Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (August 2009)

SUMMARY

vigorously supports the adoption of the core ideas and principles embedded

in each of the following recommendations.

Standardized Terminology and Reporting

The terminology used in reporting and testifying about the results of

forensic science investigations must be standardized. Many terms are used

by forensic scientists in scientific reports and in court testimony that de-

scribe findings, conclusions, and degrees of association between evidentiary

material (e.g., hairs, fingerprints, fibers) and particular people or objects.

Such terms include, but are not limited to “match,” “consistent with,”

“identical,” “similar in all respects tested,” and “cannot be excluded as the

source of.” The use of such terms can and does have a profound effect on

how the trier of fact in a criminal or civil matter perceives and evaluates sci-

entific evidence. Although some forensic science disciplines have proposed

reporting vocabulary and scales, the use of the recommended language is

not standard practice among forensic science practitioners.

As a general matter, laboratory reports generated as the result of a

scientific analysis should be complete and thorough. They should contain,

at minimum, “methods and materials,” “procedures,” “results,” “conclu-

sions,” and, as appropriate, sources and magnitudes of uncertainty in

the procedures and conclusions (e.g., levels of confidence). Some forensic

science laboratory reports meet this standard of reporting, but many do

not. Some reports contain only identifying and agency information, a brief

description of the evidence being submitted, a brief description of the

types of analysis requested, and a short statement of the results (e.g., “the

greenish, brown plant material in item #1 was identified as marijuana”),

and they include no mention of methods or any discussion of measurement

uncertainties.

Many clinical and testing disciplines outside the forensic science disci-

plines have standards, templates, and protocols for data reporting. A good

example is the ISO/IEC 17025 standard (commonly called “ISO 17025”).

ISO 17025 is an international standard published by the International

Organization for Standardization (ISO) that specifies the general require-

ments for the competence to carry out tests and/or calibrations. These

requirements have been used by accrediting agencies to determine what a

laboratory must do to secure accreditation. In addition, some SWGs in the

forensic disciplines have scoring systems for reporting findings, but these

systems are neither uniformly nor consistently used. In other words, al-

though appropriate standards exist, they are not always followed. Forensic

reports, and any courtroom testimony stemming from them, must include

clear characterizations of the limitations of the analyses, including measures

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

of uncertainty in reported results and associated estimated probabilities

where possible.

Recommendation 2:

The National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS), after review-

ing established standards such as ISO 17025, and in consultation

with its advisory board, should establish standard terminology to

be used in reporting on and testifying about the results of forensic

science investigations. Similarly, it should establish model labora-

tory reports for different forensic science disciplines and specify

the minimum information that should be included. As part of the

accreditation and certification processes, laboratories and forensic

scientists should be required to utilize model laboratory reports

when summarizing the results of their analyses.

More and Better Research

As noted above, some forensic science disciplines are supported by

little rigorous systematic research to validate the discipline’s basic premises

and techniques. There is no evident reason why such research cannot be

conducted. Much more federal funding is needed to support research in

the forensic science disciplines and forensic pathology in universities and

private laboratories committed to such work.

The forensic science and medical examiner communities will be im-

proved by opportunities to collaborate with the broader science and engi-

neering communities. In particular, there is an urgent need for collaborative

efforts to (1) develop new technical methods or provide in-depth grounding

for advances developed in the forensic science disciplines; (2) provide an

interface between the forensic science and medical examiner communities

and basic sciences; and (3) create fertile ground for discourse among the

communities. NIFS should recommend, implement, and guide strategies for

supporting such initiatives.

Recommendation 3:

Research is needed to address issues of accuracy, reliability, and

validity in the forensic science disciplines. The National Institute

of Forensic Science (NIFS) should competitively fund peer-reviewed

research in the following areas:

(a) Studies establishing the scientific bases demonstrating the

validity of forensic methods.

SUMMARY

(b) The development and establishment of quantifiable mea-

sures of the reliability and accuracy of forensic analyses.

Studies of the reliability and accuracy of forensic tech-

niques should reflect actual practice on realisticcase sce-

narios, averaged across a representative sample of forensic

scientists and laboratories. Studies also should establish

the limits of reliability and accuracy that analytic methods

can be expected to achieve as the conditions of forensic

evidence vary. The research by which measures of reliabil-

ity and accuracy are determined should be peer reviewed

and published in respected scientific journals.

in the conclusions of forensic analyses.

(d) Automated techniques capable of enhancing forensic

technologies.

To answer questions regarding the reliability and accuracy of a forensic

analysis, the research needs to distinguish between average performance

(achieved across individual practitioners and laboratories) and individual

performance (achieved by the specific practitioner and laboratory). Whether

a forensic procedure is sufficient under the rules of evidence governing crim-

inal and civil litigation raises difficult legal issues that are outside the realm

of scientific inquiry. (Some of the legal issues are addressed in Chapter 3.)

Best Practices and Standards

Although there have been notable efforts to achieve standardization

and develop best practices in some forensic science disciplines and the

medical examiner system, most disciplines still lack best practices or any

coherent structure for the enforcement of operating standards, certifica-

tion, and accreditation. Standards and codes of ethics exist in some fields,

and there are some functioning certification and accreditation programs,

but none are mandatory. In short, oversight and enforcement of operating

standards, certification, accreditation, and ethics are lacking in most local

and state jurisdictions.

Scientific and medical assessment conducted in forensic investigations

should be independent of law enforcement efforts either to prosecute crimi-

nal suspects or even to determine whether a criminal act has indeed been

committed. Administratively, this means that forensic scientists should

function independently of law enforcement administrators. The best sci-

ence is conducted in a scientific setting as opposed to a law enforcement

setting. Because forensic scientists often are driven in their work by a need

to answer a particular question related to the issues of a particular case,

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

they sometimes face pressure to sacrifice appropriate methodology for the

sake of expediency.

Recommendation 4:

To improve the scientific bases of forensic science examinations

and to maximize independence from or autonomy within the law

enforcement community, Congress should authorize and appropri-

ate incentive funds to the National Institute of Forensic Science

(NIFS) for allocation to state and local jurisdictions for the purpose

of removing all public forensic laboratories and facilities from the

administrative control of law enforcement agencies or prosecutors’

offices.

Recommendation 5:

The National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) should encourage

research programs on human observer bias and sources of human

error in forensic examinations. Such programs might include stud-

ies to determine the effects of contextual bias in forensic practice

(e.g., studies to determine whether and to what extent the results

of forensic analyses are influenced by knowledge regarding the

background of the suspect and the investigator’s theory of the

case). In addition, research on sources of human error should be

closely linked with research conducted to quantify and characterize

the amount of error. Based on the results of these studies, and in

consultation with its advisory board, NIFS should develop stan-

dard operating procedures (that will lay the foundation for model

protocols) to minimize, to the greatest extent reasonably possible,

potential bias and sources of human error in forensic practice.

These standard operating procedures should apply to all forensic

analyses that may be used in litigation.

Recommendation 6:

To facilitate the work of the National Institute of Forensic Science

(NIFS), Congress should authorize and appropriate funds to NIFS

to work with the National Institute of Standards and Technology

(NIST), in conjunction with government laboratories, universi-

ties, and private laboratories, and in consultation with Scientific

Working Groups, to develop tools for advancing measurement,

validation, reliability, information sharing, and proficiency testing

in forensic science and to establish protocols for forensic examina-

SUMMARY

tions, methods, and practices. Standards should reflect best prac-

tices and serve as accreditation tools for laboratories and as guides

for the education, training, and certification of professionals. Upon

completion of its work, NIST and its partners should report find-

ings and recommendations to NIFS for further dissemination and

implementation.

Quality Control, Assurance, and Improvement

In a field such as medical diagnostics, a health care provider typically

can track a patient’s progress to see whether the original diagnosis was

accurate and helpful. For example, widely accepted programs of quality

control ensure timely feedback involving the diagnoses that result from

mammography. Other examples of quality assurance and improvement—

including the development of standardized vocabularies, ontologies, and

scales for interpreting diagnostic tests and developing standards for accredi-

tation of services—pervade diagnostic medicine. This type of systematic and

routine feedback is an essential element of any field striving for continuous

improvement. The forensic science disciplines likewise must become a self-

correcting enterprise, developing and implementing feedback loops that

allow the profession to discover past mistakes. A particular need exists for

routine, mandatory proficiency testing that emulates a realistic, representa-

tive cross-section of casework, for example, DNA proficiency testing.

Recommendation 7:

Laboratory accreditation and individual certification of forensic

science professionals should be mandatory, and all forensic science

professionals should have access to a certification process. In de-

termining appropriate standards for accreditation and certification,

the National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) should take into

account established and recognized international standards, such

as those published by the International Organization for Standard-

ization (ISO). No person (public or private) should be allowed to

practice in a forensic science discipline or testify as a forensic sci-

ence professional without certification. Certification requirements

should include, at a minimum, written examinations, supervised

practice, proficiency testing, continuing education, recertification

procedures, adherence to a code of ethics, and effective disciplinary

procedures. All laboratories and facilities (public or private) should

be accredited, and all forensic science professionals should be certi-

fied, when eligible, within a time period established by NIFS.

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

Recommendation 8:

Forensic laboratories should establish routine quality assurance

and quality control procedures to ensure the accuracy of forensic

analyses and the work of forensic practitioners. Quality control

procedures should be designed to identify mistakes, fraud, and

bias; confirm the continued validity and reliability of standard

operating procedures and protocols; ensure that best practices are

being followed; and correct procedures and protocols that are

found to need improvement.

Codes of Ethics

A number of forensic science organizations—such as AAFS, the Mid-

western Association of Forensic Scientists, ASCLD, and NAME—have

adopted codes of ethics. The codes that exist are sometimes comprehensive,

but they vary in content. While there is no reason to doubt that many foren-

sic scientists understand their ethical obligations and practice in an ethical

way, there are no consistent mechanisms for enforcing any of the existing

codes of ethics. Many jurisdictions do not require certification in the same

way that, for example, states require lawyers to be licensed. Therefore, few

forensic science practitioners face the threat of official sanctions or loss of

certification for serious ethical violations. And it is unclear whether and to

what extent forensic science practitioners are required to adhere to ethics

standards as a condition of employment.

Recommendation 9:

The National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS), in consultation

with its advisory board, should establish a national code of ethics

for all forensic science disciplines and encourage individual societ-

ies to incorporate this national code as part of their professional

code of ethics. Additionally, NIFS should explore mechanisms of

enforcement for those forensic scientists who commit serious ethi-

cal violations. Such a code could be enforced through a certification

process for forensic scientists.

Insufficient Education and Training

Forensic science examiners need to understand the principles, practices,

and contexts of scientific methodology, as well as the distinctive features

of their specialty. Ideally, training should move beyond apprentice-like

SUMMARY

transmittal of practices to education based on scientifically valid principles.

In addition to the practical experience and learning acquired during an

internship, a trainee should acquire rigorous interdisciplinary education

and training in the scientific areas that constitute the basis for the particu-

lar forensic discipline and instruction on how to document and report the

analysis. A trainee also should have working knowledge of basic quanti-

tative calculations, including statistics and probability, as needed for the

applicable discipline.

To correct some of the existing deficiencies, it is crucially important to

improve undergraduate and graduate forensic science programs. Legitimiza-

tion of practices in forensic disciplines must be based on established scien-

tific knowledge, principles, and practices, which are best learned through

formal education. Apprenticeship has a secondary role, and under no cir-

cumstances can it supplant the need for the scientific basis of education in

and the practice of forensic science.

In addition, lawyers and judges often have insufficient training and

background in scientific methodology, and they often fail to fully com-

prehend the approaches employed by different forensic science disciplines

and the reliability of forensic science evidence that is offered in trial. Such

training is essential, because any checklist for the admissibility of scientific

or technical testimony is imperfect. Conformance with items on a checklist

can suggest that testimony is reliable, but it does not guarantee it. Better

connections must be established and promoted between experts in the

forensic science disciplines and law schools, legal scholars, and practitio-

ners. The fruits of any advances in the forensic science disciplines should

be transferred directly to legal scholars and practitioners (including civil

litigators, prosecutors, and criminal defense counsel), federal, state, and

local legislators, members of the judiciary, and law enforcement officials,

so that appropriate adjustments can be made in criminal and civil laws and

procedures, model jury instructions, law enforcement practices, litigation

strategies, and judicial decisionmaking. Law schools should enhance this

connection by offering courses in the forensic science disciplines, by offering

credit for forensic science courses taken in other colleges, and by developing

joint degree programs. And judges need to be better educated in forensic

science methodologies and practices.

Recommendation 10:

To attract students in the physical and life sciences to pursue gradu-

ate studies in multidisciplinary fields critical to forensic science

practice, Congress should authorize and appropriate funds to the

National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) to work with appro-

priate organizations and educational institutions to improve and

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

develop graduate education programs designed to cut across orga-

nizational, programmatic, and disciplinary boundaries. To make

these programs appealing to potential students, they must include

attractive scholarship and fellowship offerings. Emphasis should

be placed on developing and improving research methods and

methodologies applicable to forensic science practice and on fund-

ing research programs to attract research universities and students

in fields relevant to forensic science. NIFS should also support

law school administrators and judicial education organizations in

establishing continuing legal education programs for law students,

practitioners, and judges.

The Medicolegal Death Investigation System

Although steps have been taken to transform the medicolegal death

investigation system, the shortage of resources and lack of consistent edu-

cational and training requirements (particularly in the coroner system)²⁶

prevent the system from taking full advantage of tools—such as CT scans

and digital X-rays—that the medical system and other scientific disciplines

have to offer. In addition, more rigorous efforts are needed in the areas

of accreditation and adherence to standards. Currently, requirements for

practitioners vary from nothing more than age and residency requirements

to certification by the American Board of Pathology in forensic pathology.

Funds are needed to assess the medicolegal death investigation system

to determine its status and needs, using as a benchmark the current re-

quirements of NAME relating to professional credentials, standards, and

accreditation. And funds are needed to modernize and improve the medico-

legal death investigation system. As it now stands, medical examiners and

coroners (ME/Cs) are essentially ineligible for direct federal funding and

grants from DOJ, DHS, or the Department of Health and Human Services

(through the National Institutes of Health). The Paul Coverdell National

Forensic Science Improvement Act is the only federal grant program that

names medical examiners and coroners as eligible for grants. However,

ME/Cs must compete with public safety agencies for Coverdell grants; as

a result, the funds available to ME/Cs are inadequate. The simple reality

is that the program has not been sufficiently funded to provide significant

improvements in ME/C systems.

In addition to direct funding, there are other initiatives that should

be pursued to improve the medicolegal death investigation system. The

Association of American Medical Colleges and other appropriate profes-

²⁶ Institute of Medicine. 2003. Workshop on the Medicolegal Death Investigation System.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

SUMMARY

sional organizations should organize collaborative activities in education,

training, and research to strengthen the relationship between the medical

examiner community and its counterparts in the larger academic medical

community. Medical examiner offices with training programs affiliated with

medical schools should be eligible to compete for funds. Funding should be

available to support pathologists seeking forensic fellowships. In addition,

forensic pathology fellows could be allowed to apply for medical school

loan forgiveness if they stay full time at a medical examiner’s office for a

reasonable period of time.

Additionally, NIFS should seek funding from Congress to support the

joint development of programs to include medical examiners and medical

examiner offices in national disaster planning, preparedness, and conse-

quence management, involving the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-

vention (CDC) and DHS. Uniform statewide and interstate standards of

operation would be needed to assist in the management of cross-juris-

dictional and interstate events. NIFS should support a federal program

underwriting the development of software for use by ME/C systems for the

management of multisite, multiple fatality events.

NIFS should work with groups such as the National Conference of

Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the American Law Institute, and

NAME, in collaboration with other appropriate professional groups, to up-

date the 1954 Model Post-Mortem Examinations Act and draft legislation

for a modern model death investigation code. An improved code might, for

example, include the elements of a competent medical death investigation

system and clarify the jurisdiction of the medical examiner with respect to

organ donation.

The foregoing ideas must be developed further before any concrete

plans can be pursued. There are, however, a number of specific recom-

mendations, which, if adopted, will help to modernize and improve the

medicolegal death investigation system. These recommendations deserve

the immediate attention of Congress and NIFS.

Recommendation 11:

To improve medicolegal death investigation:

(a) Congress should authorize and appropriate incentive funds

to the National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) for

allocation to states and jurisdictions to establish medical

examiner systems, with the goal of replacing and eventu-

ally eliminating existing coroner systems. Funds are needed

to build regional medical examiner offices, secure neces-

sary equipment, improve administration, and ensure the

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

education, training, and staffing of medical examiner of-

fices. Funding could also be used to help current medical

examiner systems modernize their facilities to meet current

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention-recommended

autopsy safety requirements.

(b)

Congress should appropriate resources to the National

Institutes of Health (NIH) and NIFS, jointly, to support

research, education, and training in forensic pathology.

NIH, with NIFS participation, or NIFS in collaboration

with content experts, should establish a study section to

establish goals, to review and evaluate proposals in these

areas, and to allocate funding for collaborative research

to be conducted by medical examiner offices and medical

universities. In addition, funding, in the form of medical

student loan forgiveness and/or fellowship support, should

be made available to pathology residents who choose fo-

rensic pathology as their specialty.

(c)

NIFS, in collaboration with NIH, the National Association

of Medical Examiners, the American Board of Medicolegal

Death Investigators, and other appropriate professional

organizations, should establish a Scientific Working Group

(SWG) for forensic pathology and medicolegal death inves-

tigation. The SWG should develop and promote standards

for best practices, administration, staffing, education, train-

ing, and continuing education for competent death scene

investigation and postmortem examinations. Best practices

should include the utilization of new technologies such as

laboratory testing for the molecular basis of diseases and

the implementation of specialized imaging techniques.

(d)

All medical examiner offices should be accredited pursu-

ant to NIFS-endorsed standards within a timeframe to be

established by NIFS.

(e)

All federal funding should be restricted to accredited of-

fices that meet NIFS-endorsed standards or that demon-

strate significant and measurable progress in achieving

accreditation within prescribed deadlines.

(f)

All medicolegal autopsies should be performed or super-

vised by a board certified forensic pathologist. This re-

quirement should take effect within a timeframe to be

established by NIFS, following consultation with govern-

ing state institutions.

SUMMARY

AFIS and Database Interoperability

Great improvement is necessary in AFIS interoperability. Crimes may

go unsolved today simply because it is not possible for investigating agen-

cies to search across all the databases that might hold a suspect’s finger-

prints or that may contain a match for an unidentified latent print from

a crime scene. It is also possible that some individuals have been wrongly

convicted because of the limitations of fingerprint searches.

At present, serious practical problems pose obstacles to the achievement

of nationwide AFIS interoperability. These problems include convincing

AFIS equipment vendors to cooperate and collaborate with the law en-

forcement community and researchers to create and use baseline standards

for sharing fingerprint data and create a common interface. Second, law

enforcement agencies lack the resources needed to transition to interoper-

able AFIS implementations. Third, coordinated jurisdictional agreements

and public policies are needed to allow law enforcement agencies to share

fingerprint data more broadly.

Given the disparity in resources and information technology expertise

available to local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, the rela-

tively slow pace of interoperability efforts to date, and the potential gains

from increased AFIS interoperability, the committee believes that a broad-

based emphasis on achieving nationwide fingerprint data interoperability

is needed.

Recommendation 12:

Congress should authorize and appropriate funds for the National

Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) to launch a new broad-based

effort to achieve nationwide fingerprint data interoperability. To

that end, NIFS should convene a task force comprising relevant

experts from the National Institute of Standards and Technology

and the major law enforcement agencies (including representatives

from the local, state, federal, and, perhaps, international levels) and

industry, as appropriate, to develop:

(a) standards for representing and communicating image and

minutiae data among Automated Fingerprint Identifica-

tion Systems. Common data standards would facilitate

the sharing of fingerprint data among law enforcement

agencies at the local, state, federal, and even international

levels, which could result in more solved crimes, fewer

wrongful identifications, and greater efficiency with respect

to fingerprint searches; and

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

(b) baseline standards—to be used with computer algorithms—

to map, record, and recognize features in fingerprint images,

and a research agenda for the continued improvement,

refinement, and characterization of the accuracy of these

algorithms (including quantification of error rates).

These steps toward AFIS interoperability must be accompanied by fed-

eral, state, and local funds to support jurisdictions in upgrading, operating,

and ensuring the integrity and security of their systems; retraining current

staff; and training new fingerprint examiners to gain the desired benefits

of true interoperability. Additionally, greater scientific benefits can be real-

ized through the availability of fingerprint data or databases for research

purposes (using, of course, all the modern security and privacy protections

available to scientists when working with such data). Once created, NIFS

might also be tasked with the maintenance and periodic review of the new

standards and procedures.

Forensic Science Disciplines and Homeland Security

Good forensic science and medical examiner practices are of clear value

from a homeland security perspective, because of their roles in bringing

criminals to justice and in dealing with the effects of natural and human-

made mass disasters. Forensic science techniques (e.g., the evaluation of

DNA fragments) enable more thorough investigations of crime scenes that

have been damaged physically. Routine and trustworthy collection of digital

evidence, and improved techniques and timeliness for its analysis, can be of

great potential value in identifying terrorist activity. Therefore, the foren-

sic science community has a role to play in homeland security. However,

to capitalize on this potential, the forensic science and medical examiner

communities must be well interfaced with homeland security efforts, so

that they can contribute when needed. To be successful, this interface will

require the establishment of good working relationships between federal,

state, and local jurisdictions, the creation of strong security programs to

protect data transmittals between jurisdictions, the development of addi-

tional training for forensic scientists and crime scene investigators, and the

promulgation of contingency plans that will promote efficient team efforts

on demand. Policy issues relating to the enforcement of homeland security

are not within the scope of the committee’s charge and, thus, are beyond the

scope of the report. It can hardly be doubted, however, that improvements

in the forensic science community and medical examiner system could

greatly enhance the capabilities of homeland security.

SUMMARY

Recommendation 13:

Congress should provide funding to the National Institute of Fo-

rensic Science (NIFS) to prepare, in conjunction with the Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, forensic scientists and crime scene investigators for

their potential roles in managing and analyzing evidence from

events that affect homeland security, so that maximum evidentiary

value is preserved from these unusual circumstances and the safety

of these personnel is guarded. This preparation also should include

planning and preparedness (to include exercises) for the interoper-

ability of local forensic personnel with federal counterterrorism

organizations.

Introduction

The world of crime is a complex place. Crime takes place in the work-

place, schools, homes, places of business, motor vehicles, on the streets,

and, increasingly, on the Internet. Crimes are committed at all hours of

the day and night and in all regions of the country, in rural, suburban, and

urban environments. In many cases, a weapon is used, such as a handgun,

knife, or blunt object. Sometimes the perpetrator is under the influence of

alcohol or illicit drugs. In other cases, no one is physically hurt, but prop-

erty is damaged or stolen—for example, when burglary, theft, and motor

vehicle theft occur. In recent years, information technology has provided

the opportunity for identity theft and other types of cybercrime. A crime

scene often is rich in information that reveals the nature of the criminal ac-

tivity and the identities of those persons involved. Perpetrators and victims

may leave behind blood, saliva, skin cells, hair, fingerprints, footprints, tire

prints, clothing fibers, digital and photographic images, audio data, hand-

writing, and the residual effects and debris of arson, gunshots, and unlawful

entry. Some crimes transcend borders, such as those involving homeland

security, for which forensic evidence can be gathered.

Crime scene investigators, with varying levels of training and experi-

ence, search for and collect evidence at the scene, preserve and secure

it in tamper-evident packaging, label it, and send it to an appropriate

agency—normally a crime laboratory, where it may be analyzed by forensic

examiners. If a death was sudden, unexpected, or resulted from violence, a

medicolegal investigator (e.g., coroner, medical examiner, forensic patholo-

gist, physician’s assistant) will be responsible for determining whether a

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

homicide, suicide, or accident occurred and will certify the cause and man-

ner of death.

Crime scene evidence moves through a chain of custody in which, de-

pending on their physical characteristics (e.g., blood, fiber, handwriting),

samples are analyzed according to any of a number of analytical protocols,

and results are reported to law enforcement and court officials. When

evidence is analyzed, typically forensic science “attempts to uncover the

actions or happenings of an event . . . by way of (1) identification (categori-

zation), (2) individualization, (3) association, and (4) reconstruction.”¹ Evi-

dence also is analyzed for the purpose of excluding individuals or sources.

Not all forensic services are performed in traditional crime laboratories

by trained forensic scientists. Some forensic tests might be conducted by

a sworn law enforcement officer with no scientific training or credentials,

other than experience. In smaller jurisdictions, members of the local police

or sheriff’s department might conduct the analyses of evidence, such as

latent print examinations and footwear comparisons. In the United States,

if evidence is sent to a crime laboratory, that facility might be publicly or

privately operated, although private laboratories typically do not visit crime

scenes to collect evidence or serve as the first recipient of physical evidence.

Public crime laboratories are organized at the city, county, state, or federal

level. A law enforcement agency that does not operate its own crime labo-

ratory typically has access to a higher-level laboratory (e.g., at the state or

county level) or a private laboratory for analysis of evidence.

According to a 2005 census by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS),²

389 publicly funded forensic crime laboratories were operating in the

United States in 2005: These included 210 state or regional laboratories, 84

county laboratories, 62 municipal laboratories, and 33 federal laboratories,

and they received evidence from nearly 2.7 million criminal cases³ in 2005.

These laboratories are staffed by individuals with a wide range of training

and expertise, from scientists with Ph.D.s to technicians who have been

trained largely on the job. No data are available on the size and depth of

the private forensic laboratories, except for private DNA laboratories.

In general, a traditional crime laboratory has been defined as constitut-

ing “a single laboratory or system comprised of scientists analyzing evidence

¹ K. Inman and N. Rudin. 2002. The origin of evidence. Forensic Science International

126:11-16.

² M.R. Durose. 2008. Census of Publicly Funded Forensic Crime Laboratories, 2005. U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available at

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpffcl05.pdf.

³ Ibid., p. 9. “A ‘case’ is defined as evidence submitted from a single criminal investigation.

A case may include multiple ‘requests’ for forensic services. For example, one case may include

a request for biology screening and a request for latent prints.”

INTRODUCTION

in one or more of the following disciplines: controlled substances, trace,

biology (including DNA), toxicology, latent prints, questioned documents,

firearms/toolmarks, or crime scene.”⁴ More recently, increasing numbers of

laboratories specialize in the analysis of evidence in one area, for example,

DNA or digital evidence. (See Chapter 5 for a more complete description

and discussion of the forensic science disciplines.)

The capacity and quality of the current forensic science system have

been the focus of increasing attention by Congress, the courts, and the me-

dia. New doubts about the accuracy of some forensic science practices have

intensified with the growing number of exonerations resulting from DNA

analysis (and the concomitant realization that guilty parties sometimes

walk free). Greater expectations for precise forensic science evidence raised

by DNA testing have forced new scrutiny on other forensic techniques.

Emerging scientific advances that could benefit forensic investigation elicit

concerns about resources, training, and capacity for implementing new

techniques. A crisis in backlogged cases, caused by crime laboratories lack-

ing sufficient resources and qualified personnel, raises concerns about the

effectiveness and efficiency of the criminal justice system. When backlogs

prolong testing time, issues involving speedy trials may arise. In addition,

backlogs discourage law enforcement personnel and organizations from

submitting evidence. Laboratories also may restrict submissions of evidence

to reduce backlogs. All of these concerns, and more, provide the back-

ground against which this report is set.

Finally, if evidence and laboratory tests are mishandled or improperly

analyzed; if the scientific evidence carries a false sense of significance; or if

there is bias, incompetence, or a lack of adequate internal controls for the

evidence introduced by the forensic scientists and their laboratories, the

jury or court can be misled, and this could lead to wrongful conviction or

exoneration. If juries lose confidence in the reliability of forensic testimony,

valid evidence might be discounted, and some innocent persons might be

convicted or guilty individuals acquitted.

Recent years have seen a number of concerted efforts by forensic

science organizations to strengthen the foundations of many areas of tes-

timony. However, substantial improvement is necessary in the forensic sci-

ence disciplines to enhance law enforcement’s ability to identify those who

have or have not committed a crime and to prevent the criminal justice

system from erroneously convicting or exonerating the persons who come

before it.

⁴ Ibid., p. 24.

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

WHAT IS FORENSIC SCIENCE?

Although there are numerous ways by which to categorize the forensic

science disciplines, the committee found the categorization used by the

National Institute of Justice to be useful:

1. general toxicology;

2. firearms/toolmarks;

3. questioned documents;

4. trace evidence;

5. controlled substances;

6. biological/serology screening (including DNA analysis);

7. fire debris/arson analysis;

8. impression evidence;

9. blood pattern analysis;

10. crime scene investigation;

11. medicolegal death investigation; and

12. digital evidence.⁵

Some of these disciplines are discussed in Chapter 5. Forensic pathol-

ogy is considered a subspecialty of medicine and is considered separately

in Chapter 9.

The term “forensic science” encompasses a broad range of disciplines,

each with its own distinct practices. The forensic science disciplines exhibit

wide variability with regard to techniques, methodologies, reliability, level

of error, research, general acceptability, and published material (see Chap-

ters 4 through 6). Some of the disciplines are laboratory based (e.g., nuclear

and mitochondrial DNA analysis, toxicology, and drug analysis); others are

based on expert interpretation of observed patterns (e.g., fingerprints, writ-

ing samples, toolmarks, bite marks). Some activities require the skills and

analytical expertise of individuals trained as scientists (e.g., chemists or bi-

ologists); other activities are conducted by scientists as well as by individu-

als trained in law enforcement (e.g., crime scene investigators, blood spatter

analysts, crime reconstruction specialists), medicine (e.g., forensic patholo-

gists), or laboratory methods (e.g., technologists). Many of the processes

used in the forensic science disciplines are largely empirical applications of

science—that is, they are not based on a body of knowledge that recognizes

the underlying limitations of the scientific principles and methodologies

used for problem solving and discovery. It is therefore important to focus

on ways to improve, systematize, and monitor the activities and practices

⁵ National Institute of Justice. 2006. Status and Needs of Forensic Science Service Providers:

A Report to Congress. Available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/213420.htm.

INTRODUCTION

in the forensic science disciplines and related areas of inquiry. Thus, in this

report, the term “forensic science” is used with regard to a broad array of

activities, with the recognition that some of these activities might not have

a well-developed research base, are not informed by scientific knowledge,

or are not developed within the culture of science.

PRESSURES ON THE FORENSIC SCIENCE SYSTEM

As mentioned above, a number of factors have combined in the past few

decades to place increasing demands on an already overtaxed, inconsistent,

and underresourced forensic science infrastructure. These factors have not

only stressed the system’s capacity, but also have raised serious questions

and concerns about the validity and reliability of some forensic methods

and techniques and how forensic evidence is reported to juries and courts.

The Case Backlog—Insufficient Resources

According to the 2005 BJS census report, a typical publicly funded

crime laboratory ended the year with a backlog of about 401 requests for

services, received another 4,328 such requests, and completed 3,980 of

them. Roughly half of all requests were in the area of controlled substances.

The average backlog has risen since the 2002 census,⁶ with nearly 20 per-

cent of all requests backlogged by year end. The Department of Justice

(DOJ) defines a case as backlogged if it remains in the laboratory 30 days

or more without the development of a report or analysis. Federal, state,

and local laboratories reported a combined backlog of 435,879 requests for

forensic analysis.⁷ According to the census, a typical laboratory perform-

ing DNA testing in 2005 started the year with a backlog of 86 requests,

received 337 new requests, completed 265 requests, and finished the year

with 152 backlogged requests.

The backlog is exacerbated further by increased requests for quick

laboratory results by law enforcement and prosecutors. Witnesses before

the committee testified that prosecutors increasingly rely on laboratories

to provide results prior to approving charges and have increased requests

for additional work on the back end of a case, just before trial.⁸ Backlogs

are compounded by rising police agency requests for testing (e.g., for DNA

evidence found on guns and from nonviolent crime scenes). Laboratories

⁶ J.L. Peterson and M.J. Hickman. 2005. Census of Publicly Funded Forensic Crime

Laboratories, 2002. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice

Statistics. Available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpffcl02.pdf.

⁷ Durose, op. cit.

⁸ J.L. Johnson, Laboratory Director, Illinois State Police, Forensic Science Center at Chicago.

Presentation to the committee. January 25, 2007.

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

are thus challenged to balance requests for analyses of “older” and “cold”

cases with new cases and must make choices to allocate resources by priori-

tizing the evidence to be analyzed. In California, voters passed Proposition

69, requiring that a DNA sample be obtained from all convicted felons.

This increased the workload and resulted in 235,000 backlogged cases by

the end of 2005.⁹

These backlogs can result in prolonged incarceration for innocent per-

sons wrongly charged and awaiting trial and delayed investigation of those

who are not yet charged, and they can contribute to the release of guilty

suspects who go on to commit further crimes.

The Ascendancy of DNA Analysis and a New Standard

In the 1980s, the opportunity to use the techniques of DNA technolo-

gies to identify individuals for forensic and other purposes became apparent.

Early concerns about the use of DNA for forensic casework included the

following: (1) whether the detection methods were scientifically valid—that

is, whether they correctly identified true matches and true nonmatches and

(2) whether DNA analysis of forensic samples is reliable—that is, whether

it yields reproducible results under defined conditions of use. A 1990 re-

port by the congressional Office of Technology Assessment concluded that

DNA tests were both reliable and valid in the forensic context but required

a strict set of standards and quality control measures before they could be

widely adopted.¹⁰

In 1990, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) established guidelines

for DNA analysis and proficiency testing and four years later created the

Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), which allows federal, state, and

local crime laboratories to exchange and compare DNA profiles electroni-

cally, thereby linking crimes to each other and to convicted offenders.

In 1992, the National Research Council (NRC) issued DNA Technol-

ogy in Forensic Science, which concluded that, “No laboratory should let

its results with a new DNA typing method be used in court, unless it has

undergone . . . proficiency testing via blind trials.”¹¹ In addition, the report

cautioned that numerous questions must be answered about using DNA

evidence in a forensic context that rarely had to be considered by scientists

engaged in DNA research—for example, questions involving contamina-

tion, degradation, and a number of statistical issues. While confirming that

⁹ Durose, op. cit.

¹⁰ U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. 1990. Genetic Witness: Forensic Uses

of DNA Tests. OTA-BA-438. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, NTIS order

#PB90-259110.

¹¹ National Research Council. 1992. DNA Technology in Forensic Science. Washington,

DC: National Academy Press, p. 55.

INTRODUCTION

the science behind DNA analysis is valid, a subsequent NRC report in 1996

recommended new ways of interpreting DNA evidence to help answer a key

question for jurors—the likelihood that two matching samples can come

from different people.¹² This 1996 report recommended a set of statistical

calculations that takes population structure into account, which enhanced

the validity of the test. The report also called for independent retesting

and made recommendations to improve laboratory performance and ac-

countability through, for example, adherence to high-quality standards,

accreditation, and proficiency testing.

Since then, the past two decades have seen tremendous growth in the

use of DNA evidence in crime scene investigations. Currently more than

175 publicly funded forensic laboratories and approximately 30 private

laboratories conduct hundreds of thousands of DNA analyses annually

in the United States. In addition, most countries in Europe and Asia have

forensic DNA programs. In 2003, President George W. Bush announced a

5-year, $1 billion initiative to improve the use of DNA in the criminal jus-

tice system. Called the President’s DNA Initiative, the program pushed for

increased funding, training, and assistance to ensure that DNA technology

“reaches its full potential to solve crimes, protect the innocent, and identify

missing persons.”¹³

Thus, DNA analysis—originally developed in research laboratories in

the context of life sciences research—has received heightened scrutiny and

funding support. That, combined with its well-defined precision and ac-

curacy, has set the bar higher for other forensic science methodologies, be-

cause it has provided a tool with a higher degree of reliability and relevance

than any other forensic technique. However, DNA evidence comprises only

about 10 percent of case work and is not always relevant to a particular

case.¹⁴ Even if DNA evidence is available, it will assist in solving a crime

only if it supports an evidential hypothesis that makes guilt or innocence

more likely. For example, the fact that DNA evidence of a victim’s husband

is found in the house in which the couple lived and where the murder took

place proves nothing. The fact that the husband’s DNA is found under the

fingernails of the victim who put up a struggle may have a very different

significance. Thus, it is essential to articulate the reasoning process and the

context associated with the evidence that is being evaluated.

¹² National Research Council. 1996. The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence: An Up-

date. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

¹³ See www.dna.gov/info/e_summary.

¹⁴ The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors. 2004. 180 Day Study: Status and

Needs of U.S. Crime Labs. p. 7, table 2.

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

Questionable or Questioned Science

The increased use of DNA analysis as a more reliable approach to

matching crime scene evidence with suspects and victims has resulted in the

reevaluation of older cases that retained biological evidence that could be

analyzed by DNA. The number of exonerations resulting from the analysis

of DNA has grown across the country in recent years, uncovering a disturb-

ing number of wrongful convictions—some for capital crimes—and expos-

ing serious limitations in some of the forensic science approaches commonly

used in the United States.

According to The Innocence Project, there have been 223 postconvic-

tion DNA exonerations in the United States since 1989 (as of November

2008).¹⁵ Some have contested the percentage of exonerated defendants

whose convictions allegedly were based on faulty science. Although the

Innocence Project figures are disputed by forensic scientists who have reex-

amined the data, even those who are critical of the conclusions of The In-

nocence Project acknowledge that faulty forensic science has, on occasion,

contributed to the wrongful conviction of innocent persons.¹⁶

The fact is that many forensic tests—such as those used to infer the

source of toolmarks or bite marks—have never been exposed to strin-

gent scientific scrutiny. Most of these techniques were developed in crime

laboratories to aid in the investigation of evidence from a particular crime

scene, and researching their limitations and foundations was never a top

priority. There is some logic behind the application of these techniques;

practitioners worked hard to improve their methods, and results from other

evidence have combined with these tests to give forensic scientists a degree

of confidence in their probative value. Before the first offering of the use

of DNA in forensic science in 1986, no concerted effort had been made to

determine the reliability of these tests, and some in the forensic science and

law enforcement communities believed that scientists’ ability to withstand

cross-examination in court when giving testimony related to these tests

was sufficient to demonstrate the tests’ reliability. However, although the

precise error rates of these forensic tests are still unknown, comparison of

their results with DNA testing in the same cases has revealed that some

of these analyses, as currently performed, produce erroneous results. The

¹⁵ The Innocence Project. Fact Sheet: Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations. Avail-

able at www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php. See also B.L. Garrett. Judging innocence.

108 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (2008) (discussing the results of an empirical study of the types of

faulty evidence that was admitted in more than 200 cases for which DNA testing subsequently

enabled postconviction exonerations).

¹⁶ See J. Collins and J. Jarvis. 2008. The wrongful conviction of forensic science. Crime Lab

Report. July 16. Available at www.crimelabreport.com/library/pdf/wrongful_conviction.pdf.

See also N. Rudin and K. Inman. 2008. Who speaks for forensic science? News of the Califor-

nia Association of Criminalists. Available at www.cacnews.org/news/4thq08.pdf, p. 10.

INTRODUCTION

conclusions of forensic examiners may or may not be right—depending on

the case—but each wrongful conviction based on improperly interpreted

evidence is serious, both for the innocent person and also for society, be-

cause of the threat that may be posed by a guilty person going free. Some

non-DNA forensic tests do not meet the fundamental requirements of sci-

ence, in terms of reproducibility, validity, and falsifiability (see Chapters 4

through 6).

Even fingerprint analysis has been called into question. For nearly

a century, fingerprint examiners have been comparing partial latent fin-

gerprints found at crime scenes to inked fingerprints taken directly from

suspects. Fingerprint identifications have been viewed as exact means of

associating a suspect with a crime scene print and rarely were questioned.¹⁷

Recently, however, the scientific foundation of the fingerprint field has

been questioned, and the suggestion has been made that latent fingerprint

identifications may not be as reliable as previously assumed.¹⁸ The ques-

tion is less a matter of whether each person’s fingerprints are permanent

and unique—uniqueness is commonly assumed—and more a matter of

whether one can determine with adequate reliability that the finger that

left an imperfect impression at a crime scene is the same finger that left an

impression (with different imperfections) in a file of fingerprints. In October

2007, Baltimore County Circuit Judge Susan M. Souder refused to allow a

fingerprint analyst to testify that a latent print was made by the defendant

in a death penalty trial. In her ruling, Judge Souder found the traditional

method of fingerprint analysis to be “a subjective, untested, unverifiable

identification procedure that purports to be infallible.”¹⁹

Some forensic science methods have as their goal the “individualiza-

tion” of specific types of evidence (typically shoe and tire impressions, der-

mal ridge prints, toolmarks and firearms, and handwriting). Analysts using

such methods believe that unique markings are acquired by a source item

in random fashion and that such uniqueness is faithfully transmitted from

the source item to the evidence item being examined (or in the case of hand-

writing, that individuals acquire habits that result in unique handwriting).

When the evidence and putative source items are compared, a conclusion

of individualization implies that the evidence originated from that source,

¹⁷ R. Epstein. Fingerprints meet Daubert: The myth of fingerprint “science” is revealed. 75

Southern California Law Review 605 (2002).

¹⁸ S.A. Cole. 2002. Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identifica-

tion. Boston: Harvard University Press; Epstein, op. cit.

¹⁹ State of Maryland v. Bryan Rose. In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Case No.

K06-545.

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

to the exclusion of all other possible sources.^20,21 The determination of

uniqueness requires measurements of object attributes, data collected on

the population frequency of variation in these attributes, testing of attribute

independence, and calculations of the probability that different objects

share a common set of observable attributes.²² Importantly, the results of

research must be made public so that they can be reviewed, checked by

others, criticized, and then revised, and this has not been done for some of

the forensic science disciplines.²³ As recently as September 2008, the Detroit

Police crime laboratory was shut down following a Michigan State Police

audit that found a 10 percent error rate in ballistic evidence.²⁴

The forensic science community has had little opportunity to pursue

or become proficient in the research that is needed to support what it does.

Few sources of funding exist for independent forensic research (see Chapter

2). Most of the studies are commissioned by DOJ and conducted by crime

laboratories with little or no participation by the traditional scientific com-

munity. In addition, most disciplines in the profession are hindered by a

lack of enforceable standards for interpretation of data (see Chapter 7).

Errors and Fraud

In recent years, the integrity of crime laboratories increasingly has been

called into question, with some highly publicized cases highlighting the

sometimes lax standards of laboratories that have generated questionable

or fraudulent evidence and that have lacked quality control measures that

would have detected the questionable evidence. In one notorious case, a

state-mandated review of analyses conducted by West Virginia State Police

laboratory employee Fred Zain revealed that the convictions of more than

100 people were in doubt because Zain had repeatedly falsified evidence in

criminal prosecutions. At least 10 men had their convictions overturned as

a result.²⁵ Subsequent reviews questioned whether Zain was ever qualified

to perform scientific examinations.²⁶

Other scandals, such as one involving the Houston Crime Laboratory

²⁰ M.J. Saks and J.J. Koehler. 2005. The coming paradigm shift in forensic identification

science. Science 309:892-895.

²¹ W.J. Bodziak. 1999. Footwear Impression Evidence-Detection, Recovery, and Examina-

tion. 2nd ed. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

²² Ibid. See also NRC, 1996, op. cit.

²³ P.C. Giannelli. Wrongful convictions and forensic science: The need to regulate crime

labs. 86 N.C. L. Rev. 163 (2007).

²⁴ B. Schmitt and J. Swickard. 2008. Detroit Police lab shut down after probe finds errors.

Detroit Free Press on-line. September 25.

²⁵ In the Matter of an Investigation of the West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory,

Serology Division (WVa 1993) 438 S.E.2d 501(Zaine I); and 445 S.E.2d 165 (Zain II).

²⁶ Ibid.

INTRODUCTION

in 2003, highlight the sometimes blatant lack of proper education and train-

ing of forensic examiners. In the Houston case, several DNA experts went

public with accusations that the DNA/Serology Unit of the Houston Police

Department Crime Laboratory was performing grossly incompetent work

and was presenting findings in a misleading manner designed to unfairly

help prosecutors obtain convictions. An audit by the Texas Department of

Public Safety confirmed serious inadequacies in the laboratory’s procedures,

including “routine failure to run essential scientific controls, failure to take

adequate measures to prevent contamination of samples, failure to ade-

quately document work performed and results obtained, and routine failure

to follow correct procedures for computing statistical frequencies.”^27,28

The Innocence Project has documented instances of both intentional

and unintentional laboratory errors that have lead to wrongful convictions,

including:

• In the laboratory—contamination and mislabeling of evidence.

• In information provided in forensics reports—falsified results (in-

cluding “drylabbing,” i.e., providing conclusions from tests that

were never conducted), and misinterpretation of evidence.

• In the courtroom—suppression of exculpatory evidence; provid-

ing a statistical exaggeration of the results of a test conducted on

evidence; and providing false testimony about test results.²⁹

Saks and Koehler have written that the testimony of forensic scientists

is one of many problems in criminal cases today.³⁰ They cite the norms of

science, which emphasize “methodological rigor, openness, and cautious

interpretation of data,” as norms that often are absent from the forensic

science disciplines.

Although cases of fraud appear to be rare, perhaps of more concern is

the lack of good data on the accuracy of the analyses conducted in forensic

science disciplines and the significant potential for bias that is present in

some cases. For example, the FBI was accused of bias in the case of the

Madrid bombing suspect Brandon Mayfield (see Box 1-1). In that case, the

Inspector General of DOJ launched an investigation. The FBI conducted its

Quality Assurance Audit for Forensic DNA and Convicted Offender DNA Databasing Lab-

oratories. An Audit of the Houston Police Department Crime Laboratory-DNA/Serology Section,

December 12-13, 2002. Available at www.scientific.org/archive/Audit%20Document--Houston.

pdf.

²⁸ See also M.R. Bromwich. 2007. Final Report of the Independent Investigator for the

Houston Police Department Crime Laboratory and Property Room. Available at www.

hpdlabinvestigation.org.

²⁹ The Innocence Project. Available at www.innocenceproject.org/Content/312.php.

³⁰ Saks and Koehler, op. cit.

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

Box 1-1

FBI Statement on Brandon Mayfield Case

“After the March terrorist attacks on commuter trains in Madrid, digital images

of partial latent fingerprints obtained from plastic bags that contained detonator

caps were submitted by Spanish authorities to the FBI for analysis. The submitted

images were searched through the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identifica-

tion System (IAFIS). An IAFIS search compares an unknown print to a database

of millions of known prints. The result of an IAFIS search produces a short list of

potential matches. A trained fingerprint examiner then takes the short list of pos-

sible matches and performs an examination to determine whether the unknown

print matches a known print in the database.

Using standard protocols and methodologies, FBI fingerprint examiners de-

termined that the latent fingerprint was of value for identification purposes. This

print was subsequently linked to Brandon Mayfield. That association was inde-

pendently analyzed and the results were confirmed by an outside experienced

fingerprint expert.

Soon after the submitted fingerprint was associated with Mr. Mayfield, Span-

ish authorities alerted the FBI to additional information that cast doubt on the find-

ings. As a result, the FBI sent two fingerprint examiners to Madrid, who compared

the image the FBI had been provided to the image the Spanish authorities had.

Upon review it was determined that the FBI identification was based on an

image of substandard quality, which was particularly problematic because of the

remarkable number of points of similarity between Mr. Mayfield’s prints and the

print details in the images submitted to the FBI.”

The FBI’s Latent Fingerprint Unit has reviewed its practices and adopted

new guidelines for all examiners receiving latent print images when the original

evidence is not included.

SOURCE: FBI. May 24, 2004, Press Release. Available at www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel04/

mayfield052404.htm.

own review by a panel of independent experts. The reviews concluded that

the problem was not the quality of the digital images reviewed, but rather

the bias and “circular reasoning” of the FBI examiners.³¹

Parts of the forensic science community have resisted the implications

of the mounting criticism of the reliability of forensic analyses by inves-

tigative units such as Inspector General reports, The Innocence Project,

³¹ U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. 2006. A Review of the FBI’s

Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case. Also see R.B. Stacey. 2005. Report on the Errone-

ous Fingerprint Individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case. Available at www.fbi.

gov/hq/lab/fsc/current/special_report/2005_special_report.htm.

INTRODUCTION

and studies in the published literature. In testimony before the committee,

it was clear that some members of the forensic science community will

not concede that there could be less than perfect accuracy either in given

laboratories or in specific disciplines, and experts testified to the commit-

tee that disagreement remains regarding even what constitutes an error.

For example, if the limitations of a given technology lead to an examiner

declaring a “match” that is found by subsequent technology (e.g., DNA

analysis) to be a “mismatch,” there is disagreement within the forensic sci-

ence community about whether the original determination constitutes an

error.³² Failure to acknowledge uncertainty in findings is common: Many

examiners claim in testimony that others in their field would come to the

exact same conclusions about the evidence they have analyzed. Assertions

of a “100 percent match” contradict the findings of proficiency tests that

find substantial rates of erroneous results in some disciplines (i.e., voice

identification, bite mark analysis).^33,34

As an example, in a FBI publication on the correlation of microscopic

and mitochondrial DNA hair comparisons, the authors found that even

competent hair examiners can make significant errors.³⁵ In this study, the

authors found that in 11 percent of the cases in which the hair examiners

declared two hairs to be “similar,” subsequent DNA testing revealed that

the hairs did not match, which refers either to the competency or the rela-

tive ability of the two divergent techniques to identify differences in hair

samples, as well as to the probative value of each test.

The insistence by some forensic practitioners that their disciplines em-

ploy methodologies that have perfect accuracy and produce no errors has

hampered efforts to evaluate the usefulness of the forensic science disci-

plines. And, although DNA analysis is considered the most reliable forensic

tool available today, laboratories nonetheless can make errors working with

either nuclear DNA or mtDNA—errors such as mislabeling samples, losing

samples, or misinterpreting the data.

Standard setting, accreditation of laboratories, and certification of

individuals aim to address many of these problems, and although many

laboratories have excellent training and quality control programs, even

³² N. Benedict. 2004. Fingerprints and the Daubert standard for admission of scientific

evidence: Why fingerprints fail and a proposed remedy. Arizona Law Review 46:519; M.

Houck, Director of Forensic Science Initiative, West Virginia University. Presentation to the

committee. January 25, 2007.

³³ D.L. Faigman, D. Kaye, M.J. Saks, and J. Sanders. 2002. Modern Scientific Evidence: The

Law and Science of Expert Testimony. St. Paul, MN: Thompson/West.

³⁴ C.M. Bowers. 2002. The scientific status of bitemark comparisons. In: D.L. Faigman (ed.).

Science in the Law: Forensic Science Issues. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing.

³⁵ M. Houck and B. Budowle. 2002. Correlation of microscopic and mitochondrial DNA

hair comparisons. Journal of Forensic Sciences 47(5):964-967; see also Bromwich, op. cit.

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

accredited laboratories make mistakes. Furthermore, accreditation is a vol-

untary program, except in a few jurisdictions in which it is required (New

York, Oklahoma, and Texas)³⁶ (see Chapter 7).

The “CSI Effect”

Media attention has focused recently on what is being called the “CSI

Effect,” named for popular television shows (such as Crime Scene Inves-

tigation) that are focused on police forensic evidence investigation.³⁷ The

fictional characters in these dramas often present an unrealistic portrayal

of the daily operations of crime scene investigators and crime laboratories

(including their instrumentation, analytical technologies, and capabilities).

Cases are solved in an hour, highly technical analyses are accomplished in

minutes, and laboratory and instrumental capabilities are often exagger-

ated, misrepresented, or entirely fabricated. In courtroom scenes, forensic

examiners state their findings or a match (between evidence and suspect)

with unfailing certainty, often demonstrating the technique used to make

the determination. The dramas suggest that convictions are quick and no

mistakes are made.

The CSI Effect specifically refers to the real-life consequences of expo-

sure to Hollywood’s version of law and order. Jurists and crime laboratory

directors anecdotally report that jurors have come to expect the presenta-

tion of forensic evidence in every case, and they expect it to be conclusive.

A recent study by Schweitzer and Saks found that compared to those who

do not watch CSI, CSI viewers were “more critical of the forensic evidence

presented at the trial, finding it less believable. Forensic science view-

ers expressed more confidence in their verdicts than did nonviewers.”³⁸

Prosecutors and defense attorneys have reported jurors second guessing

them in the courtroom, citing “reasonable doubt” and refusing to convict

because they believed that other evidence was available and not adequately

examined.³⁹

Schweitzer and Saks found that the CSI Effect is changing the manner in

which forensic evidence is presented in court, with some prosecutors believ-

ing they must make their presentation as visually interesting and appealing

as such presentations appear to be on television. Some are concerned that

the conclusiveness and finality of the manner in which forensic evidence is

³⁶ National Institute of Justice. 2006. Status and Needs of Forensic Science Service Provid-

ers: A Report to Congress. Available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/213420.htm.

³⁷ See U.S. News & World Report. 2005. The CSI effect: How TV is driving jury verdicts

all across America. April 25.

³⁸ N.J. Schweitzer and M.J. Saks. 2007. The CSI Effect: Popular fiction about forensic sci-

ence affects public expectations about real forensic science. Jurimetrics 47:357.

³⁹ See U.S. News & World Report, op. cit.

INTRODUCTION

presented on television results in jurors giving more or less credence to the

forensic experts and their testimony than they should, raising expectations,

and possibly resulting in a miscarriage of justice.⁴⁰ The true effects of the

popularization of forensic science disciplines will not be fully understood

for some time, but it is apparent that it has increased pressure and attention

on the forensic science community in the use and interpretation of evidence

in the courtroom.

Fragmented and Inconsistent Medicolegal Death Investigation

The medicolegal death investigation system is a fragmented organiza-

tion of state and local entities called upon to investigate deaths and to

certify the cause and manner of unnatural and unexplained deaths. About

1 percent of the U.S. population (about 2.6 million people) dies each year.

Medical examiner and coroner offices receive nearly 1 million reports of

deaths, constituting between 30 to 40 percent of all U.S. deaths in 2004,

and accept about one half of those (500,000, or 1 in 5 deaths) for further

investigation and certification.⁴¹ In carrying out this role, medical examin-

ers and coroners are required to decide the scope and course of a death

investigation, which may include assessing the scene of death, examining

the body, determining whether to perform an autopsy, and ordering other

medical tests, forensic analyses, and procedures as needed. Yet the training

and skill of medical examiners and coroners and the systems that support

them vary greatly. Medical examiners may be physicians, pathologists, or

forensic pathologists with jurisdiction within a county, district, or state. A

coroner is an elected or appointed official who might not be a physician or

have had any medical training. Coroners typically serve a single county.

Since 1877, in the United States, there have been efforts to replace the

coroner system with a medical examiner system.⁴² In fact, more than 80

years ago, the National Academy of Sciences identified concerns regard-

ing the lack of standardization in death investigations and called for the

abolishment of the coroner’s office, noting that the office “has conclusively

demonstrated its incapacity to perform the functions customarily required

of it.”⁴³ In its place, the report called for well-staffed offices of a medical

⁴⁰ Schweitzer and Saks, op. cit.; S.A. Cole and R. Dioso-Villa. 2007. CSI and its effects:

Media, juries, and the burden of proof. New England Law Review 41(3):435.

⁴¹ M.J. Hickman, K.A. Hughes, K.J. Strom, and J.D. Ropero-Miller. 2007. Medical Ex-

aminer and Coroners’ Offices, 2004. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs,

Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/meco04.pdf.

⁴² W.U. Spitz and R.S. Fisher. 1982. Medicolegal Investigation of Death, 2nd ed. Springfield,

IL: Charles C. Thomas.

⁴³ National Research Council. 1928. The Coroner and the Medical Examiner. Washington,

DC: National Academy Press.

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

examiner, led by a pathologist. In strong terms, the 1928 committee called

for the professionalization of death investigation, with medical science at

its center.

Despite these calls, efforts to move away from a coroner system in

the United States have stalled. Currently, 11 states have coroner-only sys-

tems, 22 states have medical examiner systems, and 18 states have mixed

systems—in which some counties have coroners and others have medical

examiners. Some of these states have a referral system, in which the coroner

refers cases to medical examiners for autopsy.⁴⁴ According to a 2003 Insti-

tute of Medicine report, in addition to the variety of systems in the United

States, the location and authority of the medical examiner or coroner of-

fice also varies, with 43 percent of the U.S. population served by a medical

examiner or coroner housed in a separate city, county, or state government

office. Other arrangements involve an office under public safety or law

enforcement. The least common placement is under a forensic laboratory

or health department.⁴⁵

Variability also is evident in terms of accreditation of death investiga-

tion systems. As of August 2008, 54 of the medical examiner offices in the

United States (serving 23 percent of the population) have been accredited

by the National Association of Medical Examiners, the professional orga-

nization of physician medical examiners. Most of the country is served by

offices lacking accreditation.⁴⁶ Similarly, requirements for training are not

mandatory. About 36 percent of the population lives where minimal or no

special training is required to conduct death investigations.⁴⁷ Recently, an

18-year-old high school student was elected a deputy coroner in Indiana

after completing a short training course.⁴⁸

Additionally, funding for programs supporting death investigations

vary across the country, with the cost of county systems ranging from $0.62

to $5.54 per capita, and statewide systems from $0.32 to $3.20.⁴⁹ Most

funding comes from tax revenues, and with such limited funds available,

the salaries of medical examiners and skilled personnel are much lower than

those of other physicians and medical personnel. Consequently, recruiting

and retaining skilled personnel is a constant struggle.

At a time when natural disasters or man-made disasters could create

⁴⁴ R. Hanzlick and D. Combs. 1998. Medical examiner and coroner systems: History and

trends. Journal of the American Medical Association 279(11):870-874.

⁴⁵ Institute of Medicine. 2003. Medicolegal Death Investigation System: Workshop Report.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ R. Hanzlick. 1996. Coroner training needs. A numeric and geographic analysis. Journal

of the American Medical Association 276(21):1775-1778.

⁴⁸ See www.wthr.com/Global/story.asp?S=6534514&nav=menu188_2.

⁴⁹ IOM, op. cit.

INTRODUCTION

great havoc in our country, the death investigation system is one that is of

increasing importance. Deaths resulting from terrorism, with the exception

of any suicide perpetrators, are homicides that require robust medicolegal

death investigation systems to recover and identify remains, collect forensic

evidence, and determine cause of death.

Incompatible Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, law enforcement agencies across

the Nation began adopting Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems

(AFIS) to improve their efficiency and reduce the time needed to identify (or

exclude) a given individual from a fingerprint. Before the use of AFIS, the

fingerprint identification process involved numerous clerks and fingerprint

examiners tediously sifting through thousands of classified and cataloged

paper fingerprint cards.

AFIS was an enormous improvement in the way local, state, and federal

law enforcement agencies managed fingerprints and identified people. AFIS

searches are much faster than manual searches and often allow examiners

to search across a larger pool of candidates and produce a shorter list of

possible associations of crime scene prints and unidentified persons, living

or dead.

Working with a system’s software, fingerprint examiners can map the

details of a given fingerprint—by features that consist of “minutiae” (e.g.,

friction ridge endings and ridge bifurcations)—and ask the system to search

its database for other records that closely resemble this pattern. Depending

on the size of the database being searched and the system’s workload, an

examiner often can get results back within minutes.

However, even though AFIS has been a significant improvement for the

law enforcement community over the last few decades, AFIS deployments

and performance (operational capacities) today are still far from optimal.

Many law enforcement AFIS installations are stand-alone systems or are

part of relatively limited regional networks with shared databases or infor-

mation-sharing agreements. Today, systems from different vendors often

are incompatible and hence cannot communicate. Indeed, different versions

of similar systems from the same vendor often cannot effectively share

fingerprint data with one another. In addition, many law enforcement agen-

cies also access the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification

System database (the “largest biometric database in the world”⁵⁰) through

an entirely separate stand-alone system—a fact that often forces fingerprint

examiners to enter fingerprint data for one search multiple times in multiple

states (at least once for each system being searched). Additionally, searches

⁵⁰ See www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis.htm.

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

between latent print to AFIS 10-print⁵¹ files suffer by not being more fully

automated: Examiners must manually encode a latent print before search-

ing the AFIS 10-print database. Furthermore, the hit rate for latent prints

searched against the AFIS database is approximately 40 percent (see Chap-

ter 10). Much good work in recent years has improved the interoperability

of AFIS installations and databases, but the pace of these efforts to date has

been slow, and greater progress must be made toward achieving meaning-

ful, nationwide AFIS interoperability.

The Growing Importance of the Forensic Science

Disciplines to Homeland Security

Threats to food and transportation, concerns about nuclear and cyber

security, and the need to develop rapid responses to chemical, nuclear, ra-

diological, and biological threats underlie the need to ensure that there is a

sufficient supply of adequately trained forensic specialists. At present, pub-

lic crime laboratories are insufficiently prepared to handle mass disasters.

In addition, demands will be increasing on the forensic science community

to develop real-time plans and protocols for mass disaster responses by

the network of crime laboratories and death investigation systems across

the country—and internationally. The development and application of the

forensic science disciplines to support intelligence, investigations, and op-

erations aimed at the prevention, interdiction, disruption, attribution, and

prosecution of terrorism has been an important component of both pub-

lic health and what is now termed “homeland security” for at least two

decades. With the development and deployment of enhanced capabilities

came the integration of forensic science disciplines much earlier in the inves-

tigative process. As a result, the forensic science disciplines could be more

fruitfully leveraged to generate investigative leads to test, direct, or redirect

lines of investigation, not just in building a case for prosecution. Forensic

science disciplines are essential components of the response to mass fatality

events, whether natural or man made.

The Admission of Forensic Science Evidence in Litigation

As explained in Chapter 3, most forensic science disciplines are inex-

tricably tethered to the legal system; many forensic fields (e.g., firearms

analysis, latent fingerprint identification) are but handmaidens of the legal

system, and they have no significant uses beyond law enforcement. There-

⁵¹ AFIS 10-print records the fingers, thumbs, and a palm print on a large index card. These

prints are carefully taken, clear, and easy to read, and they make up the bulk of the AFIS data

available today.

INTRODUCTION

fore, any study of forensic science necessarily must include an assessment of

the legal system that it serves. As already noted, and as further amplified in

Chapters 4 and 5, the forensic science system exhibits serious shortcomings

in capacity and quality; yet the courts continue to rely on forensic evidence

without fully understanding and addressing the limitations of different

forensic science disciplines.

The conjunction between the law and forensic science is explored in

detail in Chapter 3. The bottom line is simple: In a number of forensic sci-

ence disciplines, forensic science professionals have yet to establish either

the validity of their approach or the accuracy of their conclusions, and the

courts have been utterly ineffective in addressing this problem. For a vari-

ety of reasons—including the rules governing the admissibility of forensic

evidence, the applicable standards governing appellate review of trial court

decisions, the limitations of the adversary process, and the common lack of

scientific expertise among judges and lawyers who must try to comprehend

and evaluate forensic evidence—the legal system is ill-equipped to correct

the problems of the forensic science community. In short, judicial review,

by itself, is not the answer. Rather, tremendous resources must be devoted

to improving the forensic science community. With more and better educa-

tional programs, accredited laboratories, certification of forensic practitio-

ners, sound operational principles and procedures, and serious research to

establish the limits and measures of performance in each discipline, forensic

science experts will be better able to analyze evidence and coherently re-

port their findings in the courts. This is particularly important in criminal

cases in which we seek to protect society from persons who have commit-

ted criminal acts and to protect innocent persons from being convicted of

crimes that they did not commit.

ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT

This report begins with a series of chapters describing the current

forensic science system, the use of forensic science evidence in litigation,

and science and the forensic science disciplines. It then addresses systemic

areas for improvement with the goal of attaining a more rigorous and ro-

bust forensic science infrastructure, including standards and best practices,

education, and training. Pursuant to its charge, in three chapters the com-

mittee addresses special issues in the areas of medicolegal death investiga-

tion (Chapter 9), AFIS (Chapter 10), and the interrelationships between

homeland security and the forensic science disciplines (Chapter 11).

The Forensic Science Community and

the Need for Integrated Governance

Forensic investigations involve intelligence and information gathering,

crime scene investigation, laboratory analysis, interpretation of tests and re-

sults, and reporting and communication with members of law enforcement

and the judicial system. Law enforcement agencies within the United States

vary in organizational structure regarding how forensic science examina-

tions are conducted and evidence is admitted into court (see Chapter 3).

Variations are attributable to the geographical size and population served

by the jurisdictional authority, the types and level of crimes encountered,

the funding source, and local tradition. In general, however, the foren-

sic science community includes crime scene investigators; state and local

crime laboratories; medical examiners; private forensic laboratories; law

enforcement identification units; resources such as registries and databases;

professional organizations; prosecutors and defense attorneys; quality sys-

tem providers (i.e., accrediting and certifying organizations); and federal

agencies that conduct or support research as well as provide forensic sci-

ence services and training. This chapter provides an overview of the major

components of the forensic science community. Data about laboratories are

based largely on two surveys conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics

(BJS) in 2002 and 2005 of publicly funded crime laboratories¹ and a more

¹ J.L. Peterson and M.J. Hickman. 2005. Census of Publicly Funded Forensic Crime Labo-

ratories, 2002. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Sta-

tistics. Available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpffcl02.pdf; M.R. Durose. 2008. Census

of Publicly Funded Forensic Crime Laboratories, 2005. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of

Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/

cpffcl05.pdf.

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

recent survey of “nontraditional forensic service providers” conducted by

researchers at West Virginia University.²

In addition to forensic laboratories, about 3,200 medical examiner

and coroner offices provided death investigation services across the United

States in 2004.³ These entities—which may comprise a coroner system, a

medical examiner system, or a mixed system at the county or state level—

conduct death scene investigations, perform autopsies, and determine the

cause and manner of death when a person has died as a result of violence,

under suspicious circumstances, without a physician in attendance, or in

other circumstances. These offices are described in greater detail in Chapter

9. In addition, standard setting, accrediting, and certifying organizations

are described in greater detail in Chapter 7, and education and training

programs are described in Chapter 8.

The committee’s first recommendation, appearing at the end of this

chapter, calls for a more central, strategic, and integrated approach to fo-

rensic science at the national level.

CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION

Evidence recovery and interpretation at the crime scene is the essential

first step in forensic investigations. Several organizational approaches to

crime scene investigation and subsequent forensic laboratory activity exist,

sometimes involving a large number of personnel with varied educational

backgrounds. Conversely, in some jurisdictions, a single forensic examiner

might also be the same investigator who goes to the crime scene, collects

evidence, processes the evidence, conducts the analyses, interprets the evi-

dence, and testifies in court. In other jurisdictions, the investigators submit

the evidence to a laboratory where scientists conduct the analyses and

prepare the reports. Crime scene evidence collectors can include uniformed

officers, detectives, crime scene investigators, criminalists, forensic scien-

tists, coroners, medical examiners, hospital personnel, photographers, and

arson investigators.⁴ Thus, the nature and process of crime scene investiga-

² T.S. Witt, Director, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, West Virginia University.

“Survey of Non-Traditional Forensic Service Providers.” Presentation to the committee. De-

cember 6, 2007.

³ R. Hanzlick, Fulton County Medical Examiner’s Center and Emory University School

of Medicine. 2007. “An Overview of Medical Examiner/Coroner Systems in the United

States—Development, Current Status, Issues, and Needs.” Presentation to the committee.

June 5, 2007. The Bureau of Justice (2004) omits Louisiana and classifies Texas as a medical

examiner state, and accordingly reports the total as 1,998. According to Hanzlick, many of

Texas’s 254 counties maintain justice of the peace/coroners offices. The total number includes

Justices of the Peace in Texas.

⁴ B. Fisher, Director, Scientific Services Bureau, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department.

Presentation to the committee. April 24, 2007.

THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED GOVERNANCE

tion varies dramatically across jurisdictions, with the potential for incon-

sistent policies and procedures and bias. Some analysts say that the lack

of standards and oversight can result in deliberate deception of suspects,

witnesses, and the courts; fraud; and “honest mistakes” made because of

haste, inexperience, or lack of a scientific background.⁵

In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court held for the first time in Monell v.

Department of Social Services of the City of New York⁶ that a municipal-

ity can be held directly liable for violating a person’s constitutional rights

under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Partly in response to this liability, most large

cities and metropolitan areas created their own professionally trained crime

scene units. However, in smaller suburban and rural communities, evidence

from a crime scene may be collected and preserved by a patrol officer or

investigator. Even in large metropolitan areas, most crime scene investiga-

tion units are composed of sworn officers.

Recognizing that some agencies did not have the resources to ad-

equately train all personnel in crime scene processing, in 2000 the National

Institute of Justice (NIJ) and its Technical Working Group on Crime Scene

Investigation (TWGCSI) developed Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide

for Law Enforcement, which stated that “successful implementation of

this guide can be realized only if staff possess basic (and in some cases

advanced) training in the fundamentals of investigating a crime scene.”⁷

However, there remains great variability in crime scene investigation prac-

tices, along with persistent concerns that the lack of standards and proper

training at the crime scene can contribute to the difficulties of drawing accu-

rate conclusions once evidence is subjected to forensic laboratory methods.

(See Chapter 5 for a discussion of methodologies and Chapter 7 for further

discussion of standards and ethics.)

FORENSIC SCIENCE LABORATORIES AND

SERVICE PROVIDERS

The configuration of forensic laboratories varies by jurisdiction. Some

are located within a state police department as part of a statewide system

of laboratories and training programs. For example, in Illinois, state law

mandates that the laboratory system provide forensic services to law en-

forcement agencies in all 102 counties (population 12.7 million). Although

the forensic laboratory system is part of the Illinois State Police, 98 percent

⁵ See J.I. Thornton. 2006. Crime reconstruction—ethos and ethics. In: W.J. Chisum and B.E.

Turvey (eds.). Crime Reconstruction. Boston: Elsevier Science, pp. 37-50.

⁶ 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

⁷ Available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178280.pdf, p. 2.

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

of the casework completed is for the 1,200 local and county police agencies

across the state.⁸

Not all forensic services are performed in traditional crime laboratories—

they may be conducted by a sworn law enforcement officer with no sci-

entific training (e.g., some latent print examiners). Thus, forensic service

providers may be located in law enforcement agencies, may be crime scene

investigators, or may be a for-profit entity. There are no good data on the

entire universe of forensic science entities, although there have been efforts

to gather data on publicly funded crime laboratories and nonlaboratory-

based providers. The committee could find no data regarding for-profit

forensic science service providers, except for DNA laboratories, of which

there are approximately 30 in the United States.

Publicly Funded Laboratories

BJS has conducted two censuses of publicly funded forensic crime

laboratories. The first census, administered in 2002, established baseline

information on the operations and workload of the Nation’s public crime

laboratories.⁹ The 2005 census documented changes in workload and back-

log that have occurred since the 2002 census. According to the 2005

census, 389 publicly funded forensic crime laboratories were operating in

the United States in 2005—210 state or regional laboratories, 84 county

laboratories, 62 municipal laboratories, and 33 federal laboratories. The

estimated budget for all 389 crime laboratories exceeded $1 billion, nearly

half of which funded state laboratories. The BJS report cites a total of

nearly 2.7 million new cases¹⁰ in 2005, including a much larger number

of separate requests for forensic services. Some laboratories are full-service

facilities; others might conduct only the more common analyses of evidence

(see Chapter 5).

Funding Sources

According to the 2005 BJS census, in addition to federal, state, or local

support, 28 percent of publicly funded laboratories charged fees for service,

and 65 percent reported receiving some funding from grants. However,

funding for laboratories has not increased with increasing demands. Some

⁸ J. Johnson, Illinois State Police Forensic Science Center at Chicago. Presentation to the

committee. January 25, 2007.

⁹ Peterson and Hickman, op. cit.

¹⁰ Durose, op. cit. “A ‘case’ is defined as all physical evidence submitted from a single

criminal investigation submitted for crime laboratory analysis,” p. 9.

THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED GOVERNANCE

laboratory directors appearing before the committee cited budget cuts as

high as 22 percent over the past five years.¹¹

Personnel and Equipment

The 2005 BJS census estimated that publicly funded crime laboratories

employed more than 11,900 full-time equivalent (FTE) personnel in 2005.

Most crime laboratories are relatively small: the median staff size in 2005

was 16. Distinctly different professional tracks exist within forensic labo-

ratories, ranging from laboratory technicians and general examiners to sci-

entists. According to the census data, analysts or examiners—persons who

typically prepare evidence, conduct tests, interpret results, sign laboratory

reports, and testify in court—comprised 58 percent of all crime laboratory

FTEs in 2005. Technical support personnel, who typically assist analysts

or examiners in preparing evidence and conducting tests, accounted for 10

percent of all FTEs. Thirteen percent of FTEs were managerial personnel,

8 percent were in clerical positions, and 6 percent were crime scene techni-

cians. Similar ranges in the distribution of personnel are evident among lab-

oratories by type of jurisdiction served. (The uncertainties in these reported

percentages depend on the number of laboratories that responded to the

FTE survey questions.) A 2006 NIJ report cited equipment shortages (which

may include insufficient equipment maintenance) as a limiting factor in

processing cases.¹² It cited equipment needs at the 50 largest laboratories in

the disciplines of controlled substances, trace evidence, firearms, questioned

documents, latent prints, toxicology, and arson. Evidence submission may

or may not be automated, depending on the laboratory. Lack of automation

increases the time the laboratory spends on logging in evidence.

A 2005 survey of public crime laboratories conducted by researchers at

the State University of New York at Albany found that the number of FTEs

in a laboratory ranged from 2 to 280, with an average of 34, the major-

ity of whom have bachelor’s degrees.¹³ Because of the distinctly different

professional tracks within larger laboratories, for example, technicians

perform tests with defined protocols, and credentialed scientists conduct

specialized testing and interpretation. Unlike many other professions, the

forensic science disciplines have no organized control over entry into the

profession, such as by degree, boards or exams, or licensure (see Chapter

¹¹ Johnson, op. cit.

¹² NIJ. 2006. Status and Needs of Forensic Science Service Providers: A Report to Congress.

Available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/213420.htm.

¹³ W.S. Becker, W.M. Dale, A. Lambert, and D. Magnus. 2005. Letter to the editor—Forensic

lab directors’ perceptions of staffing issues. Journal of Forensic Sciences 50(5):1255-1257.

STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

7). Control mechanisms traditionally have been held through employment

and job function.¹⁴

Of the laboratories surveyed by the State University of New York at

Albany, only 21 percent reported having a sufficient number of FTEs to

complete their workload. The authors concluded that “as total number

of cases increases, scientists do not have proper equipment, enough time,

adequate resources, enough information from the DA [district attorney],

enough time to prepare for courtroom testimony, and the needed resources

to provide courtroom testimony.”¹⁵ In addition, “as casework capacity in-

creases, pressure to complete cases too quickly increases significantly, and

pressure to extend opinions beyond the scientific method and pressure to

get a particular result also increases significantly.”¹⁶

The National Association of Medical Examiners (NAME) also reports

acute personnel shortages in the death investigation system, with a critical

need for significantly more board-certified forensic pathologists than are

currently available. (See Chapter 9 for a discussion of the medicolegal death

investigation system.)

Laboratory Functions

According to the 2002 BJS data, almost all public crime laboratories

examine controlled substances (90 percent). Sixty-three percent examine

firearms and toolmarks, 65 percent screen biological samples (usually in

preparation for DNA analysis on selected exhibits), and 61 percent exam-

ine latent prints.¹⁷ Fifty-nine percent of laboratories examine one or more

forms of trace evidence (e.g., hairs, fibers, glass, or paint). Fewer laborato-

ries examine questioned documents (26 percent) or conduct computer crime

investigations (11 percent). As would be expected, larger laboratories are

able to perform a broader range of examinations.

In terms of crime scene investigation, 62 percent of laboratories report

having sent examiners directly to crime scenes, although most forensic ex-

aminers did not visit crime scenes. Twenty-five percent of the laboratories

reported that laboratory personnel also served as crime scene investiga-

tors. However, more than half of laboratories (62 percent) reported that

agencies or persons not affiliated with the laboratory handled most major

investigations—usually a police unit with specialized evidence technicians

¹⁴ D.S. Stoney. Chief Scientist, Stoney Forensic, Inc. Presentation to the committee. January

26, 2007.

¹⁵ Becker, et al., op. cit., p. 1255.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 1256.

¹⁷ Peterson and Hickman, op. cit.

Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (August 2009) - page 2