 2015

Q4 2015

Q1 2016

Q2 2016

Q3 2016

Q4 2016

Q1 2017

Q2 2017

Q3 2017

Q4 2017

  EU-16 refineries capacity utilization level (left axis)
  Brent oil refinery margin, NW Europe (right axis)

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

  Global distribution of refining capacities by region (Mb/d)

  South America

  Oceania

  North America

  Middle East

  Former Soviet Republics

  Europe

  Caribbean

  Asia

  Africa

2012

2014

2013

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

Source: GLOBAL DATA

of purchasing prices in Ukraine. 

As noted above, the increased 

environmental requirements and 

stiffer competition may lead to 

further reduction of production 

capacity in Europe and, 

consequently, greater volatility 

of prices for petroleum products, 

including in Ukraine.

Ukrainian oil and 

petroleum market

The total volume of oil and 

gas condensate production in 

Ukraine has been decreasing 

for the fifth consecutive year. In 

2017, Ukraine produced about 

2.1 million tons of oil and gas 

condensate, which is 6% less 

than in 2016. The main cause 

was the reduction of Ukrnafta’s 

production by about 9%.

At Ukrnafta, the average 

daily production of conden-

sate oil increased by 2% to 

4.1 thousand tons per day 

from January to June 2017, 

and in July-October it dropped 

to about 3.3 thousand tons a 

day due to forced stoppage 

of production in six fields. The 

daily production level was 

restored, although not fully, in 

November-December 2017. 

The main reason for the reduc-

tion in volumes of hydrocarbon 

production by Ukrnafta was 

the blocking of the company’s 

special permits extension 

process

24

. If the special permits 

had been prolonged on time, 

the level of oil, condensate and 

24  

The validity of the company’s 9 special permits 

expired in 2017. Attempts to extend the special 
permits were blocked by DerzhGeonadra and 
the company was forced to stop production at 6 
fields during the period from April to June 2017. The 
company won a number of lawsuits challenging 
the inaction of the regulator on the issue of 
prolongation of special permits. At the end of 
October and November 2017, after the special 
permits were extended, Ukrnafta restored its 
suspended operations at the 6 deposits. 

gas production would remain 

stable during the year, and 

the reduction in production 

in 2017 compared to the pre-

vious year would have been 

three times lower. Due to the 

suspension of production in 6 

fields, as a result of the forced 

time-out Ukrnafta lost more 

than 92 thousand tons of oil 

and condensate and 76 mcm 

of gas.

At the same time, the extraction 

of oil and condensate by other 

enterprises that do not belong to 

the Naftogaz group grew by 6% 

in 2017. 

Ukrgazvydobuvannya processes 

oil and gas condensate at its own 

production facilities, and Ukrnafta 

sells oil and gas condensate of 

its own production at auctions 

in accordance with Article 4 of 

   Structure of oil and condensate market by E&P companies, 

2013–2017

3�50

3�00

2�50

2�00

1�50

1�00

0�50

0�00

2013

2014 

2015

2016

2017 

Million t

ons a year

  Ukrnafta         Ukrgazvydobuvannya          Other

CAGR –6�75%

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

–5

–10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

  Price for Brent oil
  Price for diesel fuel (left axis)
   Price for A-95 gasoline

   Northwest European refining 

margin (right axis)

Q4 2016 

January 2017

February 2017

Mar

ch 2017

April 2017

Ma

y 2017

June 2017

July 2017

Augu

st 2017

Sep

tember 2017

Oct

ober 2017

No

vember 2017

December 2017

   Relative developments in oil price and European refining margin 

in 2017 compared to Q4 2016

%

US

D/barr

el

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

OUR MARKET AND REFORMS

ANNUAL REPORT 2017

41

40

the Law of Ukraine "On Oil and 

Gas" and the procedure for the 

organization and holding of 

exchange auctions for the sale of 

crude oil and gas condensate of 

its own extraction and liquefied 

gas, approved by the Cabinet 

of Ministers of Ukraine (dated 

16.10.14, No. 577). Since the 

sale of oil and gas condensate 

produced by Ukranafta in 

Ukraine is subject to the strict 

regulation, the situation on the 

oil market is rather tough. In 

2017-2018, twelve auctions for 

the sale of crude oil and gas 

condensate were recognized 

by the auction committee as 

void. The main reasons for this 

situation are:

1) extremely limited demand for 

oil, since today Kremenchuk oil 

refinery is the only operating 

oil refinery in Ukraine. The 

operations of the other five 

plants are suspended and 

unlikely to resume in the short 

term;

2) other ways of selling oil and 

gas condensate are legally 

restricted;

3) Ukrtatnafta’s shift to the higher 

quality gasoline and diesel 

fuel production and increased 

volume of processing due to 

the purchase of Azeri Light oil.

At the same time, according to 

the results of the auctions, the 

price of sales of oil and gas con-

densate was at the level of world 

oil prices.

Production of petroleum 

products and LPG at oil refineries 

and gas refineries increased by 

about 6% to 2.9 million tons in 

2017. This increase in output was 

due to an increase in imported 

oil and gas to the Kremenchuk 

oil refinery. At the same time, 

the volume of processing 

at Shebelynka refinery 

(Ukrgazvydobuvannya) remained 

unchanged in 2017 (510.000 

tons of oil and gas condensate 

and components). After the new 

technological regulations that 

prohibit the sale of diesel fuel 

Euro-4 became effective in 2018, 

the plant completely switched 

to the production of the Euro-5 

diesel fuel, which resulted in 

some changes in the structure 

of production of petroleum 

products.

In 2017, Shebelynka gas refinery 

produced 133.800 tons of 

gasoline and 97.400 tons of 

diesel fuel, which is 14% and 16% 

less than in 2016, respectively. 

At the same time, production 

of benzole-containing fraction, 

reformate and liquefied 

hydrocarbon gas increased. 

The balance of light and dark 

petroleum products production 

has improved compared to past 

periods.  

According to the State Fiscal 

Service, Ukraine imported 

petroleum products worth 

65

60

55

50

45

40

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

  Sales, thousand tons (right axis)
   Calculated average sale price at auction, rebased per 1 barrel, USD (left axis)
  Platts Urals price (monthly), USD/ barrel (left axis)

January

February

Mar

ch

April

M

ay

June

July

Augu

st

Sep

tember

Oct

ober

No

vember

December

   Sales of oil and condensate by Ukranafta in 2017

   Balance of the Ukrainian petroleum products market 

in 2016–2017, million tons

11.5

8.5

11.0

9.0

2.9

2.7

–0.41
–0.23

Balance

Imports

Production

Exports

  2016              2017

US

D/ barr

el 

thou

sand t

USD 4.159 billion in 2017, which 

is 27.3% more than in 2016. 

At the same time, in volume 

terms, imports of petroleum 

products to the country in the 

past year increased by 5.6% to 

7.8 million tons.

The main trend on the market 

of petroleum products in 

Ukraine in recent years 

including 2017 is a decrease 

in consumption of automotive 

gasoline and its replacement 

with LPG (in the period 

from 2014 to 2017, the 

consumption of LPG increased 

by about 65%). According to 

the State Statistics Service of 

Ukraine, the sale of gasoline 

through gas stations in 

2017 decreased by 12.3% to 

1.61 million tons, industrial 

consumption increased by 5% 

to 548 thousand tons, while 

the volume of consumed LPG 

for the same period increased 

by 9%.

In view of the Ukraine’s 

dependence on imports, 

the growth of world oil and 

petroleum product prices 

resulted in an increase in 

51.1

108.7

176.8

   Structure of petroleum products output at Shebelynka gas condensate and oil refinery in 2015–2017, 

thousand t

Technological 

losses

Other dark 

petroleum products

Oil residue

Other light 

petroleum products

LPG

Diesel fuel

Gasoline

9.7

177.5

9.7

139.1

9.1

104.0

18.1

14.9

9.5

11.2

9.5

4.0

34.0

97.4

133.8

51.1

116.8

156.3

  2015 

  2016 

  2017 

   Developments in Shebelynka refinery output in 2015–2017

2015

520

510

500

490

480

470

460

450

thou

sand t

473

515

510

2016

2017

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

OUR MARKET AND REFORMS

ANNUAL REPORT 2017

43

42

wholesale prices on the 

Ukrainian market: by the end 

of 2017, the price of gasoline 

and diesel fuel increased by 

about 25% compared with the 

beginning of 2017. The wholesale 

prices of petroleum products on 

the domestic market of Ukraine 

are less volatile compared with 

the change in prices in the main 

hubs of Northwest Europe, 

and this is primarily due to the 

particularities of the imported 

petroleum products purchasing 

mechanism, namely purchases 

are based on average monthly 

quotations and the purchasing 

price of petroleum products 

includes supplier’s trade margin.

Oil transmission

In view of the historical 

features and technological 

connectivity of oil 

transportation systems, the 

volume of oil transit largely 

depends on Russia's policy as 

the main supplier of oil to the 

Central European countries 

and the main customer of 

oil transportation services 

on the territory of Ukraine, 

as well as from the policy, 

provision of resources and 

technical state of the refineries 

in the Czech Republic, 

Slovakia and Hungary. These 

dependencies are typical 

for all oil transportation 

service companies in the 

world, since the volume 

of oil transportation and, 

respectively, the volume of 

ordered services depend on 

demand for raw materials.

Today signifcant capacities of 

the main Ukrainian oil pipelines 

are not used (see infographic 

Ukraine’s refinery capacities 

p.122). At the same time, the 

volume of oil transit through the 

territory of Ukraine increased 

by 8% in 2017 compared to 

2016 while the volume of oil 

transportation for domestic 

25

 

consumers increased by 49% 

due to the increase in supply of 

imported raw materials to the 

Kremenchuk oil refinery and, 

25 

Wholesale prices for petroleum products in 
Ukraine, USD (according to the NBU’s average 
monthly rate of Ukrainian hryvnias to USD/Euro) 
excluding VAT, excise tax

accordingly, the restoration of 

the route Odesa – Kremenchuk 

oil refinery.

The main reason for the 

increase in transit volumes was 

the restoration of the normal 

operation of the Litvinov 

Refinery in the Czech Republic 

in 2017 and an increase in the 

transit of oil in that direction 

   Comparative developments in wholesale prices for diesel fuel in 

Ukraine and Nothwest Europe (price as of 01�01�17 = 100%)

25

40

30

20

10

0

–10

–20

January

February

Mar

ch

April

M

ay

June

July

Augu

st

Sep

tember

Oct

ober

No

vember

December

  Diesel fuel (Ukraine) net of taxes and duties
  ULSD 10 ppm quotations (Northwest Europe)

%

   Comparative developments in wholesale prices for gasoline in 

Ukraine and Nothwest Europe (price as of 01�01�17 = 100%)

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

–5

–10

–15

January

February

Mar

ch

April

M

ay

June

July

Augu

st

Sep

tember

Oct

ober

No

vember

December

  Gasoline A-95 (Ukraine)
  Gasoline 10 ppm quotations (Northwest Europe)

%

by about 18%. Since Unipetrol, 

which manages the refinery in 

the Czech Republic, extended 

the term of long-term contracts 

with Russia for oil supplies till 

July 2019, Ukraine can expect 

to have continuous stable oil 

supplies through its transit 

corridor to the Czech refineries.

At the same time, as a result of 

diversifying the supply chain by 

refineries, further decrease in 

transit volumes to the refineries 

of Slovakia and Hungary are 

observed in 2017 – by 4% and 

7% respectively.

In addition, one of the risk 

factors that could adversely 

affect the volume of oil transit 

through the Ukrainian oil 

transportation system is the 

deterioration of the qualitative 

characteristics of the Russian 

oil blend delivered to Europe. 

In late 2017 and early 2018, the 

Russian Federation redirected 

large volumes of low-sulfur oil 

from west to east to strengthen 

its leading position in the 

Chinese market. As a result, 

the quality of Urals oil, the 

main Russian export oil grade 

dropped sharply, causing 

dissatisfaction with European 

processors

26

. At the end of 2017, 

the official representatives of 

the Russian operator of the 

main oil pipelines reported that 

the content of sulfur in the oil 

to be shipped from the port of 

Primorsk will increase to 1.63% in 

2018, in the oil to be supplied via 

Druzhba oil pipeline and through 

Ust-Luga – to 1.8%, through 

Novorossiysk – up to 1.55%.

Based on analysis of the 

prospective Russian

27

 oil 

transportation development 

26 

https://ru.reuters.com/article/businessNews/
idRUKBN1FP1FO-ORUBS

27 

Transneft Group’s main investment projects 
(as of 30.09.17) http://www.transneft.ru/u/
section_file/28354/tn_mda_09m2017_rus.pdf

projects, the following 

conclusion can be drawn: the 

redirection of light sweet oil 

to the eastern markets and 

the replacement of oil with 

petroleum products in Russian 

exports is a long-term trend, 

and in view of deterioration of 

the quality characteristics of the 

Russian oil mix, the increase of oil 

exports through the oil pipeline 

system in the western direction is 

unlikely.

Deterioration of qualitative 

characteristics of oil can lead to 

lower demand for the mixture, 

and encourage European 

consumers to seek alternative 

ways to satisfy the needs of their 

refineries.

The framework agreement 

between the Czech refinery 

Unipetrol and Jadranski 

Naftovod, the Croatian operator 

of the main oil pipelines, 

signed in late 2016, on the 

establishment of cooperation 

and oil transportation to the 

Czech Republic via the Adria 

pipeline will also adversely 

impact the volume of oil 

transit via the Ukrainian oil 

transportation system. The said 

pipeline is an alternative to the 

traditional supply through the 

Druzhba oil pipeline.

   Volumes of oil transit during 2015–2017

2015

16 

15 

14

13

12

11

10

million t

15�2

13�8

13�9

2016

2017

   Volumes of domestic oil transmission during 2015–2017

2015

2�5 

2�0

1�5

1�0

0�5

0�0

million t

1�6

1�4

2�1

2016

2017

CAGR -2�7%

CAGR 9,27%

*  Including oil transmission volumes for the companies of the group

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

OUR MARKET AND REFORMS

ANNUAL REPORT 2017

45

44

Initiated in 2014, the arbitration 

proceedings have become the 

largest commercial arbitration 

ever. Mutual claims amounted 

to about USD 125 billion, which 

threatened to bankrupt both Gaz-

prom and Naftogaz.

The Stockholm arbitration also 

satisfied Naftogaz's claim for 

compensation of USD 4.63 

billion for Gazprom's failure to 

deliver the agreed volumes of 

gas for transit.

Following the results of the 

two proceedings, Gazprom 

shall pay Naftogaz USD 2.56 

billion adjusted to a USD 2.1 

billion set-off for gas delivered 

in 2014.

After four years of arbitration proceedings between Naftogaz and Gazprom, the Stockholm Arbitration  

has delivered two fateful awards: the first one came on 22 December 2017 concerning a gas supply  

contract based on the "take or pay" principle, and the second one on 28 February 2018 with respect  

to a transit contract.

In favor 

of Naftogaz

In favor 

of Naftogaz

#NaftogazWins

in SCC arbitrations against Gazprom

#Naftogaz

Wins

in SCC arbitrations against Gazprom

$ 44.3 

$ 44.3 

billion

billion

Maximum possible value of claims,
Naftogaz

Maximum possible value of claims,
Naftogaz

Maximum possible value of claims,
Gazprom

2.6

 

2.6

 

$ 81.4 

3.1

billion

    

billion

compensation

from Gazprom

compensation

from Gazprom

0.5

 

0.5

 

gas price reduction

in 2018-2019 

gas price reduction

in 2018-2019 

HISTRORICAL VICTORY 

FOR UKRAINE: STOCKHOLM 

ARBITRATION

Key results of the Arbitration on gas supply contract

CADLR*

To pay for gas allegedly 

supplied to the occupied 

territories

We will not pay for supplies 

to CADLR

We will not pay for supplies 

to CADLR

CADLR*

Gazprom’s claims

Award

Award

56

$ bn 

Gazprom’s 

take-or-pay claims

Take-or-pay provision

fully rejected for 2009-2017

52

bcm 

Annual contract 

volume obligations

Contractual volume

reduced to actual needs

Contractual volume

reduced to actual needs

5

 0

$ bn 

485

Contract gas price

in Q2 2014

Gas price for Q2 2014 

reduced

linked to oil products

linked to market price 

on German hub

linked to market price 

on German hub

352

$ per tcm

$ per tcm

bcm

* Certain Areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions

On 22 December 2017, the 

Arbitral Tribunal ruled in favor 

of Naftogaz on all contentious 

issues concerning contracts 

for the supply of gas with 

Gazprom: pricing, the "take or 

pay" provision, and invalidat-

ing other provisions that are 

ungrounded and contrary to 

the principles of competition, 

namely:

•  The arbitration court

completely dismissed 

Gazprom’s retrospective claims 

for USD 56 billion in accordance 

with the "take or pay" provision 

(which sets up the obligation 

to pay for undisbursed gas 

volumes) for 2009-2017. 

Naftogaz has succeeded in 

reducing the future mandatory 

annual volumes of gas purchases 

from Gazprom tenfold from 

42-52 bcm to 4-5 bcm, which 

corresponds to actual needs for 

gas imports.

•  Naftogaz has successfully

revised the contract 

towards the reduction 

of gas prices according 

to market conditions, as 

well as compensation for 

overpayment in the periods 

after April 2014 when 

Naftogaz initiated a revision 

of the price. In particular, 

the price of gas received by 

Naftogaz in the Q2 2014 is 

reduced by 27% – from USD 

485 tcm to USD 352 tcm. Due 

to revision of the contract 

price, Naftogaz saved USD 

1.8 billion on gas purchased in 

2014-2015.

The arbitrators also indicated 

that Naftogaz should not pay for 

the volumes of gas supplied to 

the temporarily occupied terri-

tories of Luhansk and Donetsk 

regions, as the volume of these 

supplies cannot be determined. 

In addition, the arbitration has 

declared invalid some other pro-

visions of the contract, including 

the prohibition on re-export. So 

Naftogaz may resell gas abroad.

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ANNUAL REPORT 2017

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46

On 28 February 2018, the Stock-

holm Arbitration Tribunal ruled 

in favor of Naftogaz on most of 

the important issues in the dis-

pute with Gazprom regarding 

the existing gas transit contract.

•  The Tribunal confirmed the

violation by Gazprom of 

its obligations for transit 

volumes, which according to 

the contract amount to 110 

bcm per year, and awarded 

compensation of USD 4.63 

billion. The arbitration 

award confirmed the legal 

obligations of Gazprom 

concerning deliveries under 

the transit contract.

•  The volume of transit remains

unchanged (in 2017, Gazprom 

pumped 95 bcm of gas 

through Ukraine).

•  The Tribunal did not support

Naftogaz's request for 

revision of the transit tariff, 

since the review application 

filed by Naftogaz in 2009 

did not meet the procedural 

requirements. The Tribunal 

also rejected Naftogaz's 

demand to review the transit 

contract in accordance with 

European and Ukrainian 

energy and competition 

legislation, noting that the 

implementation of regulatory 

reform in Ukraine is a matter 

for the Ukrainian authorities 

and is not within the 

competence of the tribunal in 

this case.

Naftogaz secured a financial 

victory and is now entitled 

to purchase natural gas for a 

better price that fully complies 

with the European market, and 

Gazprom must fulfill its obliga-

tions under the transit contract, 

however with the same transit  

tariff. Naftogaz also has to buy 

a certain amount of gas directly 

from Gazprom on a pre-paid 

basis.

Key results of arbitration process on gas transit

50

atm

EU

Failure

to supply

Refused 

to supply gas 
to Ukraine

Notified Ukraine

 

of the intention 
to terminate supply 
and transit contracts

Created crisis

conditions by 

breaching 

both supply 

and transit 

contracts

Decreased 

pressure 

for European 

transit

 (50 atm 

instead of 60-65
 stipulated in
the contract)

Gas prices 

in the EU 
skyrocketed 
to over $1000/tcm

Pressure drop

Prices surge

Move to cancel 

contracts

Transit put 

at risk

  Gazprom’s demarche

Failure by Gazprom to abide by the arbitration decisions

On 1 March 2018, amidst 

abnormal frost, Gazprom violated 

its contractual obligations 

having refused to supply gas 

to Ukraine without warning.  

The Russian company returned 

the prepayment for March to 

Naftogaz, lowered pressure in its 

pipelines by 20% and reduced 

gas sales to other customers to 

minimum.

Naftogaz managed to substi-

tute Gazprom’s deliveries with 

gas acquired from European 

suppliers during one day and 

took measures to decrease gas 

consumption.

Despite the awards and timely 

pre-payment by Naftogaz, 

Gazprom refused to resume 

deliveries to Naftogaz as agreed 

on 1 March 2018. Gazprom 

has also not paid the USD 

2.6 billion it owes Naftogaz. 

Instead, Gazprom has launched 

ill-founded proceedings 

against the awards in the 

Swedish courts and initiated 

a new arbitration attempting 

to reverse the outcome of the 

awards.

In addition to this, Gazprom has 

launched ill-founded proceed-

ings against the awards in the 

Swedish courts and initiated 

a new arbitration attempting 

to reverse the outcome of the 

awards.

In light of Gazprom's unwill-

ingness to comply with its 

legal obligations under the 

final awards rendered in the 

sales and transit arbitrations in 

Stockholm, Naftogaz has initi-

ated enforcement of the USD 

2.6 billion award. The company 

has asked the Swiss courts to 

enforce the award, and under-

stands that Swiss authorities 

already have taken measures 

against Gazprom's assets there.

Ordered urgent  

deliveries from
the EU

Maintained 
uninterrupted

transit 

to Europe

Ensured switching

to other fuels

  #COOLITDOWN

campaign widely

 supported by Ukrainian

citizens and enterprises

helped cut consumption

by 14% in big cities

  Response by Naftogaz and Ukraine

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OUR MARKET AND REFORMS

ANNUAL REPORT 2017

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48

UNBUNDLING OF 

GAS TRANSMISSION FUNCTION

According to the Law of Ukraine 

“On the Natural Gas Market”, 

the country’s natural gas 

transmission operations must 

be separated and independent 

from supply and production. 

The Law also stipulates that the 

vertically integrated company 

and the TSO are accountable 

for compliance with these 

requirements. This means the 

implementation of European 

energy market principles 

ensuring that all players are 

on a level playing field and a 

vertically integrated company 

cannot abuse its access to the 

gas transmission system. The 

Ukrainian side is not currently 

able to satisfy the unbundling 

requirements because of 

Gazprom’s unwillingness to 

stick to Ukrainian and European 

legislation in its relations with 

Naftogaz. 

In 2014, Naftogaz urged 

Gazprom to apply the relevant 

legislation to the contract for 

Russian gas transit through 

Ukraine in 2009-2019, including 

the right to transfer Naftogaz’s 

rights and obligations under 

the contract to the designated 

TSO. Gazprom refused to do 

this, which served as the reason 

for Naftogaz’s appeal to the 

Stockholm Arbitral Tribunal.

The tribunal announced the 

final award in Naftogaz vs 

Gazprom case regarding the 

transit contract on 28 February 

2018. The tribunal satisfied some 

claims in this case, including 

Gazprom’s obligation to pay 

Naftogaz USD 4.63 billion for 

under-delivery of contracted 

transit volumes. Following 

the results of two Stockholm 

arbitrations (regarding gas 

transit and supply contracts), 

Gazprom now owes Naftogaz 

USD 2.56 billion.

The current gas transit contract 

between Naftogaz and Gazprom 

is valid until 1 January 2020. 

According to the contract, 

Naftogaz alone is responsible for 

the proper operation of Ukraine’s 

GTS and ensures secure and 

uninterrupted transit, which 

means that the company has 

relevant technical and financial 

capacity to provide gas transit 

services as well as the right to 

operate the gas transmission 

system. Ukrtransgaz is in charge 

of the technical implementation 

of the contract under Naftogaz’s 

obligations.

Ukraine consequently remains 

where it was in 2014: despite 

Naftogaz’s efforts, progress in 

the gas transmission unbundling 

process is highly unlikely until 

the termination of the current 

transit contract. Naftogaz 

can only fulfill its unbundling 

requirements with Gazprom’s 

written consent. Otherwise, 

Naftogaz’s loss of control over 

Unfortunately, the tribunal rejected Naftogaz’s request to review the 
contract with regard to the transfer of rights and obligations to the 
designated TSO, noting that the implementation of regulatory reform 
in Ukraine lies in the domain of the Ukrainian authorities and is beyond 
the tribunal’s competence in this case.

gas transmission assets would 

put at risk the fulfilment of 

obligations to transit gas to 

European customers.  

The company continues to look 

for a solution, but it is important 

to note that the Ukrainian energy 

regulator (NCREU), with the 

support of the EU, should play 

a key role and make Gazprom 

bring the contract into line with 

EU legal norms incorporated in 

Ukrainian law.

The Ukrainian government 

continues to focus its efforts on 

identifying technical issues of 

Naftogaz group restructuring 

related to unbundling, though 

as mentioned above, the 

unbundling and independence 

requirements of the law primarily 

concern the TSO, which is now 

part of the group.

The tribunal’s award does not 

prevent the company from 

continuing active preparation 

for unbundling after 2019. 

PricewaterhouseCoopers Polska 

Sp. z o.o. (PwC) is advising 

Naftogaz on the process of 

gas transmission unbundling. 

Experts from Naftogaz and 

Ukrtransgaz, in cooperation 

with PwC, held an inventory, 

identified categories of both 

fixed and intangible assets to be 

transferred to the new TSO, and 

developed a detailed roadmap 

for the implementation of 

Resolution #496 of the Cabinet 

of Ministers of Ukraine “On 

the unbundling of natural 

gas transmission and storage 

(injection and withdrawal)”.

The Operator of the Gas 

Transmission System of Ukraine 

(OGTSU) branch was established 

and started operation as part 

of Ukrtransgaz. This new 

branch has tens of thousands 

of assets needed for gas 

transmission along with 

the relevant personnel and 

business operations in place. 

According to advisors, the 

branch concentrates all key 

business processes required 

for TSO certification according 

to the OU model stipulated 

by Ukrainian law. The natural 

gas transmission function is 

therefore ready for unbundling. 

In the absence of Gazprom 

resistance, Naftogaz would 

transfer it to the new legal entity 

as required by law.

Naftogaz’s unbundling efforts 

focus on maximizing Ukraine’s 

benefit from using the transit 

infrastructure in terms of 

both current contracts and 

those concluded after 2019. 

Meanwhile, the book value of 

gas transmission assets as of 

the end of 2017 was almost 

UAH 190 billion. These assets 

should be unbundled in a way 

that would neither decrease their 

value nor generate losses for 

Naftogaz group.

An independent TSO was 

established to facilitate an 

effective gas market. As a link 

between those who inject gas 

into the system and those who 

withdraw, the TSO cannot bear 

the risks of either party. The 

competent and independent 

energy regulator controls the 

TSO’s independence along with 

observation of competition 

rules and proper operation of 

the gas market. It is obvious that 

unbundling the transmission 

function without accomplishing 

clear prerequisites will ensure 

neither desirable independence 

of the TSO nor successful 

implementation of gas market 

reform in Ukraine. To make the 

TSO genuinely independent, 

the following conditions are 

necessary:

•  control over the independent 

TSO should be removed from 

the Cabinet of Ministers of 

Ukraine and then it will not 

be deemed as a vertically 

integrated organization 

according to the law of 

Ukraine “On the natural gas 

market”. If this occurs, a) the 

laws regulating the Energy 

Ministry and the Cabinet 

of Ministers of Ukraine 

need to be amended, and 

b) the TSO must have a 

corporate governance 

system complying with 

OECD principles and 

recommendations in place, 

including  a supervisory 

board with a majority of 

independent members and 

ample powers to ensure 

maximum autonomy 

(including the approval 

of strategy, development 

plans, financial plans and 

appointments);

•  a legal framework that would 

bring the TSO’s rights to the 

gas transmission infrastructure 

as close as possible to 

ownership rights (including 

the right to pledge property);

•  secondary legislation, 

including network codes 

(primarily GTS Code of Ukraine, 

which sets the rules for the 

market), must comply with EU 

standard network codes and 

“The suggested internal restructuring is a very sensible and first real step 
towards TSO unbundling that we see from the Ukrainian side” 

Janez Kopač, Energy Community Secretariat Director 

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OUR MARKET AND REFORMS

ANNUAL REPORT 2017

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50

hence with the Third Energy 

Package;

•  solving the issue of the 

unviable business model of 

heat suppliers and DSOs, 

which use legal loopholes to 

shift their risks and losses to 

the TSO, a responsible entity 

for maintaining balance in the 

system;

•  following the results of 

the EC-funded technical 

assistance project, an 

optimization program 

for underground gas 

storage facilities should be 

implemented, including 

finding the most efficient way 

to use them. Among other 

things, it is necessary to solve 

the problem of purchasing 

and funding of nearly 4.7 

bcm of gas that belongs to 

Naftogaz and is currently 

used by Ukrtransgaz to 

maintain the required amount 

of cushion gas; 

•  reformed composition of the 

energy regulator should win 

the trust of market participants 

and international partners in 

terms of independence and 

competence.

Currently the TSO, as part of 

Naftogaz group, is ensuring free 

access to the gas transmission 

infrastructure. The absence of 

complaints from transmission 

customers reflects this. However, 

unbundling the transmission 

function without the 

abovementioned conditions in 

place may lead to discrimination 

against some natural gas market 

participants, including Naftogaz. 

There is ample evidence of 

this discrimination, including a 

guaranteed supplier function 

imposed on Naftogaz until 

2015 and the actual role of an 

entity assuming the offtakes 

of the most defaulted market 

participants since 2016. This 

discriminative policy resulted 

in about UAH 28 billion in 

debts owed to Naftogaz by 

heat suppliers, CHPs and direct 

industrial consumers as of the 

end of 2017.

LIBERALIZATION OF GAS SUPPLY 

TO HOUSEHOLD CONSUMERS, 

PSO AND SUBSIDIES SYSTEM

A liberalized and competitive 

European-type retail gas 

market has been the main 

objective of gas market reform 

for Naftogaz group. Achieving 

this will bring tangible results 

from the reform process for 

every consumer.

According to the market 

participants, the segment 

of gas supply to industrial 

consumers has become 

completely liberalized and 

highly competitive. There are 

now more than 400 suppliers 

in the Ukrainian market, and 

more than 60 independent 

natural gas importers.

The transformation of 

pricing policy in gas supply 

to household consumers, 

launched in 2014, is an obvious 

reason for the decline in 

natural gas consumption by 

households by almost a third 

over the period from 2014 to 

2017. The rise in prices has 

contributed to a change in 

consumer behavior, which led 

to a reduction in wasteful use 

of gas, and has become an 

incentive to increase energy 

efficiency and energy saving, 

also creating conditions for 

the replacement of natural gas 

with other fuels or energy.

At the same time, the segment 

of gas supply to household 

consumers remains non-

liberalized and uncompetitive. 

This is hampered by two major 

systemic issues: imperfect 

and ineffective public service 

obligations (PSO) in the gas 

market and the housing 

subsidies.

Public service obligations in the gas market

PSO means special duties, the 

essence of which is that the 

government sets the price 

for gas at a level below the 

market and obliges individual 

companies to sell gas at a 

regulated price. The companies 

on which public service 

obligations are imposed are 

entitled to compensation for 

costs related to their execution.

The current special duties 

model obliges Naftogaz to 

sell its domestically produced 

gas and imported gas to 

designated regional gas retail 

companies (oblgazzbuts), 

which are exclusive suppliers 

to households in their 

region. The company has no 

right to refuse to sell gas to 

oblgazzbut regardless of debts 

for previously supplied gas. 

These companies are de facto 

monopolists and operate on 

preferential terms in gas supply 

to households and do not incur 

any financial risks because they 

are not obliged to pay for gas 

in advance or to pay financial 

sanctions in case of untimely 

post-payment. Oblgazzbut is a 

de facto intermediary.

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