Boeing 737 - 600/700/800/900. Operations Manual (1997 year) - page 6
Operations Manual Bulletin No. TBC-24, Dated May 17, 2000 (continued)
Administrative Information
Insert this bulletin behind the Operations Manual Bulletin Record page in
Volume 1 of your Operations Manual. The attached Operations Manual Bulletin
Record has been amended to show bulletin TBC-24 “In Effect” (IE).
This bulletin will be cancelled after Boeing is notified that all affected airplanes
have been modified by Collins Service Bulletin No. 3.
Please send all correspondence regarding Operations Manual Bulletin Status to
one of the following addresses:
Mailing Address Manager, Flight Technical Publications
737 Model
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group
P.O. Box 3707 MS 20-89
Seattle, WA 98124-2207
USA
Fax:
(206) 662-7812
Telex:
329430 Station 627
SITA:
SEABO7X Station 627
E-mail:
FlightTechnicalPublications@Boeing.com
CS3-2900
Page 2 of 2
Sect Name
Section Name
Operations Manual Bulletin
for
The Boeing Company
The Boeing Company
Seattle, Washington 98124-2207
s
Number: TBC-27
Date: March 17, 2001
Document Effectivity: D6-27370-TBC
Subject: PSEU FAULT INDICATIONS
Reason: To inform flight crews of a configuration warning anomaly.
Information in this bulletin is recommended by The Boeing Company, but may not be FAA approved
at the time of writing. In the event of conflict with the FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM),
the AFM shall supersede. The Boeing Company regards the information or procedures described
herein as having a direct or indirect bearing on the safe operation of this model airplane.
THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE AND/OR INFORMATION IS EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT
Background Information
There have been several cases of nuisance landing configuration warnings on
737NG airplanes when flaps are retracted after takeoff. This configuration
warning is the result of a malfunctioning flap position switch (S138) in the Flap
Control Unit.
An internal short in the S138 switch can initiate a landing configuration warning
horn which will sound intermittently or continuously and cannot be silenced by
the Landing Gear Warning Cutout Switch. Condition of the S138 switch is
monitored by the Proximity Switch Electronics Unit (PSEU). Current PSEU logic
incorrectly identifies this fault as a dispatchable condition. Detection of an
internal short in the S138 switch on the ground results in a PSEU light which will
illuminate on RECALL and extinguish during Master Caution system reset. Once
airborne, the internal short causes an intermittent or continuous horn that can only
be silenced by extending the flaps, lowering the landing gear, or pulling the Aural
Warning circuit breaker.
Page 1 of 2
Operations Manual Bulletin No. TBC-27, Dated March 17, 2001 (continued)
Operating Instructions
Pulling the Aural Warning circuit breaker is not recommended as it disables other
aural warning functions including the Autopilot Disconnect warning tone and the
Cabin Altitude warning horn. Flight crews experiencing an inappropriate landing
configuration warning should consider a return to landing as soon as flight
conditions permit.
In addition, the PSEU Non Normal Checklist has been revised to remove the
Master Caution system reset step. All PSEU light illuminations will require
maintenance action prior to takeoff until further notice.
Operations Manual Information
Attached is the revised PSEU Non-Normal Checklist.
Remove the current pages listed below and replace with the attached pages to your
QRH.
Remove Page No.
Date
Insert Page No.
Date
NNC.15.1 - .15.2
NNC.15.1 - .15.2
March 17, 2001
Administrative Information
Insert this bulletin behind the Operations Manual Bulletin Record page in
Volume 1 of your Operations Manual. Revise the Bulletin Record page to show
bulletin TBC-27 “Incorporated” (INC).
This condition is temporary and a Service Bulletin with a PSEU software fix is
scheduled to be released by end of second quarter 2001.
CS3-3002
Page 2 of 2
Sect Name
Section Name
Operations Manual Bulletin
for
The Boeing Company
The Boeing Company
Seattle, Washington 98124-2207
Number: TBC-29R1
Date: May 1, 2002
Document Effectivity: D6-27370-TBC
Subject: Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2001-12-51, 2002-08-52
Reason: This is a reissue of TBC-29, dated June 19, 2001, which informed flight
crews of an operational limitation associated with elevator control
surface vibration on 737-800 airplanes. The purpose of this reissue is to
inform flight crews that this limitation now exists for the 737-600/-700/-
700C and BBJ. Service Bulletin information is also provided.
Information in this bulletin is recommended by The Boeing Company, but may not be FAA approved
at the time of writing. In the event of conflict with the FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM),
the AFM shall supersede. The Boeing Company regards the information or procedures described
herein as having a direct or indirect bearing on the safe operation of this model airplane.
THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE AND/OR INFORMATION IS EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT
Background Information
In May 2001, a 737-800 airplane experienced a significant airplane vibration
event associated with speed brake deployment as the airplane descended through
flight level 220 at 320 knots IAS. Additionally, vibration events were experienced
during the 737-900 flight test program that were attributed to a lack of sufficient
damping necessary to prevent elevator tab vibration in certain flight conditions.
The 737-900 elevator tab was stiffened to provide increased damping. Based on
data gathered during the 737-900 flight test program, we believe it is likely that
the 737-800 vibration event noted above was similar to these events. This is the
only in-service event that we are aware of for 737NG airplanes in 3.5 million
flight hours. The 737-800 accounts for 1.8 million of these flight hours.
Recently, a 737-700 airplane also experienced a similar vibration event associated
with speedbrake deployment as the airplane descended through FL195 at an
airspeed of 315 KIAS.
Page 1 of 4
Operations Manual Bulletin No. TBC-29R1, Dated May 1, 2002 (continued)
As a result an operational limitation as noted below has been expanded to include
the
737-600/-700/-700C and BBJ airplanes until stiffened elevator tabs are
installed. The new elevator tab will be incorporated in production at line number
1175, scheduled for delivery in July 2002. Retrofit of in-service airplanes per
Boeing Service Bulletin 737-55A-1082 will begin in the third quarter of 2002.
Boeing anticipates this corrective action will provide suffecient damping to
eliminate vibration. This limitation is identical to that currently in effect for 737-
800 airplanes.
Operating Instructions
The following AFM limitation will be placed on the 737-600/-700/-700C/-800
and BBJ fleet until terminated by the installation of a stiffened elevator tab:
Do not operate the airplane at speeds in excess of 300 KIAS with speedbrakes
extended.
WARNING: Use of speedbrakes at speeds in excess of 320 KIAS could
result in a severe vibration, which, in turn, could cause
extreme damage to the horizontal stabilizer.
The FAA confirmed that in a situation requiring an Emergency Descent, the pilot
in command may deviate from subject AD in accordance with the responsibility
and authority provided in FAR 91.3.
Operations Manual Information
Attached are the replacement pages which reflect the revised information.
Remove the pages listed below and replace with the attached pages to your
Volume 1. A revised list of effective pages will be included in the next revision of
your operations manual.
Remove Page No.
Date
Insert Page No.
Date
L.10.7
L.10.7
May 1, 2002
Administrative Information
This bulletin replaces bulletin TBC-29, dated June 19, 2001. Discard bulletin
TBC-29. Revise the Bulletin Record page to show TBC-29 as “Cancelled”
(CANC).
Insert this bulletin behind the Operations Manual Bulletin Record page in Volume
1 of your Operations Manual. Amend the Operations Manual Bulletin Record to
show bulletin TBC-29R1 “Incorporated” (INC)
This bulletin will be cancelled after Boeing is notified that all affected airplanes
in your fleet have been modified by Service Bulletin 737-55-1080.
Page 2 of 4
Operations Manual Bulletin No. TBC-29R1, Dated May 1, 2002 (continued)
Please send all correspondence regarding Operations Manual Bulletin Status to
one of the following addresses:
Mailing Address Manager, Flight Technical Publications
737 Model
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group
P.O. Box 3707 MS 20-89
Seattle, WA 98124-2207
USA
Fax:
(206) 662-7812
Telex:
329430 Station 627
SITA:
SEABO7X Station 627
E-mail:
FlightTechnicalPublications@Boeing.com
CS3-3145
Page 3 of 4
Operations Manual Bulletin No. TBC-29R1, Dated May 1, 2002 (continued)
Intentionally
Blank
Page 4 of 4
Sect Name
Section Name
Operations Manual Bulletin
for
The Boeing Company
The Boeing Company
Seattle, Washington 98124-2207
Number: TBC-30
Date: September 16, 2001
Document Effectivity: D6-27370-TBC
Subject: Inflight Start EGT Display
Reason: To inform flight crews that the inflight start EGT start limit and
exceedance indications may not appear correctly below 20,000 feet.
Information in this bulletin is recommended by The Boeing Company, but may not be FAA approved
at the time of writing. In the event of conflict with the FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM),
the AFM shall supersede. The Boeing Company regards the information or procedures described
herein as having a direct or indirect bearing on the safe operation of this model airplane.
THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE AND/OR INFORMATION IS EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT
Background Information
Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) is normally displayed on the center instrument
panel upper display unit (DU) as both a digital readout and a round dial/moving
pointer indication. Maximum operating limits are indicated by redlines.
The EGT Start Limit redline is displayed during engine start when N2 is less than
idle. If an exceedance is noted by the electronic engine control (EEC), the digital
readout, box, pointer and indicator change color to red.
Flight testing has shown that the Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) Start Limit
redline and associated exceedance indications may not display during inflight
engine starts below 20,000 feet due to an EEC software error. An EEC software
update, due early first quarter 2002, will correct the anomaly.
Operating Instructions
Monitor EGT when performing the Inflight Engine Start procedure to ensure EGT
does not rise rapidly or exceed the start limit of 725°C during the start attempt.
Page 1 of 2
Operations Manual Bulletin No. TBC-30, Dated September 16, 2001 (continued)
Operations Manual Information
Attached are the replacement pages which reflect the revised information.
Remove the pages listed below and replace with the attached pages to your QRH.
A revised list of effective pages will be included in the next revision of your
operations manual.
Remove Page No.
Date
Insert Page No.
Date
NNC.0.17
NNC.0.17
September 16, 2001
NNC.7.17
NNC.7.17
September 16, 2001
Administrative Information
Insert this bulletin behind the Operations Manual Bulletin Record page in QRH of
your Operations Manual. Amend the Operations Manual Bulletin Record to show
bulletin TBC-30 “Incorporated” (INC). This condition is temporary until the
system is modified.
This bulletin will be revised to include Service Bulletin information when
available.
CS3-3075
Page 2 of 2
Sect Name
Section Name
Operations Manual Bulletin
for
The Boeing Company
The Boeing Company
Seattle, Washington 98124-2207
Number: TBC-32
Date: February 15, 2002
Document Effectivity: D6-27370-TBC
Subject: Deicing/Anti-icing Procedures
Reason: To advise flight crews to cycle the control column following any
deicing/anti-icing operations.
Information in this bulletin is recommended by The Boeing Company, but may not be FAA approved
at the time of writing. In the event of conflict with the FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM),
the AFM shall supersede. The Boeing Company regards the information or procedures described
herein as having a direct or indirect bearing on the safe operation of this model airplane.
THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE AND/OR INFORMATION IS EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT
Background Information
Boeing has received multiple reports of airplane vibration events that were
possibly due to excessive fluid trapped inside the elevator balance area. In these
events, the airplane had been deiced to remove snow buildup, then anti-iced
during snowy conditions prior to departure. After the completion of some of the
flights, fluid was observed dripping from the elevator balance bay area, suggesting
that fluid may have been trapped inside the balance bays.
As a result of these reports, testing was conducted to observe the fluid drainage
capability of the elevator balance bay area using both water and thickened aircraft
ground deicing/anti-icing fluid. These tests indicate that these fluids have
numerous paths to drain. It was also demonstrated that cycling the elevators
between full up and full down following any deicing/anti-icing provides
additional opportunities for fluids to drain from the elevator balance bay area.
Trimming the stabilizer to the full APL NOSE DOWN position prior to
deicing/anti-icing, in accordance with the Adverse Weather Supplementary
Procedures, further minimizes the opportunity for fluid to enter the elevator
balance panel area through the elevator vent gaps.
Page 1 of 2
Operations Manual Bulletin No. TBC-32, Dated February 15, 2002 (continued)
Operating Instructions
After any deicing/anti-icing operation, slowly cycle the control column full
forward to full aft a minimum of three (3) times to drain residual fluid from the
elevator balance bay. This should be accomplished with the stabilizer set to the full
APL NOSE DOWN position (stabilizer leading edge up).
Note: Ensure the stabilizer is re-set to the proper setting for takeoff.
Administrative Information
Insert this bulletin behind the Operations Manual Bulletin Record page in Volume
1 of your Operations Manual. Amend the Operations Manual Bulletin Record to
show bulletin TBC-32 “In Effect” (IE).
The information contained in this bulletin will be incorporated into a future
revision of the Operations Manual. The bulletin will be cancelled at that time.
CS3-3126
Page 2 of 2
Sect Name
Section Name
Operations Manual Bulletin
for
The Boeing Company
The Boeing Company
Seattle, Washington 98124-2207
Number: TBC-33
Date: May 15, 2002
Document Effectivity: D6-27370-TBC
Subject: Airworthiness Directive 2002-08-20
Reason: This bulletin notifies flight crews of operational limitations and Non-
Normal procedures associated with elevator control surface vibration
(Limit Cycle Oscillation) on the 737-600/-700/-700C/-800 and BBJ
following deicing/anti-icing operations.
Information in this bulletin is recommended by The Boeing Company, but may not be FAA approved
at the time of writing. In the event of conflict with the FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM),
the AFM shall supersede. The Boeing Company regards the information or procedures described
herein as having a direct or indirect bearing on the safe operation of this model airplane.
THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE AND/OR INFORMATION IS EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT
Background Information
Boeing has received reports of incidents of severe airframe vibration (limit cycle
oscillation) on 737-600/-700/-800 airplanes after the horizontal stabilizer had
been deiced/anti-iced. These events have been attributed to accumulation of
deicing/anti-icing fluid or other residue inside the elevator balance bay and on the
exterior surfaces of the elevator tab. The accumulation of fluid in the balance bays
has been attributed to inadequate drainage provisions. A previous Operations
Manual Bulletin provided recommendations to the flight crew to help reduce
accumulation of fluid in the elevator balance bays by ensuring the stabilizer is
trimmed to the full APL NOSE DOWN position prior to any deicing/anti-icing
operations, in accordance with the B737 Adverse Weather Supplementary
Procedures. Following application of deicing/anti-icing fluid, the control column
should be cycled slowly full forward to full aft a minimum of three times to help
drain residual fluid from the elevator balance bay.
Page 1 of 4
Operations Manual Bulletin No. TBC-33, Dated May 15, 2002 (continued)
Boeing believes these limit cycle oscillation (LCO) events can be attributed to a
lack of sufficient elevator tab damping to prevent elevator tab vibration in certain
flight conditions. An elevator tab LCO is characterized by a high frequency
(approximately
40 Hz) resonant vibration. This vibration originates, and is
strongest, in the aft part of the airplane, but can be felt in the entire structure. It
may or may not be felt in the control wheel. If the flight deck door is open, the
vibration can be heard coming from the back of the airplane. In addition, aft cabin
personnel will notice a strong vibration.
Operational limitations as noted below will be required for the 737-600/-700/-
700C/-800 and BBJ airplanes following deicing/anti-icing until stiffened elevator
tabs are installed. The new elevator tab will be incorporated in production at line
number 1175, scheduled for delivery in July 2002. Retrofit of in-service airplanes
per Boeing Service Bulletin 737-55A1080 will begin in the third quarter of 2002.
Boeing anticipates this corrective action will provide sufficient damping to
eliminate vibration. Flight test of the new elevator tabs was completed in April
2002.
In the interim, Service Bulletin 737-55A1084 has been released to improve
draining of fluid from the elevator balance bay area and to help reduce the
accumulation of fluid. Service Letter
737-SL-55-021 has been released to
periodically clean the external surface of the elevator tab. Service Letter 737-SL-
12-017 provides cleaning instructions for the elevator balance bays.
The effects of airframe vibration can be cumulative and can affect the life of the
airframe. After completion of a flight during which a suspected ice-related
airframe vibration is encountered, the flight crew is encouraged to complete a
vibration report. An example of a flight deck vibration event log can be found in
737-SL-02-2002-D, dated July 3, 2001.
Operating Instructions
After any ground deicing/anti-icing of the horizontal stabilizer, airspeed must be
limited to 270 KIAS for all follow-on flights until the applicable maintenance
procedures have been accomplished. Mach limits are not affected. Once the
applicable maintenance procedures have been accomplished, exceeding 270
KIAS is permissible only until the next deicing/anti-icing.
The speed restrictions and maintenance requirements remain in effect until the
new stiffened elevator tabs are installed.
If a limit cycle oscillation (LCO) is suspected in flight for any reason, immediately
reduce airspeed to 270 KIAS, or until the vibration ceases, whichever indicated
airspeed is lower. Do not use speedbrakes or change configuration to reduce
airspeed. Remain at or below the indicated airspeed at which the vibration ceased
for the remainder of the flight, but do not exceed 270 KIAS. Do not use
Page 2 of 4
Operations Manual Bulletin No. TBC-33, Dated May 15, 2002 (continued)
speedbrakes for the remainder of the flight. Evaluate the need to land at the nearest
practicable airport. Landing airport selection should be based on all pertinent
factors such as weather, distance to destination, range available at the reduced
airspeed, maximum landing weight and possible airframe damage. Ground
spoilers may be used for landing.
In a situation requiring an Emergency Descent, the pilot in command may deviate
from the 270 KIAS airspeed restriction and may use speedbrakes as required. As
is standard policy, if structural integrity is in doubt, limit speed as much as
possible and avoid high maneuvering loads.
In the event a non-normal procedure must be performed that requires a higher
airspeed (e.g., PACK/PACK TRIP OFF, etc.) the pilot in command may deviate
from the 270 KIAS airspeed restriction as necessary to comply with the non-
normal checklist.
Operations Manual Information
Attached are the replacement pages which reflect the revised information.
Remove the pages listed below and replace with the attached pages to your QRH.
A revised list of effective pages will be included in the next revision of your
operations manual.
Remove Page No.
Date
Insert Page No.
Date
NNC.TOC.9.1
NNC.TOC.9.1
May 15, 2002
NNC.9.22
NNC.9.22
May 15, 2002
The following information will be included in the Limitations section of your
Volume 1 in the next revision of the Operations Manual. This information will also
be added to the Limitations chapter of the Airplane Flight Manual.
After any ground deicing/anti-icing of the horizontal stabilizer, airspeed
must be limited to 270 KIAS until the crew has been informed that
applicable maintenance procedures have been accomplished that would
allow exceedance of
270 KIAS. Once the applicable maintenance
procedures have been accomplished, exceeding 270 KIAS is permissible
only until the next deicing/anti-icing.
Page 3 of 4
Operations Manual Bulletin No. TBC-33, Dated May 15, 2002 (continued)
Administrative Information
Insert this bulletin behind the Operations Manual Bulletin Record page in Volume
1 of your Operations Manual. Amend the Operations Manual Bulletin Record to
show bulletin TBC-33 “Incorporated” (INC).
This bulletin will be cancelled after Boeing is notified that all affected airplanes
in your fleet have been modified by Service Bulletin 737-55A1080.
Please send all correspondence regarding Operations Manual Bulletin Status to
one of the following addresses:
Mailing Address Manager, Flight Technical Publications
737 Model
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group
P.O. Box 3707 MS 20-89
Seattle, WA 98124-2207
USA
Fax:
(206) 662-7812
Telex:
329430 Station 627
SITA:
SEABO7X Station 627
E-mail:
FlightTechnicalPublications@Boeing.com
CS3-3133
Page 4 of 4
Sect Name
Section Name
Operations Manual Bulletin
for
The Boeing Company
The Boeing Company
Seattle, Washington 98124-2207
Number: TBC-34
Date: August 2, 2002
Document Effectivity: D6-27370-TBC
Subject: FMC MAP Display Blanking with FMC Update U10.3, U10.4 and
U10.4A software.
Reason: This bulletin notifies flight crews that FMC MAP display blanking has
been experienced on 737 airplanes with FMC Update U10.3, U10.4 and
U10.4A software installed.
Information in this bulletin is recommended by The Boeing Company, but may not be FAA approved
at the time of writing. In the event of conflict with the FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM),
the AFM shall supersede. The Boeing Company regards the information or procedures described
herein as having a direct or indirect bearing on the safe operation of this model airplane.
THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE AND/OR INFORMATION IS EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT
Background Information
Since January 2002, several operators with FMC U10.3, U10.4 and U10.4A
software installed on their 737 airplanes have reported blanking of the FMC MAP
display during approach at a limited number of airports. These MAP blanking
events appear to occur without pilot action and are unrecoverable by manual
switching.
There have also been reports of MAP RANGE DISAGREE and MAP FAIL
anomalies induced when mode/range changes are made on the EFIS control panel
during approach. These failures affect one or both MAP displays. The majority of
these events have been recoverable.
The FMC U10.5 software upgrade scheduled for third quarter/early fourth quarter
2002 is expected to correct both of these anomalies.
Page 1 of 2
Operations Manual Bulletin No. TBC-34, Dated August 2, 2002 (continued)
Operating Instructions
Minimize MAP mode/range changes during approach with FMC Update U10.3,
U10.4 or U10.4A software installed. If unrecoverable MAP display blanking
occurs, use the other pilot’s MAP display and/or conventional means of
navigation and land as soon as practicable. After landing, have maintenance
recycle power to the FMC.
Administrative Information
Insert this bulletin behind the Operations Manual Bulletin Record page in Volume
1 of your Operations Manual. Amend the Operations Manual Bulletin Record to
show bulletin TBC-34 “In Effect” (IE).
This bulletin will be cancelled after Boeing is notified that all affected airplanes
in your fleet have been updated to FMC Update U10.5 software.
Please send all correspondence regarding Operations Manual Bulletin Status to
one of the following addresses:
Mailing Address Manager, Flight Technical Publications
737 Model
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group
P.O. Box 3707 MS 20-89
Seattle, WA 98124-2207
USA
Fax:
(206) 662-7812
Telex:
329430 Station 627
SITA:
SEABO7X Station 627
E-mail:
FlightTechnicalPublications@Boeing.com
CS3-3171
Page 2 of 2
Boeing 737 Operations Manual
Limitations
Chapter L
Table of Contents
Section 0
L.0 Limitations-Table of Contents
Operating Limitations
L.10.1
General
L.10.1
Airplane General
L.10.1
Operational Limitations
L.10.1
Weight Limitations
L.10.3
Air Systems
L.10.4
Pressurization
L.10.4
Anti-Ice, Rain
L.10.4
Autopilot/Flight Director System
L.10.4
HUD System
L.10.6
Communications
L.10.6
Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting
System
L.10.6
Engines and APU
L.10.7
Engine Limit Display Markings
L.10.7
Engine Ignition
L.10.7
Reverse Thrust
L.10.7
APU
L.10.7
Flight Controls
L.10.8
Flight Management, Navigation
L.10.8
Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU)
L.10.8
QFE Selection
L.10.8
Navigational Equipment
L.10.8
Look-Ahead Terrain Alerting (GPWS)
L.10.9
Fuel System
L.10.9
Landing Gear
L.10.9
L.TOC.0.1
Limitations -
Table of Contents
Boeing 737 Operations Manual
Intentionally
Blank
L.TOC.0.2
Boeing 737 Operations Manual
Limitations
Chapter L
Operating Limitations
Section 10
General
This chapter contains Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) limitations and Boeing
recommended operating limitations. Limitations that are obvious, shown on
displays or placards, or incorporated
within
an operating procedure are not
contained in this chapter.
Airplane General
Operational Limitations
Runway slope
+/- 2%
Maximum Takeoff and Landing Tailwind
[Option - 15 kt tailwind]
Component
15 knots
[Option - 10 kt tailwind]
10 knots
Maximum speeds
Observe gear and flap placards
Maximum Operating Altitude
41,000 ft
Maximum Takeoff and Landing Altitude
[Option - Typical]
8,400 ft
[Option - High altitude
landing system]
12,000 ft
[Option - Without polar navigation]
Maximum flight operating latitude - 82° North and 82° South, except for the
region between 80° West and 130 ° West longitude, the maximum flight operating
latitude is 70° North, and the region between 120° East and 160° East longitude,
the maximum flight operating latitude is 60° South.
Installation of handle covers on the overwing exits must be verified prior to
departure whenever passengers are carried.
[Option - Photoluminescent Floor Emergency Lighting]
Photoluminescent Floor Emergency Lighting must be charged in accordance with
approved procedures.
L.10.1