UNCTAD REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT (2021)

4. Key performance indicators for ports and the shipping fleet

Figure 4.12

Trends in vessel sizes and number of companies providing services, selected

countries, first quarter 2006 to second quarter 2021

Companies

Maximum vessel size (TEU)

Companies

Maximum vessel size (TEU)

Chile

Germany

16 000

100

25 000

14 000

20 000

12 000

10 000

15 000

8 000

10 000

6 000

4 000

5 000

2 000

Companies

Maximum vessel size

Companies

Maximum vessel size

Companies

Maximum vessel size (TEU)

Companies

Maximum vessel size (TEU)

China

Samoa

120

2 000

25 000

1 800

100

1 600

20 000

1 400

1 200

15 000

1 000

800

10 000

600

5 000

400

200

Companies

Maximum vessel size

Companies

Maximum vessel size

Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by MDS Transmodal.

a country - increases with maximum vessel size. For each country, however, there is a trade-off between

accommodating more companies or receiving larger ships: moving horizontally in the chart, for a given

deployed capacity, the bigger ships are in countries with fewer companies in their markets.

Figure 4.13

Relationship between maximum vessel sizes, deployed capacity, and the number

of companies, second quarter 2021

100 000 000

Total deployed capacity

annual, TEU

Bubble size: proportional to

maximum vessel size, TEU

10 000 000

1 000 000

100 000

10 000

Companies

1 000

100

Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by MDS Transmodal.

3. Bilateral liner shipping connectivity

In addition to the country- and port-level LSCI, UNCTAD also produces a connectivity index for country

pairs, the Liner Shipping Bilateral Connectivity Index (LSBCI).³ Progress in the LSBCI, along with its five

component indicators, is illustrated in figure 4.14. Since 2006, on average the LSBCI has increased but

there have been a few disruptions - notably the global financial crisis of 2008, and the pandemic from 2020.

The financial crisis had an almost immediate impact, but the pandemic impact came in waves - delivering

a supply shock that then translated into a demand shock along with differences between countries in the

local impact and propagation of the virus.

In addition to these disruptions, since the last quarter of 2018 the LSBCI has shown a downward trend

which is more a consequence of ongoing structural transformations. One is the increase in ship size.

Between 2006 and 2019 the maximum capacity component of the index more than trebled. Between 2014

and 2019 this was largely offset changes in the other four components, all of which have been declining.

These trends for the component indicators are interlinked. Companies that have invested in larger ships

are aiming for economies of scale which should reduce unit costs. Other companies unable to make these

investments, and to compete, will either withdraw from unprofitable routes or leave the industry altogether.

This reduces the number of operators, which has been happening in all regions - in East Asia for the last

seven years, but also in Latin America, and in Sub-Saharan Africa which in addition has fewer operators

offering intra-regional connections.

With fewer companies, there are likely to be fewer direct connections. This is confirmed by the evolution

of the transhipment component and consequently of the common direct component. Nevertheless, as

direct connections are mainly on historical maritime routes the main adjusting variable on those routes is

likely to be the number of competing companies.

Increasing ships size also affects the hosting capacity of ports especially those that have improved their

infrastructure. This could explain the downward trend since 2017 for the frequency component which

reflects the number of port-to-port connections between countries.

The Liner Shipping Bilateral Connectivity Index

(LSBCI), which is publicly available in its annual form at

http://stats.unctad.org/lsbci, is made of five components: the number of transhipments needed to connect two countries

(transhipment variable), the number of common direct connections between two countries (common direct variable), the

number of port-to-port connections between two countries (frequency variable), the number of liner shipping companies

operating between two countries (operators variable) and, the maximum ship size in TEU deployed between two countries

(max. capacity variable). When no direct connection exists between two countries the latter three components correspond

to connection (option) with the best (highest) value when taking the lowest connecting segment.

4. Key performance indicators for ports and the shipping fleet

Figure 4.14

Liner Shipping Bilateral Connectivity Index (LSBCI) and its components, first

quarter 2006 to second quarter 2021

LSBCI

Transhipment

Common Direct

Frequency

Operators

Max. Capacity

Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by MDS Transmodal.

All in all, the LSBCI trend reflects a worsening

Table 4.3

Top 25 ports under the World

situation for remote and already poorly

Bank IHS Markit Container

connected countries. Added to this is the

Port Performance Index 2020

general increase in freight costs which could

Port name

Economy

Rank

have severe consequences for international trade

Yokohama

Japan

(UNCTAD, 2021a).

King Abdullah port

Saudi Arabia

Chiwan

China

Guangzhou

China

C. PORT CARGO HANDLING

Kaohsiung

Taiwan Province of China

PERFORMANCE

Salalah

Oman

Hong Kong

Hong Kong, China

Qingdao

China

1. Container port performance

Shekou

China

In April

2021, to provide stakeholders with a

Algeciras

Spain

Beirut

Lebanon

reference point for maritime trade and transport

Shimizu

China

the World Bank and IHS Markit published a new

Tanjung Pelepas

Malaysia

index, the Container Port Performance Index

Port Klang

Malaysia

(CPPI) (World Bank 2021, IHS Markit 2021). This

Singapore

index combines data on vessels, their port calls

Nagoya

Japan

and the cargos they load and unload, as well as

Colombo

Sri Lanka

the time they spend in ports.

Sines

Portugal

The first version had data for 2019 and the first half

Kobe

Japan

of 2020 (table 4.3), and was dominated by ports in

Zhoushan

China

East Asia, led by Yokohama in Japan, which was

Jubail

Saudi Arabia

ahead of King Abdullah Port in Saudi Arabia and

Yosu

Republic of Korea

Fuzhou

China

Qingdao in China. In Europe, the highest-ranked

Ningbo

China

port was Algeciras in Spain at

10; in South

Lazaro Cardenas

Mexico

Asia, it was Colombo in Sri Lanka at 17; and

in the Americas, Lazaro Cardenas in Mexico at 25.

Source: World Bank and IHS Markit Port Performance Program.

The only other North American port in the top 50 was Halifax in Canada. In Africa, the top-ranked port

was Djibouti.

UNCTAD has used the raw data from the CPPI to analyse the relationship between the performance of

ports and the time ships spend in them. As indicated in figure 4.15 there are clear economies of scale:

the more containers there are to load and unload - a larger ‘port call size’ - the fewer minutes it takes

to load or unload a container. Nevertheless, total time in port increases with call size (figure 4.16), so it is

reasonable to compare ports or countries within the same range of call sizes.

Port calls where more containers are loaded or unloaded will need longer to handle them, but also be faster

for each individual container move, so the correlation between hours in port and speed of handling a slightly

negative (figure 4.17). But limiting the analysis to one port call range confirms the expected high positive

correlation between the time it takes to move a container and the time it takes to handle a ship (figure 4.18).

For the top 25 economies, table 4.4 summarizes the speed of container handling. For five of the nine

call-size ranges the fastest handling is in Taiwan Province of China, followed by Japan for two ranges, and

Malaysia and Hong Kong, China for one range each. The ranking per country roughly follows that of the

leading individual ports in table 4.3.

Figure 4.15

Minutes per container move for container ships, by range of port call size

500 and below

501-1000

1001-1500

1501-2000

2001-2500

2501-3000

3001-4000

4001-6000

6000 and above

Call size (moves)

Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by IHS Markit Port Performance Program.

Figure 4.16

Time in port (hours) for container ships, by range of port call size

250

200

150

100

500 and below

501-1000

1001-1500

1501-2000

2001-2500

2501-3000

3001-4000

4001-6000

6000 and above

Call size (container moves)

Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by IHS Markit Port Performance Program.

100

4. Key performance indicators for ports and the shipping fleet

Figure 4.17

Correlation between time

Figure 4.18

Correlation between time

in port (hours) and minutes

per container move,

per container move, only

all call sizes

calls with 1001 to 1500

1000

containers per call

100

0.1

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

Minutes per container move

Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by IHS Markit Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by IHS Markit Port

Port Performance Program.

Performance Program. Coefficient of determination (R2) 0.99.

Table 4.4

Minutes per container move, by range of call size, top 25 countries by port calls

501-

1001-

1501-

2001-

2501-

3001-

4001-

Country\call size

<500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

4000

6000

>6000

Australia

3.44

2.27

1.84

1.57

1.47

1.31

1.28

1.25

0.81

Belgium

3.71

2.08

1.40

1.10

0.91

0.80

0.73

0.70

0.54

Brazil

3.01

1.96

1.48

1.30

1.16

1.07

0.92

China

2.92

1.68

1.14

0.92

0.77

0.66

0.57

0.49

0.42

Hong Kong, China

3.21

1.60

1.01

0.79

0.77

0.63

0.58

0.45

Taiwan Province of China

2.31

1.25

0.87

0.67

0.58

0.69

0.51

France

3.33

2.21

1.70

1.38

1.27

1.23

1.08

0.89

Germany

4.13

1.92

1.31

1.13

0.96

0.82

0.73

0.65

0.58

India

2.52

1.55

1.22

0.91

0.79

0.75

0.65

0.55

Indonesia

4.22

2.35

2.00

1.45

1.04

1.00

0.80

0.67

Italy

3.55

2.41

1.91

1.54

1.46

1.48

1.44

1.14

Japan

2.57

1.21

1.01

0.80

0.66

0.75

0.70

Republic of Korea

2.88

1.63

1.14

0.89

0.78

0.75

0.65

0.56

0.70

Malaysia

3.83

2.03

1.38

0.98

0.79

0.69

0.55

0.46

0.37

Netherlands

8.14

2.70

1.67

1.44

1.23

0.99

0.80

0.67

0.62

Panama

4.33

1.86

1.36

1.04

0.94

0.96

0.78

0.88

1.23

Philippines

4.67

3.51

2.79

2.29

1.91

1.43

1.42

Singapore

3.87

1.81

1.24

0.95

0.76

0.67

0.59

0.47

0.39

Spain

3.87

1.87

1.29

0.98

0.85

0.72

0.63

0.67

0.48

Thailand

2.69

2.79

1.11

0.94

0.79

0.69

0.70

0.66

0.58

Turkey

3.47

2.03

1.42

1.16

1.09

1.06

0.94

0.64

0.57

United Arab Emirates

6.89

2.41

1.74

1.18

0.85

0.70

0.59

0.52

0.41

United Kingdom

3.79

2.18

1.84

1.53

1.28

1.22

1.27

0.93

0.78

United States

3.16

1.77

1.34

1.16

1.06

1.01

0.93

0.90

0.85

Viet Nam

2.64

1.55

1.13

0.78

0.67

0.64

0.58

0.54

0.52

Average

3.73

2.02

1.45

1.16

0.99

0.91

0.82

0.70

0.62

Median

3.47

1.96

1.36

1.10

0.91

0.80

0.73

0.66

0.57

Minimum

2.31

1.21

0.87

0.67

0.58

0.63

0.51

0.45

0.37

Maximum

8.14

3.51

2.79

2.29

1.91

1.48

1.44

1.25

1.23

Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by IHS Markit Port Performance Program.

101

Box 4.1

Port performance in Latin America and the Caribbean - differences between

types of terminals

In Latin America and the Caribbean across 50 countries and territories, logistics and port services are

provided through 1,967 port facilities. Of these, 1,259 are certified as compliant with the International

Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, including 982 facilities that handle cargo or passenger

transfer services, and 277 that provide other services, such as shipyards, docks, and others.

Nonetheless, according to an intensive survey of port facilities in the entire region carried out by the

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), there are also another 708, of

which 590 are port terminals and 118 are related to other types of service.

Port terminals, including those that are ISPS certified and those that are not, represents a widely

diverse geographical distribution. The top ten countries according to the number of port terminals

are: Brazil, 306; Mexico, 171; Argentina, 143; Chile and Peru, 97 each; Colombia, 88; Paraguay, 65;

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 63; Panama, 48 and Cuba, 45. These 10 countries, out of 50, make

up 74 per cent of the region’s port facilities.

At the opposite end of the ranking, 15 countries or territories have five or fewer facilities each, and

almost all have no more than one terminal by port specialty: Antigua and Barbuda, Bermuda, Belize,

Barbados, Turks and Caicos Islands, El Salvador, Aruba, Bonaire, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Anguilla,

Montserrat, Sint Eustatius, Saint Barth, and Sint Maarten.

A high proportion of these facilities, 470 in total, are multipurpose terminals. The following chart exhibits

the distribution by zones and specialties:

South America

Caribbean

Passenger

Terminal

Multipurpose

Con-

tainer

Dry Bulk

Termi-

Terminal

nal

Multipurpose

Liquid Bulk Terminal

303

Dry Bulk Terminal

Central America and Mexico

250

Bulk

Passenger

Terminal

Liquid Bulk

Dry Bulk

(Liquid

Terminal

+ Dry)

Container

Terminal

Multipurpose

Passenger

Container

Ro-Ro

Liquid Bulk Terminal

Terminal

273

Bulk Terminal (Liquid + Dry)

Ro-Ro Terminal

This region is very diverse - in terms of composition, languages, economies, cultural identities, and

modes of adaptation to international instruments. The ports systems too differ in terms of maturity

and productivity. In the liquid and dry bulk categories, in the most specialized countries, productivity

is higher - as in Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, which move annual volumes close to 600 million mt.

In the last few years region has seen enormous growth in terms of containers, though only four

specialized terminals yet have semi-automated processes. Progress in digitalization and paperless

transactions has also been slow, and regulatory procedures are not very transparent, making it difficult

to promote effective competition. Long-term planning has shown a lack of foresight for ports and

connectivity with hinterland infrastructure

Some areas have weakly regulated quasi-monopolistic markets, while others have excessive

competition, which may prove harmful. Systems for the design, granting and monitoring of concessions

are hampered by institutional weaknesses. These reduce prospects for investment and better

multimodal connections and efficient access to markets and ports. The result is often inefficiency and

low productivity.

Increasing vertical integration between shipping lines, port terminals and inland logistics heightens

the risk of monopoly. In certain areas there are also tensions between management, security, and

facilitation. Better security standards would improve development, efficiency, and competitiveness.

Nonetheless, there is some optimism that these problems can be solved - with considerable potential

for more containerization and automation of procedures, as well as for improvements in facilitation.

Source: ECLAC, Maritime and Logistics Profile.

102

4. Key performance indicators for ports and the shipping fleet

2. Dry bulk port performance

VesselsValue⁴ has produced a new dataset that combines AIS data on ship movements with data on cargo

transfers. This can be used to calculate interesting performance indicators for dry bulk port operations

(table 4.5). During the period 2018 to mid-2021, among the top 30 countries in terms of ship arrivals, the

average speed of loading ranged from just six ton per minute in Romania and Turkey to 48 ton in Australia.

For dry bulk cargo, unloading tends to be slower than loading, as the operations cannot use the same

combination of gravity and conveyer belts. The fastest unloading was in China, at 23 tonnes per minute,

and the slowest in Russian Federation, at just 4 tonnes per minute, and in Norway, at just 6 tonnes

per minute. These differences partly reflect port performance and economies of scale; Chinese dry bulk

terminals are highly mechanized and handle the world’s largest iron ore carriers, while Russian Federation

and Norway have a long coast with many smaller ports.

Table 4.5

Cargo and vessel handling performance for dry bulk carriers. Top 30 economies

by vessel arrivals, average values for 2018 to first half of 2021

Average waiting to

Ton per minute,

load duration

discharge duration

discharge

(hours)

China

Australia

101

United States

101

Brazil

174

131

Russian Federation

Canada

117

Argentina

South Africa

Japan

India

Ukraine

United Arab Emirates

Indonesia

Republic of Korea

New Zealand

Chile

Turkey

Viet Nam

Colombia

Malaysia

Mexico

Taiwan Province of China

Peru

Oman

Norway

France

Saudi Arabia

Morocco

127

Romania

Mozambique

123

Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by VesselsValue.

Note: Ranked by number dry bulk carrier arrivals for loading.

Data provided electronically by VesselsValue; https://www.vesselsvalue.com, June 2021.

103

Ships generally wait longer to load than to unload, though there are significant differences between

countries. In Colombia, the average waiting time for unloading is one day while in Brazil it is five and a half

days. Brazil also has the highest waiting times for loading - on average more than a week. This is partly

a consequence of large vessel sizes and longer distances from the main markets. The shortest waits for

loading cargo are in Taiwan Province of China at 34 hours. Some countries encourage owners to arrive

early to minimize the risk of missing a scheduled port call.

3. Tanker port performance

For tanker port operations too, loading tends to be faster than unloading or ‘discharge’. Among the top

30 countries in terms of tanker arrivals, the fastest loading was by the major oil exporters, reaching up

to 113 tons per minute for Angola, followed by 95 in Qatar, 90 in Kuwait, and 86 in Saudi Arabia. For

unloading oil, the fastest average speeds were in Japan at 83 tons per minute, followed by Republic of

Korea at 67 (table 4.6). As regards waiting times, the lowest average time for loading was in Qatar at

26 hours, and for discharge in Japan at 28 hours.

Table 4.6

Cargo and vessel handling performance for tankers. Top 30 countries by vessel

arrivals, average values for 2018 to first half of 2021

Average waiting to

Tons per minute,

Average waiting to

discharge duration

discharge

load duration (hours)

(hours)

United States

Russian Federation

China

Brazil

Saudi Arabia

United Arab Emirates

Republic of Korea

Singapore

India

Malaysia

Netherlands

Indonesia

Italy

Mexico

Nigeria

129

Kuwait

Iraq

Canada

Spain

Qatar

Japan

United Kingdom

Turkey

Norway

Angola

113

Belgium

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

105

Taiwan Province of China

Argentina

Greece

Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by VesselsValue.

Note: Ranked by number tanker arrivals for loading.

104

4. Key performance indicators for ports and the shipping fleet

E. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS BY THE WORLD FLEET

1. Shipping is missing its greenhouse gas emissions targets

Over the last decade shipping has become more energy efficient so total emissions have grown slower

than the total number of vessels (figure 4.19). Nevertheless, this improvement will not suffice to meet the

emissions targets and the agreed objective of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) “to reduce the

total annual greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50 per cent by 2050 compared to 2008” as part of the

“Initial IMO Strategy on reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from ships” (IMO, 2018).

Figure 4.19

Carbon dioxide emissions by vessel type, monthly, million tons, 2011-2021

Container

Dry bulk carrier

Other

Oil and product

tanker

Lique ed gas

tanker

Offshore

General cargo

Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by Marine Benchmark.

The trends for the world’s fleet over the last decade reflect its changing composition, with a declining

proportion of journeys for general cargo ships and an increasing one for LNG carriers, with correspondingly

higher greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In figure 4.19 it is also possible to see the annual downturn in

traffic around February in line with the Chinese New Year especially in the dry bulk and container sector.

More recently this chart also shows the impact of the pandemic. ‘Other’ ships include primarily passenger

ships, including ferries and cruise ships which were worst affected. Container ships, also saw an initial

decline at the outset of the pandemic but subsequently recovered.

2. Assigning emissions to flag states

Emissions by flag state mostly correspond to market shares for tonnage. But because the fleets have

different compositions the ranking is not identical. Liberia, for example, has a larger market share than

Marshall Islands in terms of total tonnage (table 2.5), but a far smaller share for CO2 emissions because it

has a higher proportion of dry bulk carriers, which produce lower emissions per dwt than other ship types.

Germany, on the other hand, is ranked only 29 in the world fleet, but 6 in terms of emissions because

a high proportion of its fleet is container ships which tend to go faster than other ship types and emit

more CO2 per dwt.⁵

Data provided electronically by Marine Benchmark; https://www.marinebenchmark.com, June 2021.

105

Figure 4.20

Carbon dioxide emissions by flag state, annual, 2011-2020, million tons

140

Panama

Marshall Islands

120

Liberia

100

Hong Kong, China

Singapore

Germany

Malta

Bahamas

China

Japan

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by Marine Benchmark.

3. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions may reduce connectivity and

increase costs

In June 2021 the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee approved a new short-term measure

for GHG emissions, with both technical and operational requirements.

Earlier that year, UNCTAD undertook a Comprehensive Impact Assessment of the proposed measure,

setting out scenarios for 2030 with or without the measure, across three levels of emission reduction

ambition. The aim was to quantify the changes in maritime logistics costs including shipping and time

costs. All three indicated an increase in maritime logistics costs.

The IMO subsequently agreed the low scenario, for which the UNCTAD study suggested the following

outcomes for 2030:

• A reduction in average speed of 2.8 per cent.

• An increase in average maritime shipping costs by 1.5 per cent.

While significant, these changes are relatively small when compared to typical variations in freight rates.

They will also have a very small impact on global GDP and certainly far smaller than the disruption caused

by the pandemic or climate change factors, or the costs of not acting in the face of climate change.

However the IMO measures will have a greater impact on some countries than others, notably on SIDS

or LDCs, which may need support to mitigate the increased costs and alleviate the consequent fallout on

their incomes and trade flows (UNCTAD 2021c).

F. SUMMARY AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

This chapter has detailed several aspects of port and shipping performance, including fleet deployment

and the time ships spend in port, and port performance. It has highlighted persistent differences between

ports and countries, and shown how these are shaped by human, institutional, and technological factors.

Developing countries generally perform worse, with higher costs and lower connectivity - a consequence

of diseconomies of scale, greater distances from overseas markets, and lower levels of digitalization.

These and other countries should be aiming for more competitive commercial environments for port and

shipping operations, ensuring that external costs are accounted for.

Costs are likely to increase slightly as a result of measures needed for decarbonization of maritime

transport. Smaller and most vulnerable economies may need support to mitigate the increased costs and

lower connectivity.

GHG emissions can also be reduced by improving port and shipping performance. If ports can optimize

their availability, ships can plan their voyages so as to arrive in port the moment their berth becomes

available, thus reducing unnecessary speed and fuel consumption.

Maritime transport will also be transformed by the global energy transition which will increase maritime

transport costs and reduce average shipping speeds. Logistics costs increases will be greater for

developing than for developed countries.

106

4. Key performance indicators for ports and the shipping fleet

REFERENCES

IHS Markit (2021). New Global Container Port Performance Index (CPPI) Launched by the World Bank

and IHS Markit.

IMO (2018). Initial IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships. MEPC 72/17/Add.1 Annex

11. April. Available at https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Environment/Documents/

ResolutionMEPC.304(72)_E.pdf (accessed 24 May 2020).

MDST (2020). Available at https://www.portlsci.com/index.php (accessed 5 July 2020).

UNCTAD (2017). Review of Maritime Transport 2017 (United Nations publication. Sales No. E.17.II.D.10.

New York and Geneva).

UNCTAD (2021a). Container Shipping in Times of COVID-19: Why Freight Rates Have Surged and

Implications for Policy Makers. Policy Brief No. 84. Geneva.

UNCTAD (2021b). Small Island Developing States: Maritime Transport in the Era of a Disruptive Pandemic.

Policy Brief, No. 85. UNCTAD. Geneva.

UNCTAD (2021c). UNCTAD Assessment of the Impact of the IMO Short-Term GHG Reduction Measure

on States, UNCTAD/DTL/TLB/2021/2, UNCTAD. Geneva.

World Bank (2021). Asian Ports Dominate Global Container Port Performance Index.

107

This chapter has been prepared in response to a

request by the UN General Assembly in its resolution

on “International cooperation to address challenges

faced by seafarers as a result of the COVID-19

pandemic to support global supply chains”

(A/RES/75/17), at para. 7.

The shipping industry has played a vital role in the

global response to the COVID-19 pandemic - delivering

food, medical supplies, fuel, and other essential goods,

and helping keep global supply chains and commerce

running. This is to a large extent due to the world’s 1.9

million seafarers, who through these extraordinary times

have demonstrated great professionalism and dedication.

But their work has come at some risk to the seafarers

themselves, many of whom have been unable to leave their

ships. This chapter considers issues related to seafarers’

health, safety, security and welfare. It highlights areas where

The COVID-19

industry, governments, and international organizations can

cooperate to protect seafarers’ human and legal rights and

seafarer crisis

implement relevant labour standards, including those agreed

in the Maritime Labour Convention 2006, and in particular,

alleviate their plight resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Such support should be part of the implementation of the

broader 2030 Agenda - in particular, SDG 8, which aims to

ensure decent work and economic growth. Beyond protecting

the rights and welfare of seafarers and their families, this

would also support the economies of their home countries,

help maintain world trade and ensure the flow of goods

across supply chains.

Key shipping stakeholders, including international bodies,

governments, and industry, have issued guidance and

recommendations for ensuring that seafarers are medically fit

and have access to medical care, with mechanisms to prevent,

and respond to, COVID-19 emergencies at sea - and that ships

and port facilities meet international sanitary requirements.

They have also argued that seafarers should be recognized as

key workers and vaccinated as a matter of priority. However,

as the pandemic continues for a second year the crew change

crisis appears to be worsening, with continuing logistical

obstacles to the repatriation of seafarers. Stakeholders will

need to redouble their efforts while also regularly updating

their guidance and recommendations in line with the latest

scientific insights.

The COVID-19

seafarer crisis

Seafarers, many of whom from developing countries, are playing a vital

role in ensuring the ow of critical goods across supply chains and

keeping the world trade moving.

All should be working together to implement relevant labour standards, protect

seafarers’ human rights and advance the objectives of SDG 8 of decent work

and economic growth for sustainable development.

Vaccination

Concerted collaborative efforts by industry, governments and

international organizations should ensure that seafarers are

designated as key workers and are vaccinated as a matter of priority

Crew changes

Governments and industry should continue to work together,

including through the Neptune Declaration initiative, and in

collaboration with relevant international organizations, to facilitate

crew changes, in accordance with international standards and in

line with public health considerations

Route deviations

Charterers and other industry stakeholders should

be exible in accepting requests from shipping

companies for route deviation to facilitate crew

changes

Despite important

International legal framework

international efforts and

States and other relevant stakeholders should

support, the crew change

keep under review the relevant legal

crisis has worsened and

framework and ensure that international

seafarers are still facing

obligations are respected and implemented

serious problems which

need to be addressed:

Maritime single windows

Port community systems should implement the

Single Window concept to cover all the information

and formalities resulting from FAL and other

relevant instruments

Information exchange

Relevant public and private sector stakeholders should continue

their regular exchange of views and best practices on seafarers’

situation and needs

Outbreaks and emergencies at sea

Speci c guidance on measures to prevent and deal with COVID-19

and other outbreaks at sea should be updated regularly, in line with

developing scienti c insights

5. The COVID-19 seafarer crisis

A. SEAFARERS CRISIS - RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Shipping and seafarers are vital to global supply chains and the world economy - transporting over

80 per cent of world trade by volume. Around 1.9 million seafarers work to facilitate the way we live,

and during the COVID-19 pandemic seafarers have continued to demonstrate great professionalism and

dedication, helping to deliver food, medical supplies, fuel, and other essential goods, and keep supply

chains active and global commerce running.

Recognizing this, key shipping stakeholders, including international bodies, governments, and industry,

have issued guidance and recommendations to support seafarers during the pandemic.¹ The aim is to

ensure that seafarers are protected from COVID-19, are medically fit and have access to medical care;

that ships and port facilities meet international sanitary requirements; that seafarers are recognised as key

workers; and that they are vaccinated as a matter of priority.

However, the pandemic has seriously disrupted crew changes. Each month, a large number of seafarers

need to be changed over - to prevent fatigue and to comply with international maritime regulations

for safety, crew health and welfare. Aiming to protect public health, as variants of the virus emerge,

governments are continuing to impose border closures, lockdowns and preventative measures

which include suspending crew changes and prohibiting crews from disembarking at port terminals.

Due to these restrictions, and the shortage of international flights, even one year into the pandemic

hundreds of thousands of seafarers remain stranded at sea, far beyond the expiration of their contracts

(De Beukelaer, 2021). As yet, there is no global consensus on uniform measures that may allow for

efficient crew changes and transfer.

The social partners, international organizations, and industry bodies have expressed concern about this

humanitarian crisis. IMO, ILO, ICS, ITF, and UNCTAD have urged member States to designate seafarers

and other marine personnel as key workers and accept their identity documents as evidence of this

status. They have also asked for greater flexibility for ship owners and managers to divert ships and

to call in ports where crew change is possible, without imposing penalties. See IMO 2020a, ITF 2020,

IMO 2020b, and UNCTAD 2020d.

On 1 December 2020, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution on ‘International

cooperation to address challenges faced by seafarers as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic to support

global supply chains’ (A/RES/75/17).² Indonesia, which supplies much of the maritime labour force,

facilitated the negotiation, supported by UNCTAD, ILO and IMO. Co-sponsored by 71 countries, the

resolution urges member States to designate seafarers and other marine personnel as key workers and

encourages governments and other stakeholders to implement the “Industry recommended framework of

protocols for ensuring safe ship crew changes and travel during the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic”,

the importance of which was recognized by the Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO (IMO, 2021a).³ The

resolution also calls upon governments to facilitate maritime crew changes by enabling them to embark

and disembark and expediting travel and repatriation efforts, while also ensuring access to medical care.

In addition, on 8 December 2020, the Governing Body of the International Labour Organization adopted

a ‘Resolution concerning maritime labour issues and the COVID-19 pandemic’ (ILO, 2020b). This urges

all Members, to collaborate to identify obstacles to crew changes; designate seafarers as “key workers”,

for the purpose of facilitation of safe and unhindered movement for embarking or disembarking a vessel,

and the facilitation of shore leave. Members should also accept seafarer’s internationally recognized

documentation, including seafarers’ identity documents delivered in conformity with ILO Conventions

Nos 108 and 185, and also consider temporary waivers, exemptions or other changes to visa or

documentary requirements that might normally apply to seafarers. In addition, they should ensure access

See further UNCTAD,

2020a, Chapter

5.E. See also COVID-19-related IMO circulars, https://www.imo.org/en/

MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/Coronavirus.aspx. For a list of COVID-19 related communications on measures taken by

IMO Member states/Associate Members (updated weekly), see http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/

COVID-19-Member-States-Communications.aspx, as well as weekly updates from BIMCO on implementation measures

imposed by governments and UN bodies, for sea transport including for crew changes https://www.bimco.org/news/

ports/20210528-bimco-covid-19-weekly-report. For calls for action by UNCTAD, see UNCTAD, 2020b, 2020c, 2020d.

Also see UNCTAD, 2020e, and 2020f, ILO, 2020, WHO, 2020a, and INTERTANKO, 2020. For a roadmap to improve and

ensure good indoor ventilation in the context of COVID-19, see WHO, 2021a. For policy and technical considerations for

implementing a risk-based approach to international travel in the context of COVID-19, including for seafarers, see WHO,

2021b and 2021c.

https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/75/17. Inter alia, the Resolution also requests IMO and UNCTAD to report on issues related

to the resolution.

Subsequently revised in April 2021, to include reference to vaccination.

111

to medical facilities ashore, emergency medical treatment and, where necessary, emergency repatriation

for seafarers regardless of nationality.

On 21 September 2020, another relevant resolution was adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee of

the IMO - ‘Recommended action to facilitate ship crew change, access to medical care and seafarer

travel during the COVID-19 pandemic’ (IMO, 2020c). The IMO urged governments and relevant national

authorities to engage nationally and internationally in discussions on the implementation of the industry

protocols and consider applying them to the maximum extent possible; designate seafarers as “key

workers” providing an essential service,in order to facilitate safe and unhindered movement for embarking

or disembarking a vessel; consider temporary measures including (where possible under relevant law)

waivers, exemptions or other relaxations from any visa or documentary requirements that might normally

apply to seafarers; encourage the use of prevention measures, such as tests on crews before embarkation

and provide seafarers with immediate access to medical care ashore.

In response, echoing the above calls, in January 2021, more than 600 companies and organizations

signed the

‘Neptune Declaration on Seafarer Wellbeing and Crew Change’

(Global Maritime

Forum, 2021a).⁴ The declaration recognizes their shared responsibility to resolve the crew change crisis

and calls for the implementation of the industry protocols. For this purpose, it defines four main actions:

recognize seafarers as key workers and give them priority access to COVID-19 vaccines; establish

and implement gold-standard health protocols based on existing best practice; increase collaboration

between ship operators and charterers to facilitate crew changes; and ensure air connectivity between

key maritime hubs for seafarers. Subsequently, the signatories developed a set of best practices that

serve as a framework for charterers to facilitate crew changes and work with ship owners to minimize

the disruptions to operations (Global Maritime Forum, 2021b). In addition, they developed a Neptune

Declaration Crew Change Indicator which aggregates data from 10 leading ship managers covering about

90,000 seafarers, to estimate the number affected by the crisis (Global Maritime Forum, 2021c).⁵ At

the peak of the crisis, more than 400,000 crew were trapped on board their ships. As of March 2021,

around 200,000 seafarers remained on board commercial vessels beyond the expiry of their contracts

(IMO, 2021b, Aljazeera, 2021).

In March 2021, IMO, ICAO, ILO, WHO and IOM, issued a joint statement on priority vaccination of seafarers

and aircrews (IMO, 2021c, IMO, 2021d; ILO, 2021a). Around that time, there were other important

documents published, including an industry paper ‘COVID-19: Legal, liability and insurance Issues arising

from vaccination of seafarers’ (ICS et al, 2021a), and a ‘Practical guide on vaccination for seafarers and

shipowners’ (ICS et al, 2021b). A further publication by the ICS in May 2021 was ‘Coronavirus (COVID-19):

Roadmap for vaccination of international seafarers’ (ICS et al, 2021c).

The ILO has a Special Tripartite Committee established under the 2006 Maritime Labour Convention

(MLC). In April 2021, the Committee adopted a ‘Resolution concerning the implementation and practical

application of the MLC, 2006, during the COVID-19 pandemic’ which called on Members to designate

and treat seafarers as key workers, and take other necessary steps to ensure their rights (ILO, 2021b).

This would mean providing them with access to COVID-19 vaccination at the earliest opportunity and

promoting the mutual acceptance of vaccine certificates. The Committee also adopted a ‘Resolution

concerning COVID-19 vaccination for seafarers’ (ILO, 2021c), and recommendations concerning the

review of maritime-related instruments (ILO, 2021d). In addition, the ILO, following formal requests from

shipowner and seafarer organizations, has intervened with member States that have ratified MLC 2006, to

remind them of their obligations, notably the obligation of port States to grant access to seafarers in need

of medical care in foreign ports (ILO, 2021e).

In May 2021, the IMO Maritime Safety Committee adopted Resolution MSC.490 (103): ‘Recommended

action to prioritize COVID-19 vaccination of seafarers’ (IMO, 2021e), recommending that member States

and relevant national authorities prioritize their seafarers, as far as practicable, in their national COVID-19

vaccination programmes, taking into account the WHO SAGE Roadmap (WHO, 2020b). And, while

bearing in mind their national vaccines supplies, they should also consider extending COVID-19 vaccines

to seafarers of other nationalities.

Seafarers should also be designated as “key workers” and since they frequently travel across borders

member States should consider exempting them from requiring proof of COVID-19 vaccination as a

condition for entry. In addition, the 109^th Session of the International Labour Conference in June 2021

Signed by more than 800 companies and organizations, as of June 2021.

Anglo- Eastern, Bernhard Schulte, Columbia Shipmanagement, Fleet Management (FLEET), OSM, Synergy Marine,

Thome, V.Group, Wallem, and Wilhelmsen Ship Management.

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5. The COVID-19 seafarer crisis

adopted a ‘Global call to action for a human-centred COVID-19 recovery’ which prioritizes the creation of

decent jobs for all and addresses the inequalities caused by the crisis (ILO, 2021f; ILO, 2021g).

According to IMO, as of the end of June 2021, 60 member States and two associate members had

signed on to designate seafarers as key workers (IMO, 2021f). However, despite a gradual easing, many

countries still maintain restrictions on crew changes based on nationality or travel history. Problems are

also being created in certain contracts of carriage, preventing crew changes while the charterer’s cargo is

onboard and not allowing the ship to deviate to ports where crew changes could take place (ILO, 2021h;

IMO, 2020d). Seafarers also have problems in obtaining visas or travel permits to transit countries.

Despite the above efforts, the crew-change crisis appears to be getting worse. The latest Neptune

Declaration Crew Change Indicator published in July 2021 shows that the number of seafarers on board

beyond the expiry of their contracts continued to rise in June 2021, as did the number of seafarers on

board for over 11 months (table 5.1) (Global Maritime Forum, 2021d). Since the launch of the Indicator in

May 2021, the proportion of seafarers on board vessels beyond the expiry of their contract had increased

from 5.8 to 8.8 per cent - an increase of over 50 per cent. The number of seafarers on board for over

11 months had increased from 0.4 to 1 per cent - an increase of 150 per cent. According to the MLC 2006,

the default maximum period of service on board, following which a seafarer is entitled to repatriation, is

11 months (Regulation 2.5 and Regulation 2.4). In July 2021, the International Chamber of Shipping

estimated that, the number of seafarers remaining on board beyond the expiry of their contract, was

around 250,000.

Table 5.1

Neptune Declaration Crew Change Indicator, July 2021

Percentage of seafarers on board beyond

Percentage of seafarers on board

the expiry of their contracts

for over 11 months

Monthly percentage

Percentage point change

Monthly percentage

Percentage point change

from previous month

May 2021

5.8

0.8

June 2021

7.2

+1.4

0.4

-0.4

July 2021

8.8

+1.6

1.0

+0.6

Source: Global Maritime Forum 2021.

As part of the reporting for the Neptune Declaration Crew Change Indicator, contributing ship managers

also highlighted the following key developments:

“Continual high infection rates and subsequent

domestic lockdowns are still challenging crew changes and causing disruption to crew movements; a

decrease of daily inbound flights to the Philippines as well as the travel ban announced by the Philippine

Government for seafarers traveling from United Arab Emirates, Oman, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka,

Pakistan are causing a general disruption to crew movements; travel restrictions continue to prevent

seafarers from going back home and many flights have been cancelled; and leading maritime crew

nations continue to have low vaccination rates and seafarers continue to have limited vaccine access.”⁶

(see also box 5.1).

Crew changes and repatriation of seafarers thus still entail serious logistical challenges. Moreover, seafarer

access to medical care and priority vaccination remains inadequate, with important repercussions for their

health and safety, as well as for public health (DevPolicy, 2021).

In June 2021, it was reported that a cargo ship’s captain, who developed COVID-19 symptoms shortly

after the vessel set sail, died on board after 11 days (CNN, 2021). Successive ports refused to allow the

vessel to call, and no medical evacuation measures were taken. For six weeks, despite repeated pleas for

assistance, the ship was stranded offshore, unable to find a port that would take the corpse. As a result,

the crew was stuck at sea for weeks, with a potential COVID-19 outbreak on its hands.

This state of affairs is clearly unacceptable. Seafarers should not just be designated as key workers and

vaccinated but also provided with speedy and effective emergency medical assistance in the event of a

COVID-19 outbreak at sea.

It will also be important to keep abreast of the latest guidance, which should be updated in line with

the latest scientific insights on transmission pathways, variants, vaccine efficacy, and related risks.

According to ICS, informal industry survey data about vaccinations by nationality of seafarers suggests that, with some

notable exceptions, only a small proportion of the world’s seafarers has been currently vaccinated.

113

The latest industry guidance for ship-operators (ICS et al., 2021d), draws on sector-specific WHO

guidance published in August 2020 (WHO, 2020a).⁷ A good model is that of Belgium which in July 2021,

started a vaccination programme for all seafarers arriving in a Belgian port, regardless of their nationality

(Safety4Sea, 2021). Other countries have seafarer vaccination programmes, including Australia, Cyprus,

Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States. In India the National Union of Seafarers has started a

programme to offer 5,000 doses to seafarers and their families (TradeWinds, 2021).

Addressing the complex issues arising in the context of facilitating global trade in times of a pandemic

while protecting the health of seafarers and the public at large will require the continued engagement of all

stakeholders, including in the negotiations of legal instruments, guidelines and recommendations under

the auspices of UN bodies, including ILO, IMO, and UNCTAD, and in respect of relevant national and local

implementation. Reflecting the continued need to raise awareness and alleviate the plight of seafarers,

while recognizing their vital role in world trade, it is worth noting that “Seafarers: at the core of shipping’s

future” was selected as the World Maritime theme for 2021.⁸

According to the BIMCO/ICS Seafarer Workforce Report 2021 (BIMCO/ICS 2021), in 2021 around the

world there were 1,892,720 seafarers, of whom 857,540 were officers and 1,035,180 were ratings - skilled

seafarers who carry out support work for officers. The largest supplier for both officers and ratings was

the Philippines followed by the Russian Federation, Indonesia, China, and India (table 5.2). Together, these

countries supplied 44 per cent of the global seafarer workforce. These numbers are growing.

Box 5.1

The case of the Philippines

Seafarer supply

The Philippines is now the world’s largest source of seafarers, with an estimated 700,000 deployed

on domestic or foreign-flagged seagoing vessels. Over a quarter of all global merchant shipping crew

members come from the Philippines. As of 2019, there were 380,000 Filipino seafarers overseas.

By mid-2020, over the three months after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the quarantine

imposed in the country, 50,000 Filipino seafarers had been repatriated, but only 17,845 outbound

or deployed seafarers were recorded by the authorities. As reported by Business Mirror, during

July-September

2020, according to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, the

deployment of Filipino seafarers started to return to normal, with over 136,000 sailors able to board

ships traveling in international waters.

Seafarer remittances

2019, the Philippines earned more than $30.1 billion from overseas Filipino workers, including

$6.5 billion from seafarers. In

2019, the remittances of overseas Filipino workers constituted

9.3 per cent of the Philippines’ GDP and 7.3 per cent of gross national income. By the end of 2020,

total remittances of overseas foreign workers amounted to $29.9 billion a 0.8 per cent decline that year.

Of this amount, $6.3 billion was remitted by sea-based workers - a 2.8 per cent decline.

Seafarer vaccination

When it comes to vaccination against COVID-19, seafarer-supplying nations are at a disadvantage.

According to the New York Times vaccination tracker, as of the beginning of August 2021, globally

on average 53 doses of the COVID-19 vaccines had been administered for every 100 people, but the

Philippines had delivered only 18 doses for every 100 people. Among the world’s five-largest seafarer

providers every country except China (117) had delivered less than the global average: Russian

Federation, 42; Indonesia, 25; and India, 34.

Sources: Maritime Industry Authority (2020). A Letter to All Filipino Seafarers Around the World.13 April.

https://marina.gov.ph/2020/04/13/a-letter-to-all-filipino-seafarers-around-the-world. The World Bank.

https://data.worldbank.org. Philippines Overseas Employment Administration https://www.poea.gov.ph/

ofwstat/ofwstat.html. Global Maritime Forum (2020). S.E.A.F.A.R.E.R. 30 September.

https://www.globalmaritimeforum.org/news/s-e-a-f-a-r-e-r. Business Mirror (2020). 136,000 Filipino seafarers

deployed aboard international vessels overseas since July’. 1 October. https://businessmirror.com.ph/2020/

10/01/136000-filipino-seafarers-deployed-aboard-international-vessels-overseas-since-july. Bangko Sentral ng

Pilipinas (2021). Statistics. Overseas Filipinos’ Cash Remittances. https://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/external/

ofw2.aspx. Philippine Statistics Authority. https://psa.gov.ph/national-accounts/base-2018/data-series.

The industry guidance also refers to non-sector specific guidance for the general public (WHO, 2020c).

https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/pages/DOTS-2021.aspx.

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5. The COVID-19 seafarer crisis

Table 5.2

Five largest seafarer-supply countries, 2021

All Seafarers

Officers

Ratings

Philippines

Russian Federation

Indonesia

China

Indonesia

China

India

China

India

Indonesia

India

Source: BIMCO/ICS, Seafarer Workforce Report 2021, London, 2021.

The 1978 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers

(STCW) establishes basic requirements on training, certification and watchkeeping. Between 2015

and 2021 the supply of STCW -certified officers increased by 11 per cent and that of STCW-certified

ratings by 19 per cent (BIMCO/ICS 2015).

B. SEAFARER CRISIS - IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ILO MARITIME

LABOUR CONVENTION, 2006, AS AMENDED (MLC 2006)

The ILO Maritime Labour Convention 2006, entered into force on 20 August 2013 and, as of July 2021,

had been ratified by 98 of the 187 ILO member States. The Convention comprehensively sets out rights

and responsibilities, as well as minimum standards for seafarers’ working and living conditions. It covers a

wide range of issues, including minimum age, employment agreements, hours of work or rest, payment of

wages, paid annual leave, repatriation at the end of contract, and onboard medical care. It also addresses

licensed private recruitment and placement services, accommodation, food and catering, health and

safety protection and accident prevention and complaint handling. In addition, the Convention introduces

compliance and enforcement components for flag State inspection and for port State control. The MLC

2006,⁹ taken together with other instruments, thus helps guarantee the health, safety, security and welfare

of seafarers as well as their human rights.¹⁰

Nevertheless, as result of COVID-19 restrictions many seafarers have been stranded. As a recent UN

report highlights, “hundreds of thousands of seafarers are trapped on ships as routine crew changes

cannot be carried out, while hundreds of thousands are stranded on land, prevented from re-joining

ships. Those stranded on ships are being denied their human rights, including their rights to physical

and mental health, to family life, and to freedom of movement, and are often forced to work beyond the

default 11-month maximum period of service on board, as established by MLC 2006. This is resulting

in cases that could amount to forced labour” (UN Global Compact, et al., 2021). The report addresses

seafarers’ rights, and offers cargo owners, charterers and logistics providers guidance and a checklist for

conducting due diligence across their supply chains. The aim is to identify, prevent, mitigate and address

adverse human rights impacts for seafarers affected by the ongoing COVID-19 crisis.

On 12 December 2020, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and

Recommendations, adopted a document entitled ‘General observation on matters arising from the

application of the MLC, 2006, during the COVID-19 pandemic’ (ILO, 2021i). The Committee noted with

deep concern the impact that COVID-19 restrictions have had on the protection of seafarers’ rights as laid

out in the Convention. The Committee also took note of the observations of the International Transport

Workers’ Federation received on 1 October 2020 and of the International Chamber of Shipping on

26 October 2020 that ratifying States had failed to comply with major provisions of the Convention during

the COVID-19 pandemic - notably regarding cooperation among Members, access to medical care and

repatriation of seafarers. In addition, they noted the risk that fatigue and other health issues could lead to

serious maritime accidents.¹¹ It therefore, strongly encouraged ratifying States in their different capacities

as flag States, port States or labour-supplying States that have not yet done so, “to recognize seafarers

as key workers without delay and to draw in practice the consequences of such qualification, in order to

restore the respect of their rights as provided for in the MLC, 2006.”

https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:91:0::NO::P91_INSTRUMENT_ID:312331.

The protection of human rights is a cross cutting issue for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which seeks

to realize the human rights of all (see A/RES/70/1, Preamble). Thus, the 2030 Agenda and human rights are interwoven

and inextricably tied together (OHCHR, 2015).

For further information on the labour rights and standards involved, see ILO, 2020c, 2020d.

115

In February 2021, ILO, through a revised information note, published guidance, on how best to address

the complexities of the current crisis in light of the provisions of MLC, 2006. This was updated to reflect the

observations of the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and recommendations

(ILO, 2021j), and also made reference to the MLC, 2006 and previous work of ILO bodies¹², as well as to

recommendations from the IMO and WHO, and related work by the ICS and the ITF.

The Committee advises that the notion of ‘force majeure’, i.e., unforeseen or unforeseeable circumstances

making it impossible to comply with the MLC 2006, may no longer be invoked from the moment that options

are available to comply with the provisions of the Convention, although more difficult or cumbersome, and

urged ratifying States which have not yet done so, to adopt all necessary measures without delay to

restore the protection of seafarers’ rights and comply to the fullest extent with their obligations under the

MLC 2006.

The note urges all ratifying States to:

• Adopt the necessary measures or reinforce existing ones without delay to ensure that, in no case,

are seafarers forced to continue working on extended contractual arrangements without their

formal, free, and informed consent.

• Recognize seafarers as key workers without delay and to draw in practice the consequences of

such qualification, in order to restore the respect of their rights as provided for in the MLC, 2006.

• Adopt necessary measures, in consultation with relevant seafarers’ and shipowners’ organizations,

to further enhance cooperation with each other to ensure the effective implementation and

enforcement of the Convention, in particular during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Flag States are urged to ensure that:

• The ships that fly their flags fully comply with the provisions of the Convention and adopt the

necessary measures and/or reinforce the existing ones without delay, including through more

frequent inspections, if necessary.

• Seafarers on ships that fly their flags are covered by adequate measures for the protection of their

health and have access to prompt and adequate medical care whilst working on board, including

access to vaccination (Regulation 4.1).

• Seafarers are provided with occupational health protection and live, work and train on board ship in

a safe and hygienic environment (Regulation 4.3).

• The prohibition to forgo minimum annual leave with pay is strictly enforced, with the limited exceptions

authorized by the competent authority (Regulation 2.4 and Standard A2.4, paragraph 3).

• Seafarers are repatriated at no cost to themselves in the circumstances specified in the Convention,

with strict respect of the default 11 months maximum period of service on board derived from the

provisions of the Convention (Regulation 2.5 and Regulation 2.4).

• Ships that fly their flag have sufficient of seafarers employed on board to ensure that ships are operated

safely, efficiently and with due regard to security under all conditions, taking into account concerns

about seafarer fatigue and the particular nature and conditions of the voyage (Regulation 2.7).

• No fees or other charges for seafarer recruitment or placement, including the cost of any quarantine

obligations before joining the ship, are borne directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the seafarer,

other than the cost authorized under Standard A1.4, paragraph 5.

• Seafarers are granted shore leave for their health and well-being and consistent with the operational

requirement of their positions, subject to the strict respect of any public health measures applicable

to the local population.

Port States are urged to:

• Ensure that seafarers on board ships in their territory who are in need of immediate medical care,

are given access to medical facilities on shore (Regulation 4.1).

• Facilitate the repatriation of seafarers serving on ships which call at their ports or pass through their

territorial or internal waters (Standard A2.5.1, paragraph 7).

Including the CEACR and the Special Tripartite Committee of MLC 2006.

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5. The COVID-19 seafarer crisis

• Allow and facilitate the replacement of seafarers who have disembarked and consequently ensure

the safe manning of ships, by providing an expeditious and non-discriminatory treatment of new crew

members who enter their territory exclusively to join their ships (Standard A2.5.1, paragraph 7).

Labour-supplying States which have not yet done so, are called upon to:

• adopt the necessary and immediate measures to ensure that the required facilities are put in place

in relation to transport, testing and quarantine of seafarers.

• While encouraging a pragmatic approach regarding certificates in respect of training and

qualifications since the beginning of the pandemic, all ratifying States are urgently called upon

to adopt all necessary measures without delay to restore the protection of seafarers’ rights and

comply, to the fullest extent, with their obligations under the MLC 2006.

• With respect to maritime labour certificates and inspections, while recognizing challenges since

the outbreak of COVID-19, in respect of conducting the inspections required in accordance with

MLC 2006, all ratifying countries with responsibilities as flag States and port States are urged to

adopt the necessary measures without delay, to ensure compliance with the Convention.

In addition, the guidance notes that the measures adopted to contain the pandemic are creating additional

challenges in resolving the cases of abandonment that occurred before the outbreak of COVID-19.

The IMO/ILO database on reported incidents of abandonment of seafarers, shows a dramatic increase in

cases of abandonment in the second part of 2020, with some of those cases linked to COVID-19-related

measures.¹³ It was recalled that, even in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, flag States, port

States and labour-supplying States remain bound by the requirements concerning repatriation set out in

Regulation 2.5 of the MLC 2006, and the relevant provisions of the Code of the Convention.

Member States must undertake all necessary action to promptly resolve situations of abandonment

and ensure that affected seafarers are repatriated as soon as possible and receive the payment of

outstanding wages, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the MLC 2006 (ILO, 2021j). According

to ILO, as of mid-July 2021, 60 cases had been reported for 2021, which, if that rate continued,

would surpass the number of cases in 2020. Also, resolution of a number of abandonment cases had

been delayed due to the pandemic (e.g., not being able to repatriate seafarers due to restrictions on

disembarkation and travel).

C. CREW CHANGES AND KEY WORKER STATUS - OTHER RELEVANT

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

In addition to the MLC 2006, a number of other international conventions and instruments contain

provisions aiming to reduce the formalities and documents required, and to facilitate and simplify crew

changes. These cover issues such as seafarers’ repatriation, transit and joining ships, and the issuance

and harmonization of seafarers’ identity documents, while enhancing border and port security. Adopting

and implementing these instruments would ease the situation of seafarers during the COVID-19 pandemic

and beyond.

ILO Convention No. 108 on Seafarers’ Identity Documents, 1958

It has been a longstanding common practice to allow seafarers shore leave to access medical,

communications and other onshore welfare facilities. In addition, to join or change ships seafarers may

need to transit or transfer through countries, which requires border facilitation at seaports and airports.

For this purpose, they have traditionally been issued with a seafarers’ identity document (SID). Although

a SID is not considered a travel documents per se, like a passport or visa it may be subject to the same

national laws.

The Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention, 1958 (No. 108) entered into force on 19 February 1961,

and has been ratified by 64 States.¹⁴ The Convention specifies the minimum mandatory details that should

be contained in the SID but does not require any security features, or specific form of the document.

As a result, various countries subsequently developed their own, making it difficult for border and port

authorities to determine whether a document is legitimate.

https://www.ilo.org/dyn/seafarers/seafarersbrowse.home. For more information on work by IMO/ILO in cooperation

with ITF, on the issue of abandonment of seafarers, see https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Legal/Pages/Seafarer-

abandonment.aspx.

https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C108.

117

ILO Convention No. 185 on Seafarers’ Identity Documents (Revised)

2003, as amended

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Seafarers’ Identity Documents Convention

(Revised), 2003 (No. 185), was adopted.¹⁵ It included innovations that related to the form of the SID, which

addition to a photograph and other details could include biometric security features such as fingerprints as

well as verification options for uniformity and machine readability. The Convention also contains minimum

requirements for the SID’s issuance processes and procedures, including quality control, national

databases, and national focal points to provide information to border authorities. In particular, article 6,

paragraph 7, of the Convention, provides: “Each Member for which this Convention is in force shall, in the

shortest possible time, also permit the entry into its territory of seafarers holding a valid seafarers’ identity

document supplemented by a passport, when entry is requested for the purpose of: (a) joining their ship

or transferring to another ship; (b) passing in transit to join their ship in another country or for repatriation;

or any other purpose approved by the authorities of the Member concerned.”

Convention No.185 entered into force in February 2005, but so far has been ratified by only 36 out of

187 ILO member States, including only few port States. Although some countries have made considerable

investment to properly implement this Convention, they can therefore only count on only a few other

countries to recognize their SIDs. Moreover, only a few ratifying countries are in a position to issue SIDs

that conform with the Convention, while 64 countries still remain Parties only to the 1958 Convention.

Implementation has been slow partly because the specified fingerprint technology and biometric features

were soon considered out of date. Instead, since 2003 many border authorities have been using the

standards of the International Civil Aviation Authority, namely, ICAO Doc 9303 on Machine Readable Travel

Documents.¹⁶ This is now universally followed for travel and similar documents and includes the facial

image in a contactless chip - as in electronic passports.

In 2016, ILO Convention No.185 was subsequently amended to align its biometric requirements with

those of ICAO Doc 9303.¹⁷ This way, the SID should look and function like an e-passport, booklet, or card

and can be issued, read, and verified with the same equipment - enhancing security while simplifying the

processes for seafarers when they arrive in ports, or transit or cross international borders.

The amended version entered into force in June 2017, and the amendments are applicable to all member

States to the original Convention No.185, except for Marshall Islands. Authorities issuing SIDs, were

given a five-year transition period to update their systems, i.e., until 2022, although individual countries

may issue the new SIDs as soon as they are able to. All the 1.9 million seafarers could benefit from the

new SIDs, which would allow them to travel without a visa to join their ships and to disembark in ports.

Unfortunately, implementation appears to have slowed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

IMO Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965

(FAL Convention)

The IMO Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, 1965 (FAL Convention) entered into

force on 5 March 1967, and has been ratified by 125 out of 174 IMO member States.¹⁸ Its objective

is “to facilitate maritime traffic by simplifying and reducing to a minimum the formalities, documentary

requirements and procedures on the arrival, stay and departure of ships engaged in international voyages.”

Rather than address trade-related aspects of shipping, it focuses on the formalities and procedures for

ships calling in ports, including those related to the arrival and departure of seafarers.

The FAL Convention contains standards and recommended practices and rules for simplifying formalities

and documentary requirements. Customs and immigration officials and port authorities should ask for

the minimum of information at the appropriate time, and offer documents to be completed in a standard

format, while those providing information, should provide accurate data, at the appropriate time and in

the agreed format.

https://seafarersrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/INTERNATIONAL_TREATY_ILO-CONVENTION-C185_2003_

ENG.pdf.

https://www.icao.int/publications/pages/publication.aspx?docnum=9303.

https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C185.

https://euroflag.lu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Convention-on-Facilitation-of-International-Maritime-Traffic-1965-

as-amended-FAL-Convention-2.7.4-Recommended-Practice.pdf. For more information on the FAL Convention, see

Chapter 5, Review of Maritime Transport 2021.

118

5. The COVID-19 seafarer crisis

•

2009 amendments to the FAL Convention¹⁹ - These entered into force on 15 May 2010 and include

changes related to the contents and purpose of documents: “A passport or an identity document

issued in accordance with relevant ILO conventions, or else a valid and duly recognized seafarer’s

identity document, shall be the basic document providing public authorities with information relating

to the individual member of the crew on arrival or departure of a ship.”

•

2016 amendments to the FAL Convention²⁰ - These entered into force on 1 January 2018 and

provide for additional guarantees. Any discrimination is prohibited, and shore leave should be

granted to crew members, irrespective of the ship’s flag State. Since 2019, ships and ports have

had to exchange FAL data electronically and are encouraged to use a “single window”, in which

all the many agencies and authorities exchange data via a single point of contact. Following the

expected adoption of further amendments in 2022, and their subsequent entry into force, the single

window could become obligatory from January 2024.

The IMO Compendium on Facilitation and Electronic Business²¹

This is an important IMO instrument for accelerating digitalization and connectivity in the maritime industry.

It facilitates the exchange of information ship to shore and enables interoperable single windows - reducing

port formalities by harmonizing the data elements required and standardizing electronic messages. Its

key components are the IMO Data Set and the IMO Reference Data Model which provide common

semantics and representation of the data needed to fulfil ship reporting requirements. The IMO data

elements are mapped across the main models (e.g., UN/CEFACT, WCO Data Model and ISO) ensuring full

interoperability between standards for ship clearance. Since 2019, the Compendium has been extended

beyond FAL forms and is now connected to several IMO instruments, such as MARPOL for advance

notification of waste delivery to port reception facilities. From 2020, the Compendium also included the

Maritime Declaration of Health (MDH), a requirement of the WHO International Health Regulations.

IMO Guidelines for setting up a maritime single window

The IMO has developed guidelines for setting up a maritime single window (MSW).²² These offer information,

advice and guidance along with examples of the experience and knowledge gained by some member

States in introducing an MSW. Single windows, mainly for cargo, are currently being developed under

various technical assistance projects in developing countries, including in cooperation with ASYCUDA.²³

MSW and port community systems can smooth formalities, (e.g., data elements included in the crew list,

the passenger list and the maritime declaration of health).²⁴

D. THE WAY FORWARD

Despite important international support, seafarers are still facing serious problems as a result of the

COVID-19 pandemic. This requires urgent action in a number of important areas.

• Vaccination

- Concerted collaborative efforts by industry, governments and international

organizations should ensure that seafarers are designated as key workers and are vaccinated as a

matter of priority.

• Crew changes - Governments and industry should continue to work together, including through

the Neptune Declaration initiative, and in collaboration with relevant international organizations, to

facilitate crew changes, in accordance with international standards and in line with public health

considerations. They should also ensure the availability and access to related seafarer data.

• Route deviations - Charterers and other industry stakeholders should be flexible in accepting

requests from shipping companies for route deviation to facilitate crew changes and should refrain

from using “no crew change” clauses in charterparties.

https://www.imo.org/fr/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/Pages/FAL-35th-Session.aspx.

https://www.imo.org/fr/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/Pages/FAL-40th-session.aspx.

https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Facilitation/Pages/IMOCompendium.aspx.

https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Facilitation/Facilitation/FAL.5-CIRC.42-REV.1.pdf.

https://asycuda.org/en/. Also see Chapter 6, part on trade facilitation.

For further information on Single Windows, see Chapter 5 of the Review of Maritime Transport 2021. Also see Premti A.,

Asariotis R., 2021.

119

• International legal framework - States and other relevant stakeholders should, in consultations and

meetings on seafarers’ issues at ILO and IMO, keep under review the relevant legal framework and

ensure that international obligations are respected and implemented.

• Maritime single windows - Port community systems should implement the Single Window concept,

similarly to the customs-centric Single Window powered by ASYCUDA, to cover all the information

and formalities resulting from FAL and other relevant instruments.

• Information exchange - Relevant public and private sector stakeholders should continue their regular

exchange of views and best practices on seafarers’ situation and needs, and lessons learned,

including from the COVID-19 pandemic, and promote further harmonization and standardization.

• Outbreaks and emergencies at sea - In line with developing scientific insights, governments,

international organizations and all stakeholders should regularly update specific guidance

on measures to prevent and deal with COVID-19 and other outbreaks at sea and ensure that

mechanisms are in place to reduce, and respond to medical emergencies at sea.

Public and private stakeholders must continue to work together to implement relevant labour standards

and address health, safety, security, welfare, and other challenges faced by seafarers. All should be

working to protect seafarers’ human rights and advance the objectives of SDG 8 of decent work and

economic growth for sustainable development.

120

5. The COVID-19 seafarer crisis

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context of COVID-19: interim guidance: annex to: Policy considerations for implementing a risk-based

approach to international travel in the context of COVID-19. 2 July. Available at https://apps.who.int/

iris/handle/10665/342212.

124

This chapter summarizes important recent international

legal and regulatory developments. It also covers maritime

trade and transport facilitation issues, particularly those

related to COVID-19 which has created many problems

for clearing goods through ports, but also created

opportunities for new and smart solutions.

Many of the latest innovations in maritime transport involve

online and automated systems that raise concerns about

cybersecurity. However, shipowners and operators can

also take advantage of recently adopted guidelines on how

to maintain cybersecurity in their companies and onboard

ships, taking into account the requirements of IMO, and other

relevant guidelines.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted many systemic

weaknesses, including delays in documentation and related

problems, which could provide an impetus for the more

widespread use of secure electronic solutions that are

already available and accepted by the market. Related work

at UN bodies, including the United Nations Commission on

International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), is also underway, to

explore the possibility of developing a negotiable transport

Legal and regulatory

document or electronic record.

developments and

In addition, the industry is conducting trials on maritime

autonomous surface ships (MASS). In May 2021, the IMO

the facilitation of

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) completed a regulatory

scoping exercise. A number of high-priority issues, cutting

maritime trade

across several legal instruments, remain to be addressed at a

policy level to determine future work.

In June

2021, the IMO adopted amendments to Annex

VI of the MARPOL Convention aimed at reducing carbon

intensity of ships and including targets for energy efficiency,

to further reduce GHG emissions from shipping. The industry

is also planning an International Maritime Research and

Development Board, a non-governmental body funded by a

$2-per-ton-levy on shipping fuel. Other important regulatory

developments relate to the ship-source pollution control and

environmental protection measures, including shipping and

climate change mitigation and adaptation; air pollution, in

particular sulphur emissions; oil pollution from ships; ballast

water management; and biofouling.

Finally, the chapter addresses maritime trade and transport

facilitation. This includes the Trade Facilitation Agreement of

the World Trade Organization and recent amendments to the

FAL Convention related to digitalization, concluding with a

section on UNCTAD’s ASYHUB Maritime system.

Legal and regulatory

developments and the

facilitation of maritime trade

Development of maritime autonomous surface ships

(MASS) technology and trials, as well as related regulatory

responses, are advancing

With increasing automation and digitalization, there is a

growing need to effectively protect shipping assets and

technology from cyber threats

Climate-change adaptation and resilience-building for

seaports is becoming an increasingly urgent challenge,

especially for vulnerable developing countries that are

at high and growing risk of climate change impacts

IMO Member States agree on new mandatory

regulations to further reduce GHG emissions from

international shipping

Digitalization and automation of trade procedures such

as Maritime Single Windows are catalysts for more

ef cient and paperless compliance processes at ports

Multilateral Agreements such as the WTO TFA and the

IMO FAL Convention provide solid international standards

to build automated systems while ensuring interconnectivity

and interoperability

Building resilient and ef cient logistic supply chains requires

public-private dialogue. Cooperation from businesses involved

in maritime trade and port operations through National Trade

Facilitation Committees foster successful trade reforms

6. Legal and regulatory developments and the facilitation of maritime trade

A. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MARITIME INDUSTRY

1. Ensuring maritime cybersecurity

The maritime sector is increasingly structured around online and automated systems. These are appearing

in shipping, port operations, offshore infrastructure, and digital commercial transactions. Online platforms

and information systems have many advantages but also expose the industry to new and unforeseen

threats and vulnerabilities, notably the risk of cyberattacks (British Ports Association, 2020). In response,

in recent years the IMO has adopted number of international instruments and developed tools for

assessing the cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities of the international maritime sector and strengthening

the resilience of vital systems of shipping companies, ships and ports.¹

More recently, the industry organization BIMCO issued

‘Guidelines on Cyber Security on board

Ships - fourth version’ (BIMCO et al., 2021).² Taking account of IMO guidelines and the US National

Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) framework, the guidance specifies, for example, that

company plans and procedures for cyber-risk management should be incorporated into existing security

and safety risk management requirements contained in the International Safety Management Code (ISM)

Code and International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.

According to the BIMCO guidelines, enterprises should:

• Identify cybersecurity threats - to the ship, both external and internal, including those posed by

inappropriate use, and poor cybersecurity practices.

• Identify vulnerabilities of assets within the company - and develop inventories of onboard systems

with direct and indirect communications links. Everyone concerned should understand the

consequences of cybersecurity threats and the capabilities and limitations of existing protection

measures.

• Assess risk exposure, and vulnerabilities - and the potential for such vulnerabilities being exploited.

• Develop protection and detection measures - to reduce the likelihood of vulnerabilities being

exploited and the potential impact.

• Establish response plans - including contingency plans to respond to cyber-risks, and tackle the

effects of potential attacks on ship safety and security.

• Respond and recover - from any cyber security incidents using the contingency plan, then report on

the effectiveness of the response plan, update it, and reassess threats and vulnerabilities (BIMCO

et al., 2021).

The maritime industry is increasingly taking action against these threats, but much remains to be done.

Maintaining effective cybersecurity is not easy. It requires collaborative, top-down approaches that

engage senior management, combined with bottom-up approaches working with other staff to identify

vulnerabilities and risks unique to each operational environment - all the while balancing and managing

such risks within acceptable limits.

Implementing cybersecurity helps to protect shipping assets and technology from cyber-threats and

makes economic sense. But inaction could also result in consequences. Shipowners who fail to comply

with the IMO requirements risk having their ships detained by port control authorities - though enforcement

should be uniform and equitable.

Failure to address cybersecurity may also result in potential contractual liability. Cyberattacks can cause

damage, loss or misappropriation of cargos, with implications for liability in the context of contracts for

the carriage of goods by sea. Arguably, a shipowner’s obligation to exercise due diligence, and provide

a seaworthy vessel before and at the beginning of the voyage (see Art. III, r. 1 and IV, r. 1, Hague-Visby

Rules³), may also include an obligation to conduct regular cybersecurity risk assessments, and address

For further information, and an overview of IMO, ISO, EU, US and industry cybersecurity guidance, see UNCTAD, 2020a,

chapter 5. See also IMO, 2021a.

Other available guidelines include the Digital Container Shipping Association’s Implementation Guide for Cyber Security

on Vessels v1.0 (DCSA, 2020), based on version 3 of the industry guidelines (BIMCO et al., 2018), and the US NIST

framework (NIST, 2018). While their target audience is the container industry, other segments of shipping may also find

them useful. In addition, the International Association for Classification Societies (IACS) has issued a recommendation

(IACS 2020), which applies to newbuild ships only, but can also serve as guidance for existing ships.

https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/sea.carriage.hague.visby.rules.1968/portrait.pdf.

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risks and reduce vulnerabilities through safety management systems, in accordance with IMO and industry

guidance.

For ports, BIMCO and other maritime NGOs have invited public and private stakeholders to help create

global digital ISO standards to facilitate the digital exchange of data, particularly in light of the new urgency

brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic and increasing demand (BIMCO, 2021).

2. Maritime autonomous surface ships

The use of maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS) could increase safety and improve environmental

performance, and accelerate decarbonization. Various countries are moving ahead fast with this

technology and currently have MASS commercial projects at the stage of advanced testing and trialling

(Gard, 2020; Yara, 2020).

To enable the safe, secure, and environmentally sound operation of MASS within the existing IMO

instruments, the IMO has been considering amending its regulatory framework (IMO, 2017, para. 20.2).

These issues are also being considered by the academic community, industry, and governments. In 2017

the IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), embarked on a regulatory scoping exercise which it completed

in May 2021. This should also help progress related discussions in other IMO Committees namely LEG,

MEPC and FAL (see also UNCTAD, 2019).

For each provision under its purview the MSC considered whether MASS could be regulated by either:

equivalences as provided by the instruments or developing interpretations; and/or amending existing

instruments; and/or developing a new instrument; or none of the above.⁴

The committee highlighted high-priority issues that cut across several instruments. An immediate concern

is terminology - including the definition of a MASS and clarifying terms such as “master”, “crew” and

“responsible person” which should be agreed internationally in cooperation with the ISO. The MSC has

also considered the function and operations of the remote-control station or centre, and the possible

designation of a remote operator as a ‘seafarer’. The committee has identified other issues across several

safety treaties related to: manual operations and alarms on the bridge; actions by personnel, such as

firefighting, cargo stowage and securing and maintenance; watchkeeping; search and rescue; and the

information required to be on board for safe operation.

The MSC noted that the best way to address these gaps and themes would be to proceed in a holistic

manner. This should result in a MASS instrument/Code whose goals, functional requirements, and

corresponding regulations, are suitable for all four degrees of autonomy. For further work it will be important

to establish a joint MSC/LEG/FAL working group, but in the meantime these committees can liaise on

common issues and align any future work (IMO, 2021b).

In July 2021, the IMO Legal Committee completed its scoping exercise, concluding that MASS could be

accommodated within the existing LEG conventions without the need for major adjustments or a new

instrument. Some conventions can accommodate MASS as drafted, though others may require additional

interpretations or amendments (IMO, 2021c).

B. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL

SHIPPING, CLIMATE CHANGE AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

1. IMO action on greenhouse gas emissions

In April 2018 the IMO adopted its initial strategy on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from ships

(see IMO, 2018, annex 1; UNCTAD, 2019). This envisages emissions peaking as soon as possible and

by 2050 falling to at least 50 per cent below the 2008 level, with the aim of being phased out entirely.

By 2030 the target is to reduce the carbon intensity of international shipping by at least 40 per cent of

the 2008 level (IMO, 2020a).

In June 2021, in line with the IMO initial strategy, the MEPC adopted new mandatory regulations as

amendments to Annex VI of the MARPOL Convention. These build on earlier efficiency requirements and

aim to cut the carbon intensity of existing ships, and further reduce GHG emissions from shipping - requiring

operators to measure the energy efficiency of all ships and meet specified targets.

The outcome of the MSC’s regulatory scoping exercise, as approved by the Committee, including the full analysis of

treaties, can be found as an annex to the report on its 103^rd session (IMO, 2021b).

128

6. Legal and regulatory developments and the facilitation of maritime trade

For this purpose, operators can use a new Energy Efficiency Existing Ship Index (EEXI), along with a new

operational carbon intensity indicator (CII) - a dual-track approach that will enable them to address both

technical and operational measures. The EEXI measures the energy efficiency of the ship compared to a

baseline and should be calculated for ships of 400 GT and above, in accordance with values set for ship

types and size categories. Ships are required to reduce the EEXI by a specified percentage of the baseline.

Ships of 5,000 GT are already required to collect data on fuel oil consumption. Now they must also bring

their operational carbon intensity within a specific level, document and verify their CII against the required

value, and record this in the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP). This should result in

a performance rating of A, B, C, D or E - corresponding to major superior, minor superior, moderate,

minor inferior, or inferior. A ship rated D for three consecutive years, or E, would have to submit a plan for

corrective action, to show how the required rating (C or above) would be achieved. Administrations, port

authorities and other stakeholders are encouraged to provide incentives to ships rated A or B.

These amendments are expected to enter into force on 1 November 2022, with the requirements for

EEXI and CII certification coming into effect from 1 January 2023. This will allow the first annual reporting

on carbon intensity to be completed in 2023, with the first rating given in 2024. For its part, the IMO is

to review the effectiveness of the implementation by 1 January 2026 and, if necessary, adopt further

amendments. To support the implementation, the MEPC has also adopted related guidelines.

The GHG reduction candidate measures considered at IMO need to undergo an initial assessment of their

impact on States, based on the procedure adopted in 2019 (MEPC.1/Circ.885). The procedure also states

that proposed measures, including the latest measures adopted, need to undergo a comprehensive impact

assessment before adoption if required by the Committee. To support this process, UNCTAD has been

collaborating with the IMO on an expert review of the impact assessments submitted to ISWG-GHG 7, as

well as the final comprehensive impact assessment of the short-term combined measures submitted to

the 76^th session of MEPC (UNCTAD, 2021a; see also chapters 2 and 4 for a discussion of the outcomes).

The 75^th and 76^th sessions of the MEPC also discussed an industry-led proposal for a non-governmental

International Maritime Research and Development Board (IMRB), funded by a mandatory $2 per-tonne

levy on ship fuel. The MEPC also considered mid- and long-term measures, including market-based

measures, and a work plan for further cutting GHG emissions from shipping, in line with the initial IMO

strategy (IMO, 2021d). Further consideration of the proposals should take place during ISWG-GHG 10 in

October 2021.

2. Adapting transport infrastructure to the impacts of climate change

In August

2021, less than three months before COP26 in Glasgow in November

2021, the

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change issued its 6^th Assessment Report (AR6) (IPCC, 2021). This

was the first comprehensive review of the science of climate change since 2013 and gave clear warnings

of increasingly extreme heatwaves, droughts, and flooding that could have devastating consequences,

making effective adaptation action a matter of increasing urgency. AR6 projects that, depending on

scenario, the mean global temperature increase of 1.5°C relative to pre-industrial times is likely to be

reached by 2040; and if emissions are not slashed in the next few years this threshold may be reached

even earlier. Nevertheless, these impacts can be avoided if the world acts quickly with essential measures

for adaptation and mitigation (IPCC 2018; IPCC 2019; IPCC 2021).

Adaptation will be particularly important for seaports. Ports are exposed to various climate hazards,

including heat waves, extreme winds and precipitation, as well as a rise in mean sea level and associated

extreme sea-levels

(IPCC,

2019). This consideration, which is of particular importance from the

perspective of developing countries, was highlighted again in October 2020, at the eighth session of the

UNCTAD Multi-year Expert Meeting on Transport, Trade Logistics and Trade Facilitation which focused on

“Climate change adaptation for seaports in support of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”

(UNCTAD, 2020c) (UNCTAD, 2020d). Effective adaptation will need to be underpinned by strong legal and

regulatory frameworks, along with strategies, policies and plans to reduce vulnerability. For this purpose,

stakeholders will need the appropriate standards, guidance and tools.

One of the outcomes of COP22 was the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action⁵, which is

designed to provide a strong foundation for how the UNFCCC process will catalyse and support climate

action. This has produced the ‘Climate Action Pathway for Transport’ which includes recommendations

for ‘Resilient transport systems, infrastructure and vehicles’, with milestones towards 2050 (for 2025, 2030

See https://unfccc.int/climate-action/marrakech-partnership/reporting-and-tracking/climate_action_pathways.

129

and 2040) (UNFCCC, 2021a and 2021b). By 2025, all new transport infrastructure, systems and, where

necessary vehicles, should be climate-resilient to at least 2050; by 2030, that should extend to all

critical transport infrastructure and systems. By 2040, all critical infrastructure and systems should be

climate-resilient to at least 2100 (UNFCCC, 2021b).

Translating this timely ambition into action will require a major acceleration of efforts. For its part, in 2021

the EU issued its Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, which aims for a climate-resilient EU by 2050 - “by

making adaptation smarter, more systemic, swifter, and by stepping up international action” (European

Commission, 2021). The EU has also adopted a new Climate Law, which entered into force on 29 July 2021

(European Union, 2021). This aims for EU climate neutrality by 2050 and by 2030 to reduce domestic net

greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 per cent of their 1990 levels. In addition, the new law envisages

“continuous progress in enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability

to climate change in accordance with Article 7 of the Paris Agreement” and related stocktaking, starting

in 2023.

Guidance for action has also been produced by the World Association for Waterborne Transport

Infrastructure (PIANC). In 2020 PIANC issued a revised version of ‘Climate Change Adaptation Planning

for Ports and Inland Waterways’ (PIANC 2020). This covers priority actions such as: inspection and

maintenance; monitoring systems and effective data management; and risk assessments, contingency

plans and warning systems. It also focuses on flexible and adaptive infrastructure, systems and operations

and better resilience through engineered redundancy.

Also worth noting is the new ISO standard ISO 14091:2021 - Adaptation to climate change-Guidelines

on vulnerability, impacts and risk assessment (ISO, 2021). This covers vulnerability to climate change,

and highlights the importance of risk assessments and of monitoring and evaluating for any organization,

regardless of size, type, or nature.

2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a significant fall in investment in transport

infrastructure.⁶ However, major scaling up of investment and capacity building for developing countries

will be critical to ‘building back better’ after the pandemic. The OECD estimates that meeting the SDGs

by 2030 will require $6.9 trillion in infrastructure investment annually, (OECD, 2017). At a recent UNCTAD

dialogue, SIDS representatives highlighted the urgent need for better availability/access to green and

blue infrastructure financing (UNCTAD, 2021b and c). This could bring enormous economic benefits: the

World Bank estimates that investing in resilient infrastructure in developing countries could bring returns

of $4.2 trillion over the lifetime of new infrastructure - a $4 benefit for each dollar invested (Hallegatte S.

et al., 2019).

3. Protecting the marine environment and biodiversity

Recent regulatory actions for the protection of the marine environment and conservation and the

sustainable use of marine biodiversity,⁷ include the following:

a) Implementing the IMO 2020 sulphur limit

Limiting SOx emissions from ships is important to improve air quality and protect both human health

and the environment. On 1 January 2020 an IMO regulation entered into force that reduces the limit

on the sulphur content in ship fuel oil from 3.5 to 0.5 per cent. In designated emission control areas,

the limit remained even lower, at 0.1 per cent.⁸ To further support enforcement, in December 2020, the

MEPC adopted several amendments to MARPOL Annex VI, which will enter into force on 1 April 2022.

These mainly relate to definitions and onboard sampling of the sulphur content of fuel oil, fuel verification

According to UNCTAD, investment in transport infrastructure, power generation/distribution (except renewables) and

telecommunications was down 60 per cent compared to 2019, https://unctad.org/programme/covid-19-response/

impact-on-trade-and-development-2021#aTransport.

As regards negotiations on a new international legal instrument under the UNCLOS on the Conservation and Sustainable

Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction, discussions on a broad range of issues, including

marine genetic resources; area-based management tools, including marine protected areas; environmental impact

assessments; and capacity-building and marine technology transfer, were expected to continue during the fourth session

of the Intergovernmental conference on an international legally binding instrument, scheduled to be held from 23 March

to 3 April 2020, but were postponed due to COVID-19 crisis (for information on discussions at earlier sessions, see

UNCTAD, 2019, 2020a). The next session of the conference was scheduled to take place from 16 to 27 August 2021, but

due to the COVID-19 situation, it was again postponed to the earliest possible available date in 2022, preferrably during

the first half of the year (see A/75/L.96).

The four emission control areas are: the Baltic Sea area; the North Sea area; the North American area (covering designated

coastal areas of Canada and the United States); and the United States Caribbean Sea area (around Puerto Rico and the

United States Virgin Islands).

130

6. Legal and regulatory developments and the facilitation of maritime trade

procedures, and consequent related amendments to the International Air Pollution Prevention (IAPP)

certificate.

From 1 January 2020, Flag and Port State controls have had to make sure that ships comply with the

0.5 per cent sulphur limit. To do so, shipowners and charterers can adopt three different approaches:

a) Use a compliant fuel which is low enough in sulphur such as VLSFO or MGO;

b) Use alternative fuels such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), methanol, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG),

hydrogen fuel cells, or biofuels which emit very small amounts of SOx; or

c) Use equivalent methods, including fitting or retro-fitting their ships with exhaust gas cleaning

systems, also known as scrubbers. Scrubbers may be open loop -discharging wash water into the

sea - or closed loop discharge residues to adequate reception facilities ashore.

During 2020 and the first half of 2021, implementation, primarily with the use of VLSFO, was relatively

smooth, and compliant fuel oil was widely available globally (IMO, 2021e). There was some disruption by

COVID-19, and several more ports and countries banned open-loop scrubber wash water discharge.

Global enforcement of the new regulation was facilitated, however, by a ban on the carriage of

non-compliant fuel.

Liability for compliance mainly rests with shipowners - who typically supply the fuel. In the case of

charterparties, usually voyage charters, the contract may require the shipowner to warrant that the

vessel complies with international rules and regulations. For time charters, on the other hand, it is

the charterers who usually purchase and provide the fuel; therefore contractual provisions may shift

responsibility for compliance with applicable Sulphur Content Requirements to the charterers, so

the liability and the associated risk is divided between them and the shipowners, who warrant that

the vessel itself is compliant. Examples of relevant clauses include the BIMCO’s Marine Fuel Sulphur

Content Clause for Time Charter Parties (BIMCO, 2018), and INTERTANKO’s Bunker Compliance Clause

(INTERTANKO, 2018). In order to increase clarity, contracting parties should consider incorporating such

clauses in charterparties.

Further special regulation has been agreed for the environmental protection of Arctic waters. In June 2021,

the MEPC adopted amendments to MARPOL Annex I that prohibit the use, and carriage for use of heavy

fuel oil by ships in Arctic waters on and after 1 July 2024. Ships that meet certain standards on oil fuel tank

protection would need to comply on and after 1 July 2029.

However, up to 1 July 2029 a Party with a coastline bordering Arctic waters may temporarily waive the

requirements for ships flying its flag and operating in waters that are subject to that Party's sovereignty or

jurisdiction. After that date, exemptions and waivers would no longer apply. Currently, MARPOL Annex I

regulation 43 prohibits the use or carriage of heavy-grade oils on ships in the Antarctic; and under the

Polar Code⁹ ships are encouraged not to use or carry such oil in the Arctic. The new regulation will help

protect these fragile areas further. However, its impact could be significantly reduced by the waivers and

exemptions for contracting States with a coastline bordering Arctic waters, until 2029.

b) Ballast water management

One of the greatest threats to the world’s oceans and a major threat to biodiversity is ships discharging

untreated ballast water. This has severe consequences for public health and has environmental and economic

implications for fisheries and the exploration of marine genetic resources (see also UNCTAD 2011, 2015b).

In December 2020. the MEPC adopted amendments to the International Convention for the Control and

Management of Ships' Ballast Water and Sediments, 2004 (the BWM Convention) which aims to prevent

the introduction and proliferation of non-native species following the discharge of untreated ballast water

from ships. These amendments, which are expected to enter into force on 1 June 2022, relate to the

commissioning and testing of ballast water management systems and to the form of the International

Ballast Water Management Certificate. As of 31 July 2021, the BWM Convention had 86 Contracting

States representing 91 per cent of the GT of the world’s merchant fleet.¹⁰

c) Biofouling

A prominent, but underestimated, source of microplastic pollution is antifouling coatings on ships (Dibke C.

et al., 2021). In June 2021, the MEPC adopted amendments to the IMO Convention for the Control

For more information, see UNCTAD, 2015a.

https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/StatusOfTreaties.pdf.

131

of Harmful Anti-fouling Systems on Ships, 2001 (AFS Convention)¹¹, to prohibit anti-fouling systems

containing cybutryne. This would apply from 1 January 2023 or, for ships already using such a system, at

its next scheduled renewal after 1 January 2023, but no later than 60 months following the last application

to the ship of such an anti-fouling system.¹²

d) Oil-pollution from shipping

An important risk of pollution is oil spills from ships, not just from oil tankers, but also from other maritime

transport - container ships, chemical carriers, general cargo ships and passenger or cruise vessels. Oil

spills, and the resultant clean-up operations, can seriously affect marine and coastal environments, from

both physical smothering and the effects of toxins. There are also costly and wide-ranging economic

implications (Asariotis R., Premti A., 2020). The risks are particularly high for vulnerable coastal developing

states and ocean economies such as SIDS that rely heavily on fisheries, aquaculture and tourism, and are

being heightened by bigger vessels carrying high volumes of bunker fuel oil.

The ‘Wakashio’ bunker oil spill off the coast of Mauritius in

2020 demonstrated the devastating

consequences of oil spills for the economies and tourism industries of coastal countries, as well as for

ecosystems and biodiversity, further endangering corals, fish, and other marine life (IPCC 2018). This spill

also highlighted the need for international legal instruments in this field and for all States to adopt the latest

of these.

Oil spills raise serious issues of liability and of compensation, including for the costs of reinstating the

environment. In this respect there is a comprehensive international regime in place on liability and

compensation for oil pollution damage caused by persistent oil spills from tankers (CLC-IOPC Fund regime)

(UNCTAD, 2012).¹³ Unfortunately, this did not apply in the Wakashio case, as the spill was of bunker oil

from a bulk-carrier, not from an oil tanker (Asariotis R., Premti A., 2020; UNCTAD 2020b).

Bunker oil spills from ships other than oil tankers are covered by the International Convention on Civil

Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 2001 (Bunkers Convention).¹⁴ This Convention aims “to ensure

that adequate, prompt, and effective compensation is available to persons who suffer damage caused by

spills of oil, when carried as fuel in ships' bunkers”. Modelled after the International Convention on Civil

Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992 (CLC), the Bunkers Convention has many similar provisions but

the amount of liability may be limited (Art. 6), in accordance with any applicable national or international

regime such as the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC), 1976, as amended

in 1996. As a result, the compensation available to claimants is significantly lower than that available under

the CLC-IOPC Fund regime for oil pollution from tankers.¹⁵ Given the continuing growth in sizes of ships

of all types, the issue of liability for bunker oil spills from ships other than tankers may need to be revisited.

A Claims Manual for the Bunkers Convention

For the IOPC FUNDS, there is a Claims Manual but there is no corresponding manual for the Bunkers

Convention. During its 107^th session in December 2020, the IMO Legal Committee supported the

development of an ‘IMO Claims Manual for the Bunkers Convention’ to guide national courts, claimants,

shipowners and insurers in their interpretation of the Convention (IOPC FUNDS, 2019). This manual would

differ from the 1992 Fund Claims Manual but should be consistent with it. The Committee agreed that, in

cooperation with protection and indemnity clubs, a more detailed proposal would be taken forward on an

intersessional basis, (IMO, 2020b, pg. 27). Then in July 2021 at its 108th session the Legal Committee

expressed its broad support for the development of dedicated and authoritative guidance for claimants

within the scope of the Convention (IMO, 2021c). Such a manual would assist claims under the Convention,

but it should also reflect the needs of vulnerable coastal developing countries and SIDS, particularly on the

question of limitation of liability.

For some background information, see Review of Maritime Transport 2020.

The Convention, which as of 31 July 2021, was in force for 91 Contracting States representing 95.93 per cent of the GT of

the world’s merchant fleet, defines “anti-fouling systems” as “a coating, paint, surface treatment, surface or device that is

used on a ship to control or prevent attachment of unwanted organisms”. It already prohibits the use of harmful organotin

compounds in anti-fouling paints used on ships and establishes a mechanism to prevent the potential future use of

other harmful substances in anti-fouling systems. These harmful substances include the biocide chemical compound

cybutryne, for which scientific data has indicated it causes significant adverse effects to non-target organisms and the

environment, especially to aquatic ecosystems, and therefore needs to be controlled.

1992 Civil Liability Convention (CLC), 1992 Fund Convention and 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol. See further

https://www.iopcfunds.org/.

http://library.arcticportal.org/1616/1/6693.pdf.

See, https://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/Convention-on-Limitation-of-Liability-for-Maritime-Claims-

(LLMC).aspx.

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6. Legal and regulatory developments and the facilitation of maritime trade

Limitation of liability under IMO conventions

In certain circumstances a shipowner may lose the statutory right to limitation of liability under some

international conventions. The IMO Legal Committee has also been discussing a unified interpretation

on the relevant test for breaking the shipowner's right to limit liability (see IMO, 2019a, 2019b). In

December 2020, the Committee established a remote intersessional group to draft such a unified

interpretation and consider the vehicle for its adoption - which would be either the Conference of States

Parties, the Assembly, or the Legal Committee. Drawing on this work, a related draft Assembly Resolution

has since been finalized by the IMO Legal Committee at its 108th session and submitted for consideration

by the Assembly at the end of the year (IMO, 2021c).

C. LEGAL AND REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS OF THE COVID-19

PANDEMIC

The COVID-19 pandemic is causing delays and unprecedented supply-chain disruptions that affect the

performance of a wide range of contractual obligations and can lead to the need for costly litigation,

involving complex jurisdictional issues in a global context. This could be on such a scale as to overwhelm

some legal and administration of justice systems, with implications for global governance and the rule

of law.¹⁶

Avoiding this outcome will require collective and coordinated action by governments and industry. This

could involve, for example agreeing contractual extensions, showing restraint in pursuing legal rights and

claims, and resolving disputes through mediation and arbitration, as well as strengthening formal and

informal dispute resolution mechanisms and institutions. It could also involve commercial risk-allocation

through standard clauses drafted to address contractual rights and obligations in the light of the

circumstances associated with the pandemic.

As part of UN action in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, UNCTAD and the UN regional Commissions

are currently implementing a joint technical assistance project: “Transport and trade connectivity in the

age of pandemics: Contactless, seamless and collaborative UN solutions”.¹⁷ UNCTAD is leading several of

these components, including work on the international commercial transport and trade law implications of

the pandemic, and has already published two briefing notes: one on Cargo Claims, (UNCTAD, 2021d; the

other on International Sale of Goods (UNCTAD, 2021e)). These highlight some of the complex commercial

law issues and implications to encourage discussions between the affected parties and consider

appropriate measures for future agreements.

One issue which has clearly come to the market’s attention is that of delays in documentation. This may

provide an impetus for more commercial parties to adopt secure electronic solutions that are already available

and have been accepted by the market. However, with increasing reliance on electronic interactions, they

will also have to manage any associated cyber-risks and enhance their cybersecurity systems.

Lessons learnt from the global pandemic should generally encourage carriers, insurers, and cargo interests

to take leaps forward and make the best use of technology, both to minimize disruption, and to allocate

fairly any commercial risks that arise from unforeseen events beyond the control of the contracting parties.

Trade associations can help in this respect by devising standard form terms for inclusion into commercial

contracts. In addition, governments and policymakers should consider temporary financial support to

avoid widespread business failure and protect the essential flow of goods across all trade routes.

D. OTHER LEGAL AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING

TRANSPORTATION

1. Combating fraudulent registration and registries

2019, following reports by several members on the fraudulent use of their flags, the IMO Legal

Committee, agreed on measures to prevent fraudulent ship registration and registries (UNCTAD, 2019).

The Committee supported the development of a comprehensive database of registries to be held on

the publicly available contact points module of the IMO Global Integrated Shipping Information System.

Note in this context also SDG 17, which focuses on partnership for the goals, and SDG 16 on peace, justice, and strong

institutions.

https://unctad.org/project/transport-and-trade-connectivity-age-pandemics.

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This would contain the names and contact details of national governmental bodies or authorized/delegated

entities in charge of the registration of ships, as well as other relevant information. The Committee also

approved best practices to combat fraudulent registration and registries of ships, and established an

intersessional correspondence group to consider various proposals in greater detail (IMO, 2019b). This

group, in which UNCTAD participated, has since prepared a draft Resolution on “Encouragement of

Member States and all relevant stakeholders to promote actions for the prevention and suppression of

fraudulent registration and fraudulent registries, and other fraudulent acts in the maritime sector”. This

was finalized by the IMO Legal Committee at its 108th session in July 2021 and submitted to the IMO

Assembly, for consideration in December 2021 (IMO, 2021c). The intersessional group had also proposed

future work on a corresponding IMO study, which was agreed upon by the IMO Legal Committee. It should

be noted that there is already an International Convention on the Registration of Ships, 1986,¹⁸ which

provides some safeguards against fraudulent ship registration, and was adopted under the auspices of

UNCTAD, but it has not entered into force.

2. Multimodal transport discussions at UNCITRAL and ESCAP

Multimodal transport can be a key driver of sustainable development, by enabling existing capacities and

infrastructure to be used more effectively and promoting a better balance between transport modes across

supply-chains. However, the international legal framework is lagging behind. Despite numerous attempts,

no uniform legal regime on multimodal transport has entered into force internationally (UNCTAD, 2003).

Instead, the existing framework consists of a complex jigsaw of international conventions designed for

unimodal carriage, regional and sub-regional agreements, national laws, and standard term contracts.

This is associated with a lack of legal certainty and a need for costly evidentiary enquiries and litigation.

ESCAP - Harmonizing multimodal legal frameworks in Asia

and the Pacific

In August 2020, a ESCAP Expert Group Meeting, in which UNCTAD participated, discussed options for

harmonizing the legal framework for multimodal transport at the regional level. The Expert Group requested

a more detailed analysis of the advantages, disadvantages and specificities of each option - including

the level of commitment needed, the timelines for completion and the potential for causing additional

fragmentation or legal conflicts. (ESCAP, 2020).

In March 2021 this analysis was discussed by a second Expert Group Meeting (ESCAP, 2021). Several

participants highlighted the value of a single comprehensive legal instrument, but the meeting concluded

that would be more practical to take a step-by-step approach. This included consideration of the following

possibilities:

i. Tailor-made legal solutions addressing specific modal interfaces.

ii. A single transport document that could serve as evidence of a contract.

iii. Digitalization of consignment notes.

iv. A framework agreement together with soft law solutions.

v. Solutions building on existing infrastructure networks and agreements, such as an instrument on

multimodal transport operations envisaged under the Intergovernmental Agreement on Dry Ports.

The secretariat was requested to take these elements into account and to provide relevant background

material for the next meeting.

UNCITRAL - Negotiable multimodal transport documents

In July 2019, at the 52^nd session of UNCITRAL, the Government of China presented a proposal on

possible future work by UNCITRAL to develop a legal framework for railway consignment notes. This

noted that railway transportation had some advantages, such as shorter distances, greater speed, and

less vulnerability to weather. However, unlike ocean bills of lading which were used for maritime transport,

international railway consignment notes did not serve as documents of title and were not used for the

settlement and financing of letters of credit. UNCITRAL considered that the proposal could be of practical

significance for world trade, and particularly for the economic growth of developing countries. However,

given the complexity of the issues, the Commission decided, as a first step, to request the Secretariat to

coordinate with other relevant organizations and conduct research on the legal issues related to the use

of railway or other consignment notes, (UNCITRAL, 2019, paras. 216 -217).

Text is available at UNCTAD’s website, https://unctad.org/topic/transport-and-trade-logistics/policy-and-legislation.

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6. Legal and regulatory developments and the facilitation of maritime trade

Expert Group meetings were held in 2019 and 2020, and in May 2020 their conclusions were presented

to the 53^rd annual session of UNCITRAL (UNCITRAL, 2020a). The Commission recognised the value

of electronic transport documents, particularly for the new supply chain and logistics models expected

to develop following the COVID-19 disruption and requested the secretariat to start preparatory work,

in close coordination and cooperation with relevant international organizations, on a new international

instrument on multimodal negotiable transport documents that could be used for contracts not involving

carriage by sea (UNCITRAL, 2020b, para.16(e)).

In February 2021, there was a Third Expert Group Meeting on a ‘New International Instrument on Negotiable

Multimodal Transport Documents’, with the participation of international organizations, including UNCTAD,

as well as practitioners and academia. In April 2021, an open webinar on ‘International experiences with the

dematerialization of negotiable transport documents’ was held (UNCITRAL, 2021a). At its 54^thsession in

July 2021, UNCITRAL welcomed the preparatory work and confirmed its strong interest in the project. The

Commission agreed that “the primary purpose of a new international instrument should be to ensure legal

recognition of a medium neutral negotiable transport document in different modes of transport and that, for

that purpose, it was desirable to focus first on negotiable transport documents and subsequently consider

whether other types of transport documents accepted by banks for documentary credit should also be

encompassed”. The Commission also agreed on the need for proper coordination and interface with the

liability regimes provided under existing conventions on international carriage of goods by various modes

and invited the secretariat to continue its preparatory work in close coordination with other organizations

currently working on or exploring solutions to enable the use of a negotiable transport document in the rail

plus or other multimodal context, as well as other organizations with relevant expertise, or representing

relevant industries (UNCITRAL, 2021b).

Given the broad substantive scope of the proposed future legal instrument, public and private stakeholders

both in multimodal transport and in all the different modes are encouraged to participate in any related

further work. For small traders in developing countries, a key concern will be adequate liability for cargo

loss or damage. UNCTAD will continue to participate in any related work under the auspices of UNCITRAL.

3. Status of conventions

A number of international conventions in the field of maritime transport have been prepared or adopted

under the auspices of UNCTAD. During the current reporting period, only the status of the Hamburg

Rules changed, with one additional accession

(see https://unctad.org/webflyer/review-maritime-

transport-2021). For additional information, see https://unctad.org/ttl/legal. For official status information,

see the United Nations Treaty Collection, available at https://treaties.un.org.

E. MARITIME TRANSPORT WITHIN THE WTO TRADE FACILITATION

AGREEMENT

Implementing trade and transport facilitation procedures efficiently, and in line with international guidelines

reduces time and costs, and makes for more agile logistics supply chains. This will involve simplifying

maritime and trade procedures, and integrating new technologies in trade and transport facilitation so as

to standardize and harmonize for cross border trade in goods.

The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the many national regulations and administrative bottlenecks involved

in the emergency supply of medical equipment, drugs - as exemplified by the ongoing vaccine supply

chain. Minimizing disruption in the logistics supply chains, including maritime transport, will mean extending

international frameworks, building more public-private partnerships, and further digitalizing trade facilitation.

Such reforms will rely on harmonized international frameworks such as the WTO TFA and the IMO FAL

Convention. These instruments, which provide governments with guidance and incentives in reforming

trade facilitation measures, are paving the way for digitalization, transparency, and rationalization of

administrative formalities. They already serve as the bases for many bilateral and regional trade facilitation

agreements, and other initiatives are emerging as complementary building blocks.

1. Implementation of the WTO TFA

The WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement aims to boost the speed and efficiency of cross-border trade

procedures through 36 measures and covers four areas: transparency, fees and formalities, customs

cooperation, and transit. As of July 2021, 154 WTO members have ratified the TFA, meaning that 94 per

cent of WTO Members apply the agreement on a most-favoured-nation basis.

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However, the agreement is not being implemented by all members - only by 71 per cent of developing

countries and by 36 per cent of LDCs. The reality on the ground may even be less positive, as it is not sure

that countries fully comply in practice with their notified implementation schedules.

Trade facilitation makes ports and shipping more efficient. Those developing countries and LDCs that

implement the TFA tend to have a higher turnover of container ships at port. This is evident from the

UNCTAD Liner Shipping Connectivity Index, which shows that 13 per cent of the variance of the time

that container ships spend in port can be statistically explained by differences in TFA implementation

(UNCTAD, 2016).

To help developing countries and LDCs implement the agreement, the TFA provides for Special and

Differential Treatment (SDT) through which those countries can acquire the necessary capacity. To benefit

from SDT, developing countries and LDCs need to define their needs for technical assistance and capacity

building (TACB). As of July 2021, 119 developing and least developed members had notified their intention

to use the SDT provisions.

Recipients of TACB have made progress in implementing TFA commitments. For LDCs that have received

TACB support, OECD indicators and WCO-Time Released Study data reveal substantial reductions

in customs clearance times. The progress is especially evident in transparency on customs rules and

regulations, customs automation, and in the timely release and clearance of goods (OECD/WTO, 2019).

2. Measures related to maritime transport

The TFA presents the regulatory requirements for the release and clearance process of export, import and

transit operations and covers procedures linked to customs clearance and to standards and controls from

other border agencies (Bureau of Standards, Ministry of Agriculture, etc.). Article 7 of the TFA addresses

the Release and Clearance of goods, including customs operations such as pre-arrival processing,

risk management, and trade facilitation measures for authorized operators. Article 10 on Formalities

connected with Importation, Exportation and Transit, addresses the relations between border agencies

and the business community, and includes provisions for single window implementation, and the use

of international standards and of customs brokers. Finally, articles 8 and 12 cover Border Agency and

Customs Cooperation.

Some provisions are more fully implemented than others (WTO, 2021). The higher implementation rates

are those for the use of customs brokers at 87 per cent, for pre-arrival processing at 74 per cent and

electronic payments at 69 per cent but other provisions involving IT infrastructure such as the single

window are lower at 45 per cent. Only 59 per cent implement Article 8 on Border Agency Cooperation.

The value of the TFA is demonstrated by the World Bank Logistics Performance Index (LPI) which shows

that implementation of trade facilitation measures is positively correlated with logistics performance, with

the greatest benefits from Article 1 on Publication, Article 6 on Fees and Charges, Article 8 on Border

Agency Cooperation and Article 10 on Formalities (UNCTAD, 2016).

3. The value of public-private dialogue

Any successful trade reform relies on cooperation between public administrations and the business

community. With trust and dialogue among stakeholders, the trade ecosystem can develop sustainably,

and public reforms can respond to the needs of the trader community. This principle is embedded in a

number of measures in the TFA - on border agency cooperation, customs cooperation, consultations,

and the opportunity for the private sector to comment before adopting a legal text.

The most important component in this context is article 23.2 on the obligation to set up in each

country a National Trade Facilitation Committee (NTFC). The NTFC should comprise public and private

stakeholders who can devise a coherent and coordinated strategy and champion and drive the trade

facilitation agenda. NTFCs may gather all border agencies, business associations, freight forwarders

associations, as well as the port authorities, agencies and private sector stakeholders working on

maritime trade. According to an UNCTAD survey, 40 per cent of the NTFC members come from the

private sector (Ugaz, 2019).

In Kenya, for example, the NTFC has set up a Technical Working Group on the Mombasa Port Charter

which includes the Kenya Port Authority. In Namibia, the NTFC comprises the Namibia Port Authority

as well as the Walvis Bay Port users’ association. This public-private dialogue proved useful for defining

policies, improving consultations, and resolving conflict, and during the COVID-19 crisis has been used to

coordinate emergency guidelines for supplies coming through ports.

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