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F16C/D (BLOCKS 50 AND 52+). FLIGHT MANUAL (15 OCTOBER 2002) - page 33

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

222

TAKEOFF WITH ASYMMETRIC STORES

Roll trim should be set prior to takeoff with

asymmetric stores to prevent wing drop. The amount

of roll trim required for various asymmetric store

weights is shown in T.O. GR1F16CJ11, Part 2.

NOTE

It is possible to exceed the roll trim

authority of the aircraft for an onspeed

takeoff with a net asymmetric (rolling)

moment less than aircraft takeoff

limits. Refer to ASYMMETRIC

STORES LOADING, Section V.

When ARI activates after takeoff, roll trim for

asymmetric stores causes a rudder input that can

cause aircraft yaw away from the wing with the

asymmetric store. This yaw is easily controllable by

pilot rudder inputs.

CLIMB

The climb schedules are defined by airspeed/mach

number or mach number only. When airspeed/mach

number is shown, climb at the scheduled airspeed to

the scheduled mach number, then maintain the

mach number to the desired altitude. When starting

a climb at an altitude above the airspeed/mach

transition point, climb at the scheduled mach

number.

The recommended MIL climb schedule to optimum

cruise altitude is tabulated versus drag index in T.O.

GR1F16CJ11, Part 3. For MIL, the schedule

provides optimum range performance. The recom

mended MIL climb schedules to altitudes other than

optimum cruise altitude are shown in T.O.

GR1F16CJ11 and T.O. GR1F16CJ1CL1.

The recommended MAX AB climb schedule is

tabulated versus drag index in T.O. GR1F16CJ11,

Part 3. The MAX AB climb schedule provides

minimum time to climb performance.

CLIMB/INFLIGHT/OPERATIONAL

CHECKS

At frequent intervals, check the aircraft systems,

engine instruments, cockpit pressure, and oxygen

flow indicator and system operation. Monitor fuel in

each internal and external tank to verify that fuel

is transferring properly by rotating the FUEL QTY

SEL knob and checking that the sum of the pointers

and totalizer agree and that fuel distribution is

correct.

Maximum fuel transfer rate is 18,000

pph from the 300gallon fuel tank or

30,000 pph from the 370/600gallon

fuel tanks. Maintaining fuel flow

above these values while the external

tank(s) is feeding results in a decrease

of internal fuel. Prolonged operation

under these conditions may result in

the rapid depletion of fuselage fuel and

render fuel transfer by siphoning

action inoperative. Without siphoning

action, fuel transfer to the fuselage

tanks is provided by the wing turbine

pumps at a maximum rate of 6000 pph.

A fuel flow rate greater than 6000 pph

continues to deplete fuselage fuel.

Under these conditions, the external

fuel tank(s) may appear slow to feed

and a fuel imbalance may result.

Prolonged AB operation in a three tank

configuration may result in engine

flameout prior to depletion of external

fuel.

1. Fuel-Check quantity/transfer/balance.

2. FUEL QTY SEL knob-NORM.

NOTE

The FUEL QTY SEL knob must be in

NORM for operation of the automatic

forward fuel transfer system, trapped

fuel warning, and for the BINGO fuel

warning computation to be based on

fuselage fuel.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

Change 1223

3. Oxygen system-Check.

4. Cockpit pressurization-Check.

The CABIN PRESS caution light does

not illuminate until cockpit pressure

altitude is above 27,000 feet. At

ambient altitudes where hypoxia is

possible, do not remove the oxygen

mask without first checking cockpit

pressure altitude.

5. Engine instruments-Check.

AIR REFUELING PROCEDURES

Refer to T.O. 11C1 for general AR procedures and

to AIR REFUELING PROCEDURES, Section VIII

for specific AR procedures.

DESCENT/BEFORE LANDING

1. Fuel-Check quantity/transfer/balance.

2. Final approach airspeed-Compute.

3. DEFOG lever/cockpit heat-As required.

4. Landing light-On.

*5. Altimeterand altitude indications -Check

altimeter setting, ELECT versus PNEU mode

altimeter readings, and ELECT mode altitude

versus altitude displayed in HUD.

For subsonic flight below 20,000 feet MSL

with vertical velocity less than 500 fpm, the

difference between ELECT and PNEU

mode altitudes should not exceed 270 feet

and the difference between the ELECT

mode altitude and the altitude displayed in

the HUD should not exceed 75 feet.

An erroneous ELECT mode altitude

can be displayed without a CADC

caution light or a transfer to PNEU

mode.

An erroneous altitude can be displayed

in the HUD without a CADC caution

light.

*6. Attitude references-Check ADI/HUD/SAI.

7. ANTI ICE switch-As required.

8. TGP-Stow.

LANDING

NORMAL LANDING

Refer to figure 23. Fly initial at 300 knots. At the

break, retard throttle and open speedbrakes as

required. On downwind leg, when airspeed is below

300 knots, lower the LG. During base turn, recheck

the LG down and slow to computed final approach

airspeed to arrive on final at 11 or 13 degrees AOA.

Check speedbrakes open and maintain computed

final approach airspeed/AOA on final. Rate of

descent decreases slightly when entering ground

effect. Reduce thrust gradually to continue the

descent while applying back stick to reduce sink rate

to the minimum practical. Thrust can be reduced

sooner during an 11degree approach than during a

13degree approach. In either case, maintain a

maximum of 13 degrees AOA while reducing sink

rate to the minimum practical.

Physically confirm that the LG handle

is fully down. The LG handle may

visually appear to be down when in an

intermediate position. An intermedi

ate position may allow LG extension

and/or safe indications; however, the

LG handle is not locked and LG

retraction could occur during subse

quent inflight or ground operations.

Failure of the ANTISKID switch can

allow it to be bumped/placed towards

PARKING BRAKE while airborne. A

very small movement out of ANTI

SKID is sufficient to engage the

parking brake. Landing with the

parking brake engaged will result in

main tire failures upon touchdown.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

224

Failure to depress the LG handle down

permission button prior to attempting

to lower the LG may result in damage

to the electrical solenoid.

Failure to reduce sink rate, particu

larly at heavier GW's, may cause a firm

landing and structural damage or

failure of the LG.

Use of the paddle switch may cause

pitch and/or roll transients as control

is switched from one cockpit to the

other.

Avoid landing directly on approach

end arresting cable to prevent possible

cable strike damage to nozzle, speed

brakes, and ventral fins.

Horizontal tail contact with the run

way is possible if a large roll input is

made at or near touchdown.

Deploying the drag chute above 170

knots may result in loss of the chute

canopy.

Drag chute deployment below 90 knots

may result in improper deployment

and damage to the chute.

NOTE

The HUD AOA bracket and AOA

indicator display the correct AOA until

NLG WOW. Therefore, these indica

tions are valid references for aircraft

attitude throughout twopoint aerody

namic braking. After NLG WOW, the

AOA indicator displays zero.

The LG warning horn and the TO/LDG

CONFIG warning light are inhibited

at approach airspeed above 190 (

knots.

Aft CG approaches may be character

ized by increased pitch sensitivity

which will be most noticeable upon

entering ground effect.

Deploy the drag chute (if desired) immediately after

touchdown. The nose may pitch up or down when

the chute is deployed, but the motion is easily

controlled.

NOTE

To deploy the drag chute after touch

down, lift the guard and switch in one

single motion with the side of the index

finger.

When deploying the drag chute in a

twopoint aerodynamic braking atti

tude, the drag chute may contact the

runway.

Use twopoint aerodynamic braking until approxi

mately 100 knots; then fly the nosewheel to runway.

Maximum effective twopoint aerodynamic braking

is achieved at 13 degrees AOA. An AOA less than 11

degrees results in significantly reduced twopoint

aerodynamic braking. Although twopoint aerody

namic braking is effective as low as 80 knots,

runway length and condition should be used to

determine when, after decelerating to 100 knots, to

lower the nose to the threepoint attitude.

Do not touch down with brake pedals

depressed. A failure in either the

touchdown protection circuitry or an

MLG WOW switch can result in locked

wheels and blown MLG tires.

Use a maximum of 13 degrees AOA for

twopoint aerodynamic braking. Nozzle,

speedbrakes, and ventral fins may

contact runway if 15degree pitch angle

is exceeded.

During twopoint aerodynamic brak

ing, the speedbrakes (43 degrees or

greater open) may contact the cable.

During the landing phase, large/rapid

roll control inputs in reaction to

turbulence or wake vortices will cause

temporary retraction of one and

sometimes both flaperons. This retrac

tion will decrease lift and may induce

a sink rate beyond the structural limit

of the landing gear. During rapid

reversal of roll inputs, both flaperons

might move up to a position that will

illuminate the TO/LDG CONFIG

warning light. Display of ISA FAIL

PFL's is also possible. Be prepared to

initiate a goaround if wake turbu

lence is encountered.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

225

GR1F-16CJ-1-0099A37

DOWNWIND LEG

FINAL

LANDING ROLL

TOUCHDOWN

BASE LEG

APPROACH BREAK

LEVEL BREAK

Normal Landing Pattern (Typical)

NOTES:

FINAL APPROACH AIRSPEED/13 DEGREES AOA CROSS-CHECK.

ADD 8 KNOTS FOR 11 DEGREES AOA APPROACH.

135 136 KNOTS + 4 KNOTS PER 1000 POUNDS OF FUEL/STORE WEIGHTS.

137 138 KNOTS + 4 KNOTS PER 1000 POUNDS OF FUEL/STORE WEIGHTS.

AOA 13 DEGREES (MAX)

LG CHECK DN

SPEEDBRAKES AS

REQUIRED

AOA 13 DEGREES (MAX)

SPEEDBRAKES OPEN

AOA 13 DEGREES (MAX)

SPEEDBRAKES

FULLY OPEN

BRAKES AS

REQUIRED

AOA 13 DEGREES

(MAX)

LG DN

SPEEDBRAKES

AS REQUIRED

THROTTLE AS REQUIRED

SPEEDBRAKES AS REQUIRED

AIRSPEED 300 KNOTS

DRAG CHUTE

AS REQUIRED

(AFTER NLG WOW)

TAXI

NWS

SELECTED

THE PRECEDING BASELINE AIRSPEEDS ARE BASED ON THE BASIC OPERATING WEIGHT FROM

T.O. GR1F-16CJ-1-1 PLUS FULL AMMO. ACTUAL FINAL APPROACH AIRSPEED AT 11/13 DEGREES AOA

MAY DIFFER BY +/-5 KNOTS DUE TO VARIATIONS IN AIRCRAFT CG.

PW229

GE129

Figure 23.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

226Change 1

After the nosewheel is on the runway, open the

speedbrakes fully and maintain full aft stick for

maximum threepoint aerodynamic braking and

wheel braking effectiveness.

Crossing an arresting cable in a three

point attitude above 90 knots

groundspeed with a centerline store

may cause cable strike.

Do not move SPD BRK switch to open

until the nosewheel is on runway as

speedbrakes may contact runway.

Until WOW, forward stick pressure in

excess of approximately 2 pounds

results in full trailing edge down

deflection of the horizontal tails. This

horizontal tail deflection reduces

wheel braking effectiveness. At high

speeds in the threepoint attitude,

forward stick results in excessive loads

on the NLG which can lead to nose tire

failure and possibly cause structural

failure of the NLG.

Smoothly apply moderate to heavy braking to

decelerate to taxi speed. Using less than moderate

braking increases the likelihood of a hot brake(s).

NWS should not be engaged above taxi speed unless

required to prevent departure from prepared

runway surface.

NWS malfunctions at any speed may

cause an abrupt turn, tire skidding or

blowout, aircraft tipping, and/or

departure from the prepared surface.

SHORT FIELD LANDING (DRY RUNWAY)

NOTE

The following procedures should be

used anytime stopping distance is

critical, whether due to a long, fast,

heavy weight, or short field landing.

When stopping distance is critical, a normal

approach should be made. Select IDLE at or slightly

before touchdown. Touch down as near as possible

to the end of the runway at 13 degrees AOA. Deploy

the drag chute immediately after touchdown.

Twopoint aerodynamic and wheel braking should

be used with the nose held up at 13 degrees AOA

until the nose falls. Pitch must be held at 13 degrees

AOA if twopoint aerodynamic braking is to be

effective. Maximum effort braking is achieved by

using the wheel brakes in conjunction with

twopoint aerodynamic braking. When the wheel

brakes become effective, the nose automatically

lowers. This occurs soon after brakes are applied.

After the nosewheel is on the runway, maintain full

aft stick, open the speedbrakes fully, and use

maximum wheel braking (antiskid on).

For landing on icy/wet runways, refer to LANDING

IN ICY OR WET CONDITIONS, Section VII.

CROSSWIND LANDING

The recommended technique for landing in a

crosswind is to use a wing level crab through

touchdown. At touchdown, the ARI switches out.

Undesirable yaw transients may occur if roll control

is being applied at this time. After touchdown,

perform twopoint aerodynamic braking using the

rudder to maintain aircraft track down the runway

and flaperon to prevent wing rise. In crosswinds,

the aircraft may drift downwind due to side loads

imposed by the crosswinds or travel upwind due to

insufficient directional control inputs/availability.

As the airspeed decreases, increasing amounts of

rudder are required to maintain track. Maintain

twopoint aerodynamic braking until approxi

mately 100 knots or until roll or directional control

becomes a problem. As the pitch attitude decreases,

the nose tends to align itself with the ground track.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

227

Aft stick and fully opened speedbrakes reduce

stopping distance. Apply brakes after nosewheel is

on the runway; however, if stopping distance is a

factor, refer to SHORT FIELD LANDING, this

section. With all LG on the runway, maintain

directional control with rudder, differential brak

ing, and NWS if required.

During landing rollout, the main concerns are wing

rise (roll control), weathervaning (directional

control), and downwind drift. Wing rise is controlled

by flaperon into the crosswind. Excessive flaperon

deflection degrades directional control. Use rudder

and differential braking to control ground track,

especially on wet or icy runways. Engage NWS if

required to maintain directional control and to

prevent departure from the runway. Excessive

differential braking may result in a hot brake

condition. High rudder pedal force may result in a

yaw transient when NWS is engaged. NLG strut

compression is required to engage NWS but

sustained forward stick may result in full

horizontal tail deflection which decreases weight on

the MLG and thus reduces wheel braking

effectiveness. NWS engagement may be required

with the drag chute deployed to control increased

weathervaning tendencies. However, the nose up

pull of the drag chute may prevent early NWS

engagement.

Be prepared to release the drag chute

during the landing rollout if direction

al control or downwind drifting be

comes a problem.

NOTE

Deploying the drag chute during

twopoint aerodynamic braking with a

crosswind may complicate aircraft

control.

TOUCHANDGO LANDING

Perform a normal approach and landing. After

touchdown, maintain landing attitude, advance the

throttle, close the speedbrakes, and perform a

normal takeoff.

AFTER LANDING

Do not use parking brake. Use only

chocks, if available, or minimum

possible toe brakes pressure to hold

the aircraft stationary. Parking brake

use may cause residual heat damage to

brakes and may increase the probabil

ity of a subsequent brake fire.

NOTE

Avoid heavy braking below 20 knots at

light GW's. Heavy braking during

these conditions may cause both MLG

WOW switches to momentarily go to

the air position, which causes the

antiskid system to deactivate the toe

brakes. The WOW switches return to

the ground position after 11.5 sec

onds, restoring braking capability. If

heavy braking resumes, the cycle may

be repeated.

NWS disengagements are possible

when taxiing with CG near the

inflight aft limit.

1. DRAG CHUTE switch - NORM/REL as

required.

NOTE

Turn aircraft into the wind prior to

releasing drag chute.

2. PROBE HEAT switch-OFF.

If probe heat is on or has been on, heat

in probes may be sufficient to cause

injury if touched.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

228

Prolonged ground operation of probe

heat may cause failure of AOA probe

heaters.

3. ECM power-Off.

4. Speedbrakes-Close.

*5. Ejection safety lever-Safe (up).

6. IFF MASTER knob-STBY.

7. IFF M4 CODE switch-HOLD.

8. LANDING TAXI lights-As required.

9. ZEROIZE switch-As required.

NOTE

If any FLCS single failures occurred

while airborne, they are reported in

the PFL 2 minutes after WOW. The

FLCS FAULT caution light also illumi

nates.

If an FLCS SNGL FAIL PFL occurs and

FLCS 049 and 070 MFL's are the only

MFL's present on the MFD test page,

perform up to three additional FLCS

BIT's and MFL clear actions. If these

FLCS MFL's clear, no writeup is

required. If these FLCS MFL's do not

clear, inform maintenance.

10. Canopy handle-Up.

NOTE

Unlock the canopy to insure that the

canopy seal is deflated before the

canopy is opened.

If the canopy handle is placed to up

within 2 minutes of WOW, an FDR 024

MFL is generated.

11. Armament switches-Off, safe, or normal.

PRIOR TO ENGINE SHUTDOWN

NOTE

If a flight control related problem was

experienced during the flight, coordi

nate with maintenance to determine if

the contents of the FLCC fault history

table are desired before shutdown of

FLCS power.

1. EPU safety pin (ground crew)-In.

NOTE

Installation of the EPU safety pin

should be delayed until after engine

shutdown under the following condi

tions:

The ground crew recovering the

aircraft is not familiar with F16

danger areas.

The aircraft is being recovered by

emergency response personnel

(landing with activated EPU, hot

brakes, etc.).

Place the EPU switch to OFF prior to

engine shutdown if the EPU safety pin

is not installed.

2. EGI/INS-Check.

Steerpoint of current location-Select.

Miscellaneous data-Record.

EGI or INS locations 19 (RER), 20 (CEP),

62 (align events), 64 (NAV events), 66 (VX),

and 67 (VY)-Record.

NOTE

EGI or INS radial error rate (RER)

greater than 3 nm/hour or either

velocity (VX or VY) greater than 5 fps

is considered out of tolerance.

3. MFL-Record (as required).

4. AVTR power switch-

PX II

OFF,

PX III

UNTHRD.

NOTE

Place the AVTR power switch to OFF at

least 15 seconds prior to engine

shutdown to allow the tape to

unthread.

T.O. GR1F16CJ1

229

PX II

CNI,

PX III

C & I knob-BACKUP.

PX II

INS,

PX III

EGI knob-OFF.

NOTE

PX II

Turn INS off at least 10 seconds

prior to engine shutdown to insure that

the INU has adequate time to complete

its shutdown sequence.

PX III

Turn EGI off at least 20 seconds

prior to engine shutdown to insure that

the INU has adequate time to complete

its shutdown sequence.

7. Avionics-OFF:

HUD thumbwheels.

SNSR PWR switches.

AVIONICS POWER switches.

ENGINE SHUTDOWN

A postshutdown engine tailpipe fire is

possible. Ignition may be indicated by a

mild bang, followed by smoke, fumes, or

a small fire in the combustion/turbine

area. Potentially hazardous inlet and

exhaust areas should be avoided within

PW 229

10,

129

5 minutes after

engine shutdown. This phenomenon

does not cause damage to the engine or

aircraft. If a postshutdown fire occurs,

the engine may be motored with the

JFS for approximately 1 minute to

extinguish the fire. If motoring the JFS

is not possible, the fire extinguishes on

its own within a few minutes.

1. Throttle-OFF.

2. JFS RUN light-Check.

Notify maintenance if the JFS RUN light is

flashing after the throttle is placed to OFF.

After main generator drops off line:

3. EPU GEN and EPU PMG lights-Confirm

off.

If either light is illuminated, turn the

MAIN PWR switch to OFF. Insure that

the EPU safety pin remains installed

and notify maintenance.

4. MAIN PWR switch-OFF.

NOTE

129

Delay placing MAIN PWR

switch to OFF until after engine rpm

decreases through 20 percent. This

delay should allow the exhaust nozzle

to remain open and makes it easier for

maintenance to accomplish the post

flight inspection.

5. Oxygen hose, survival kit straps, lapbelt,

gsuit hose, and vest hose-Disconnect, stow.

Stow oxygen connector in bracket on right

sidewall. Insure oxygen hose does not

protrude beyond console edge.

Stow lapbelt and survival kit straps on seat

cushion.

Use both hands to disconnect gsuit hose to

avoid excessive force on the hosetoconsole

connection.

Onehanded or brute force disconnects

of the gsuit connection will cause

internal damage to the hose at the

hosetoconsole connection.

Failure to properly stow lapbelt,

survival kit straps, oxygen connector,

gsuit hose, and oxygen hose may

cause damage to consoles and to the

ejection seat during seat adjustment.

6. OXYGEN REGULATOR-OFF and 100%.

Content .. 31 32 33 34 ..

F16C/D (BLOCKS 50 AND 52+). FLIGHT MANUAL (15 OCTOBER 2002) - page 33

F16C/D (BLOCKS 50 AND 52+). FLIGHT MANUAL (15 OCTOBER 2002) - page 33