The United States of America Seventh National Report for the Convention on Nuclear Safety (2016)

Operating experience includes several instances of degradation and deformation of

neutron-absorbing materials in SFPs, as described in IN 09-26, “Degradation of

Neutron-Absorbing Materials in the Spent Fuel Pool,” dated October 28, 2009, and other earlier

communications. Although there have been no criticality incidents, licensee performance with

regard to detection and mitigation of neutron-absorbing materials degradation has resulted in

several licensees being outside their licensing bases. This experience has raised concerns with

the adequacy of licensees’ current SFP neutron-absorbing materials monitoring.

Therefore, the NRC issued a draft GL, “Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel

Pools,” on March 11, 2014, to request licensees to provide information that demonstrates that

credited neutron-absorbing materials in the SFP of power reactors and the fuel storage pool,

reactor pool, or other wet locations designed for the purpose of fuel storage in nonpower

reactors are in compliance with the licensing and design basis, and applicable regulatory

requirements. The staff issued the final document as GL 2016-01, “Monitoring of

Neutron-Absorbing Materials In Spent Fuel Pools,” on April 7, 2016. The NRC staff will review

licensees responses and determine wither further regulatory action is needed.

Staff Readiness to Transition Plants from Construction to Operations

With respect to the NRC readiness to transition new reactors from construction to operations, an

NRC staff-level transition working group was established in 2013 to develop an integrated plan

that identified all regulatory functions necessary to support the transition of the Vogtle and

V.C. Summer AP1000 units from construction to operation. In September 2014, NRC staff

summarized the working group’s results in the report, “Assessment of the Staff’s Readiness to

Transition Regulatory Oversight and Licensing as New Reactors Proceed from Construction to

Operation.” The report included 21 readiness issues with associated options and

recommendations, with an emphasis on ensuring continuity during the oversight transition. The

resolution of these recommendations is currently being tracked and reported to management on

a regular basis.

In response to one of the readiness issues, NRC staff is drafting a detailed implementation plan

to transfer regulatory oversight and licensing for the AP1000 design center from the New

Reactor Licensing and Construction organizations implementing the Construction Reactor

Oversight Program (cROP) framework to the appropriate operations organizations responsible

for the Reactor Oversight Process. The draft implementation plan is currently undergoing

internal review and approval, and will be distributed to public stakeholders for comments and

discussion at a future Reactor Oversight Process public meeting. Once comments have been

received and addressed, a final version will be forwarded for approval by the impacted Office

Directors and Region II Administrator. The plan is intended to be a living document and will be

revised, as necessary. In line with the NRC’s Principles of Good Regulation, the readiness plan

will be executed with openness and clarity by coordinating with the licensees and

communicating with the public, as appropriate.

Staff Readiness to Transition Plants from Operation to Decommissioning

When a utility decides to close a nuclear power plant permanently, the facility must be

decommissioned by safely removing it from service and reducing residual radioactivity to a level

that permits release of the property and termination of the license. The NRC has strict rules

governing nuclear power plant decommissioning, involving cleanup of radioactively

contaminated plant systems and structures, and removal of the radioactive fuel. These

requirements protect workers and the public during the entire decommissioning process, and

the public after the license is terminated.

The requirements for decommissioning a nuclear power plant are set out in several NRC

regulations.⁸ In August 1996, revised rules went into effect that redefined the decommissioning

process. The revised regulation required licensees to provide the NRC with early notification of

planned decommissioning activities. The rules do not allow major decommissioning activities to

be undertaken until after certain information has been provided to the NRC and the public.

Most regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization

Facilities,” as well as other parts of NRC’s regulations were intended to be applicable only to a

reactor that is authorized to operate. Once a licensee has submitted certifications of permanent

cessation of operation and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel, in accordance

with 10 CFR 50.82, “Termination of License,” it is no longer authorized to operate its nuclear

power plant. Because the risks at a permanently shut down reactor are significantly lower

compared to the risks from operating reactors, certain reactor regulations and specific license

conditions may not be applicable to permanently shutdown reactors. In these circumstances,

the licensee may apply for an exemption to the regulation or amendment to its license, and the

NRC staff will review and evaluate the licensee’s specific request.

In 2013 and 2014, five power reactor units permanently ceased operation (i.e., Kewaunee;

Crystal River, Unit 3; San Onofre, Units 2 and 3; and Vermont Yankee). These were the first

reactors to permanently cease operations since 1998 - a span of nearly 15 years without a

power reactor permanently shutting down. In addition, the licensees for seven other reactor

units have announced an intent to permanently cease operations in the next few years. These

reactor units include: Fort Calhoun Station; James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Clinton

Power Station, Unit 1; Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Pilgrim Nuclear Power

Station; and the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. All of the recent reactors

transitioning to decommissioning have requested amendments to their licenses and exemptions

from the NRC’s regulations. Most changes involve modifications to staffing, security, emergency

preparedness and financial assurance requirements; and the deletion of license conditions and

technical specifications that are no longer applicable. The NRC staff reviews each request with

a focus on safety and the individual circumstances at each site and whether the request, if

approved, would maintain an adequate level of protection. To the maximum extent practicable,

the staff has used precedent from previously decommissioned plant evaluations as a basis for

the current licensing action reviews.

Since the last plants that entered into decommissioning in the 1990s, there have been many

new and revised regulatory requirements for operating plants related to emergency

preparedness and security rules and Orders that address lessons learned from the terrorists

attacks of September 11, 2001, and the 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident in Japan.

These requirements also need to be considered for their applicability in decommissioned plants.

8 Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20 Subpart E, and Part 50, Sections 50.75, 50.82, 51.53, and

51.95.

As licensing actions were issued, starting with the shutdown of Kewaunee in 2013,

decommissioning experience has been acquired, and significant efficiencies for processing

subsequent decommissioning reviews have been achieved.

In SRM-SECY-14-0118, “Request By Duke Energy Florida, Inc., for Exemptions from Certain

Emergency Planning Requirements,” dated December 30, 2014, the Commission directed the

staff to proceed with a rulemaking on decommissioning. The Commission stated that the

rulemaking should address issues such as:

the graded approach to emergency preparedness

lessons learned from the plants that have already (or are currently) going through the

decommissioning process

the advisability of requiring a licensee's Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activity Report

to be approved by NRC

the appropriateness of maintaining the three existing options for decommissioning and

the timeframes associated with those options

the appropriate role of state and local governments and non-governmental stakeholders

in the decommissioning process

other issues deemed relevant by the NRC staff

As documented in SECY-15-0014, “Anticipated Schedule and Estimated Resources for a Power

Reactor Decommissioning Rulemaking,” dated January 30, 2015, the staff has initiated the

decommissioning rulemaking process. One objective of this potential rulemaking would be to

provide a more efficient and predictable decommissioning transition process. In addition, the

potential rulemaking would support the Principles of Good Regulation, including openness,

clarity, and reliability. An Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was published in November

2015. The NRC received 161 public comment submissions, which are being considered as part

of the development of the regulatory basis for the proposed rule. Subsequently, the staff will

submit a proposed rule for Commission review and approval. Should the Commission decide to

proceed with this rulemaking, the staff will not provide the draft final rule to the Commission for

approval until calendar year 2019 or beyond, depending on the competing demands on agency

decommissioning experts.

Subsequent License Renewal

The NRC’s current regulatory framework in 10 CFR Part 54, “Requirements for Renewal of

Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants,” supports the receipt and review of a subsequent

license renewal application. Specifically, 10 CFR 54.31(d) states that “a renewed license may

be subsequently renewed in accordance with all applicable requirements.”

Several industry representatives have expressed an interest in operating plants beyond

60 years. In SRM-SECY-14-0016, “Ongoing Staff Activities to Assess Regulatory

Considerations for Power Reactor Subsequent License Renewal,” dated August 29, 2014, the

Commission concluded that the current regulatory framework for the first license renewal was

sound and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the power reactors can safety

operate beyond 60 years. On November 5, 2015, the Commission received a formal letter of

intent to pursue such a renewal for Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, in 2019. On

June 7, 2016, the Commission received a formal letter of intent to pursue a second license

renewal for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3, in 2018.

To support the review of the application, the NRC staff has developed guidance documents to

address the unique aging management needs for a subsequent license renewal. The unique

aging management needs include technical issues such as reactor pressure vessel neutron

embrittlement at high fluence, irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking of reactor internals

and primary system components, concrete degradation and electrical cable qualification and

condition assessment. These guidance documents were developed by making the necessary

revisions to the existing license renewal guidance documents, which include NUREG-1801,

“Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report,” Revision 2, and NUREG-1800, “Standard

Review Plan for Review of License Renewal Applications for Nuclear Power Plants,” Revision 2,

both issued in December 2010. The NRC staff plans to issue the updated guidance by

mid-2017. Section 14.1.4.3 of this report describes the subsequent license renewal activities in

more detail.

Project Aim

Project Aim is an NRC initiative to improve agency efficiency, effectiveness, and agility, driven

largely by the need to align agency regulatory work environment, structure, and processes with

numerous fact-of-life changes. The agency has grown significantly to enhance security and

incident response (subsequent to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks) and to prepare for

projected growth in the use of nuclear power in the U.S. The forecasted growth did not occur

because of market conditions in the nuclear industry that resulted in fewer new nuclear facilities

and the early closure of existing plants.

The NRC’s Executive Director for Operations established Project Aim in coordination with the

Chief Financial Officer in June 2014 to enhance the agency’s ability to plan and execute its

mission while adapting in a timely and effective manner to a dynamic environment. The project

team gathered perspectives from internal and external stakeholders to forecast the future

workload and operating environment. Based on analysis of these perspectives, literature review,

and the evaluation of the NRC’s current state, the team and NRC senior leadership identified

key strategies to transform the agency to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and agility of the

NRC. If implemented, these strategies will better position the NRC to respond to new safety and

regulatory challenges without compromising our important mission and without affecting our

ability to demonstrate organizational values and Principles of Good Regulation.

In late January 2015, NRC staff provided a number of recommendations to the Commission.

The staff’s report proposed that the NRC could function more efficiently by performing the

following:

right-sizing the agency while retaining appropriate skill sets needed to accomplish its

mission

streamlining agency processes to use resources more wisely

improving timeliness in regulatory decisionmaking and responding quickly to changing

conditions

promoting unity of purpose with clearer agencywide priorities

On June 8, 2015, the Commission approved many of the recommendations presented by the

staff’s report. A wide range of implementation activities are currently underway and are being

tracked as 19 discrete tasks. Among the Project Aim activities, the Commission directed the

staff to undertake a “re-baselining” effort to identify work that can be shed or eliminated,

deferred, or done with fewer resources. This task, which involved a broad review of the

agency’s workload, resulted in recommended efficiencies for Commission consideration as

documented in SECY-15-0009, “Recommendations Resulting from the Integrated Prioritization

and Re-Baselining of Agency Activities,” dated January 31, 2016. The Commission approved

almost all of those recommendations in SRM-SECY-16-0009, which was issued on

April 13, 2016. The staff began developing implementation plans to achieve these approved

efficiencies in an open, collaborative, and transparent manner.

1.3.3 Major Regulatory Accomplishments

Since its previous U.S. National Report was issued in 2013, the NRC has achieved numerous

regulatory accomplishments. The following are some of the major items.

continued storage

issuance of new licenses

Fukushima lessons learned

revisions to the petition for rulemaking process

Southern Exposure 2015 exercise

Continued Storage

On August 31, 1984, the Commission issued the Waste Confidence Decision and Rule

(49 FR 34658 and 49 FR 34688), codified in 10 CFR 51.23, “Environmental Impacts of

Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel Beyond the Licensed Life for Operation of a Reactor.”

This regulation represented the Commission’s generic environmental determination that spent

fuel can be stored safely and without significant environmental impacts for a period of time after

the end of the licensed life for operation. This generic determination meant that the NRC did not

need to consider the storage of spent fuel after the end of a reactor’s licensed life for operation

in documents that support its reactor and spent fuel storage application reviews in accordance

with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The Commission conducted subsequent

reviews of the decision and rule in 1990 and 1999 (55 FR 38474; September 18, 1990 and 64

FR 68005; December 6, 1999).

On December 23, 2010, the Commission published in the Federal Register a revision of the

Waste Confidence Decision and Rule to reflect information gained from experience in the

storage of spent fuel and the increased uncertainty in the siting and construction of a permanent

geologic repository for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste (75 FR 81032 and

75 FR 81037). Several parties challenged the Waste Confidence Decision, which provided the

regulatory basis for the rule. On June 8, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit vacated the NRC’s Waste Confidence Decision and Rule because it did not

comply with NEPA. The Court concluded that to comply with NEPA, the agency was required to

identify the impacts of failing to develop a repository, and that its analyses of spent fuel pool

leaks and fires provided in the Waste Confidence Decision could not support a ‘finding of no

significant impact’ (because the pool leak analysis was not sufficiently forward-looking and the

analysis of fires addressed only the likelihood, but not the consequence, of a fire).

In response to the court’s ruling, the Commission directed the NRC staff to proceed with a

rulemaking, supported by an environmental impact statement. On August 26, 2014, the

Commission approved the revised 10 CFR 51.23 rule and associated NUREG-2157, “Generic

Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel.” The revised

rule and NUREG were published on September 19, 2014. The revised rule adopts the generic

impact determinations made in NUREG-2157 and codifies the NRC’s generic determinations

regarding the environmental impacts of continued storage of spent nuclear fuel beyond the term

of a reactor’s operating license (i.e., those impacts that could occur as a result of the storage of

spent nuclear fuel at at-reactor or away-from-reactor sites after a reactor’s licensed life for

operation and until a permanent repository becomes available). Additionally, the NRC adopted

the new name, “Continued Storage,” as a replacement for the long-standing historical name,

“Waste Confidence.” This name change reflects the fact that the analysis considers the

storage of spent fuel under three separate scenarios:

(1) the short-term timeframe considers

60 years beyond the reactor’s license term (including two renewal terms); (2) the long-term

timeframe considers an additional 100 years; and (3) the indefinite timeframe assumes that no

repository becomes available.

In 2014, the parties who challenged the 2010 Waste Confidence Update filed new petitions for

review of the Continued Storage final rule in the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that that

the generic environmental impact statement insufficiently addressed several issues under

NEPA. In a decision issued on June 3, 2016, in New York v. NRC, the Court denied the

petitions and upheld the NRC’s Continued Storage final rule.

Issuance of New Licenses

Enrico Fermi Nuclear Plant, Unit 3

On May 1, 2015, the NRC issued a combined license to DTE Energy Company for the Enrico

Fermi Nuclear Plant, Unit 3. The license authorizes DTE Energy Company to build and operate

(with specified conditions) a General Electric-Hitachi’s Economic Simplified Boiling Water

Reactor at the Fermi site, adjacent to the company’s existing reactor near Newport, Michigan.

This is the fifth combined license issued by the NRC and the first combined license issued for

an Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor. The combined license is valid for 40 years from

the date of the Commission finding that the acceptance criteria in the combined license are met.

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2

On October 22, 2015, the NRC issued a full power facility operating license for Watts Bar

Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, to the Tennessee Valley Authority. The operating license is valid for

40 years. The Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, is the first initial operating license granted by the

NRC under 10 CFR Part 50 since the operating license was issued for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant,

Unit 1, on February 7, 1996. Additional information about the licensing of Watts Bar Nuclear

Plant, Unit 2, can be found in Section 18.1.2 of this report.

South Texas Project, Units 3 and 4

On February 12, 2016, the NRC issued combined licenses to Nuclear Innovation North America

LLC for the South Texas Project, Units 3 and 4. The licenses authorize Nuclear Innovation

North America LLC to construct and STP Nuclear Operating Company to operate (with specified

conditions) two Advanced Boiling Water Reactors at the South Texas Project site, adjacent to

the two existing reactors in Matagorda County, Texas. These are the sixth and seventh

combined licenses issued by the NRC, and the first combined licenses issued for an Advanced

Boiling Water Reactor. The combined licenses are valid for 40 years from the date of the

Commission finding that the acceptance criteria in the combined license are met.

Fukushima Lessons Learned

The NRC has implemented a number of safety enhancements based on lessons learned from

the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant in Japan. As part of its activities in this

area, the NRC has interacted extensively with the U.S. nuclear industry, members of the public,

and other stakeholders on how to best implement the actions contained in the NTTF report and

additional Commission direction. The NRC’s public Web site has a dedicated portal

(http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-info.html ) that contains information

on activities and documents related to the agency’s implementation of lessons learned from the

accident.

Orders, Rulemaking, and Seismic and Flooding Evaluations

The NRC continues to review nuclear power plant licensees’ plans to achieve compliance with

the mitigation strategies and SFP instrumentation orders, which were issued in March 2012.

The NRC has issued both interim and final staff evaluations and is in the process of inspecting

the licensees’ implementation of these safety improvements. On October 4, 2014, the first

licensee informed the NRC that one of its nuclear plants was fully compliant with both orders. All

plants are expected to be in compliance with the SFP order by the end of December 2016.

Nearly all plants will be in compliance with the mitigating strategies order by the end of 2016,

with the exception of those plants whose mitigating strategies also rely on implementing the

hardened vent order (in those cases, all other enhancements will be in place at that time).

Nuclear power plant licensees are also reevaluating seismic and flooding hazards for their sites

and are performing evaluations to ensure that mitigating strategies are available to address

potentially more severe external events. The need for mitigating strategies to address

beyond-design-basis external events is included in a rule that will be provided to the

Commission for approval by the end of 2016, and the majority of licensees are expected to

complete the evaluations and any necessary modifications in 2017.

In June 2014, NRC staff received the licensees’ integrated plans for compliance with Phase 1

(wetwell venting) of the revised severe-accident-capable hardened vents order, which was first

issued in March 2012 and subsequently revised in June 2013. The staff has issued interim staff

evaluations of those plans. Licensees submitted their plans for Phase 2 (drywell venting) of the

revised order in December 2015, and are required to fully implement these plans on a

staggered basis and by no later than June 2019.

The NRC requested that nuclear power plant licensees reevaluate potential seismic and

flooding hazards. If these reevaluated hazards are not bound by the current design basis, the

licensee will determine whether interim protection measures are needed while a longer-term

evaluation is completed.

The NRC staff is reviewing the flooding hazard reevaluations and is issuing assessments, as

described in COMSECY-15-0019, “Closure Plan for the Reevaluation of Flooding Hazards for

Operating Nuclear Power Plants,” dated June 30, 2015. Under this plan, licensees will perform

an assessment of the mitigating strategies to ensure that they can address the reevaluated

hazards. Licensees are expected to complete the mitigation strategies assessment to the

reevaluated flood hazard by December 2016. The plan also includes provisions for additional

evaluations, beyond those associated with mitigating strategies, depending on the reevaluated

hazard.

The NRC has received the seismic hazard reevaluation reports from its licensees and has

determined the final list of operating reactor sites where the development of a seismic risk

evaluation is warranted. Approximately one third of the sites are expected to perform a seismic

PRA, the first of which will be due to the NRC in March 2017. Some sites will perform

limited-scope evaluations (i.e., a high-frequency evaluation, low-frequency evaluation, or SFP

evaluation). Nine sites have screened out of any further evaluation.

The NRC also requested information from licensees on emergency preparedness staffing and

communications, which is further discussed in Section 16.9 of this report.

Licensees completed the seismic and flooding walkdowns and submitted reports to the NRC in

November 2012. NRC inspectors accompanied and independently verified that the walkdowns

were performed in accordance with JLD-ISG-12-04, “Interim Staff Guidance on Performing a

Seismic Margin Assessment in Response to the March 2012 Request for Information Letter,”

and JLD-ISG-05, “Interim Staff Guidance on Performance of an Integrated Assessment for

Flooding,” both issued in November 2012. Identified discrepancies were entered into the

respective licensee’s corrective action program.

Rulemaking activities related to the requirements of the orders and other NTTF

recommendations are also proceeding as scheduled. As mentioned above, the NRC has

received comments from external stakeholders on the proposed Mitigation of

Beyond-Design-Basis Events rulemaking and plans to provide a final rule to the Commission by

the end of 2016. With regard to the planned second post-Fukushima rulemaking, the

“Containment Protection and Release Reduction” rulemaking, the Commission directed the staff

not to proceed with that rulemaking after determining that the safety benefit is already being

achieved through the hardened containment vent order and additional requirements in that area

would not be justified.

While undertaking actions to address the seismic and flooding hazards discussed above, the

NRC staff recognized that it should reevaluate other external hazards against existing

requirements and regulatory guidance. Other external hazards include phenomena such as

tornados, hurricanes, severe winds, extreme temperatures, extreme precipitation, dust storms,

forest fires, and volcanic activity. Because sufficient resource flexibility, including availability of

critical skill sets, did not exist at the time that the staff prioritized the recommendations, the staff

prioritized the other external hazards evaluation as a Tier 2 activity and are working to resolve

the issue as part of the completion of Fukushima-related activities.

The NRC is moving forward with resolving the remaining open Tier 2 and 3 recommendations

that have not already been addressed through, for example, the ongoing rulemaking initiative or

other Tier 1 activities. On October 29, 2015, the NRC staff delivered a paper, SECY-15-0137, to

the Commission that described the resolution paths for these recommendations. The NRC staff

recommended that some could be closed now, while others would benefit from either further

stakeholder interaction or additional analysis or documentation. With respect to its evaluation of

external hazards other than seismic and flooding, SECY-15-0137 discusses the staff’s plans to

further develop a process to determine if there is a need and justification to impose a new

regulatory requirement under the backfit rule or if the NRC should take some other regulatory

action (e.g., issue a generic communication) to enhance protection from other hazards. The

proposed process would entail the NRC applying screening criteria to determine if a hazard

could be screened out generically and, if not, to take into account site- or hazard-specific

information. SRM-SECY-15-0137, dated February 8, 2016, approved the staff’s resolution plans

for these Tier 2 and 3 recommendations. The Commission approved closing a subset of these

recommendations and directed the staff to continue issuing status updates on those

recommendations that remain open. The staff provided the Commission with final assessments

concluding that no additional regulatory actions were warranted for containments other than

BWR Mark I and II designs, hydrogen control, or enhanced instrumentation. The assessments

of the remaining Tier 2 and 3 recommendations are expected to be completed by late 2016.

Spent Fuel Storage

As part of the resolution of a recommendation to assess the merits of expediting the transfer of

spent fuel from pools to dry storage casks, the NRC completed an SFP consequence study,

documented in NUREG-2161, “Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake

Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor,” dated September 2014.

The study considered an elevated SFP (similar to the one at Fukushima and 23 U.S. reactors)

undergoing a postulated earthquake with ground motion stronger than the maximum earthquake

reasonably expected to occur for the reference plant. The study examined both a full SFP and

one with less fuel, after removing older fuel assemblies, as well as emergency procedures for

adding water to the pool in the unlikely event that the earthquake causes the pool to lose water.

The detailed analysis showed that even a very strong earthquake has a low probability of

damaging the pool to the point of losing water through a draindown. The study also showed that

even if this particular pool was damaged, the fuel could be kept cool by air circulation, in all but

a few analyzed conditions.

In cases where the analysis led to fuel damage, the study predicted that, with existing

emergency procedures, no offsite early fatalities attributable to acute radiation exposure would

occur. Those emergency measures could involve relocating people from a large area of

potentially contaminated land. The study also examined the potential benefits of moving all

spent fuel older than 5 years (and therefore containing a smaller inventory of radioactive fission

products) into storage casks. For the scenarios examined, the study concluded faster fuel

transfer to casks would not provide a significant safety benefit for the plant. The NRC used the

study to inform regulatory evaluations in COMSECY-13-0030, which supported a

recommendation to the Commission to close the issue. The Commission agreed with the staff’s

recommendation that this Tier 3 activity be closed and that no further generic assessments be

pursued related to possible regulatory actions to require the expedited transfer of spent fuel to

dry cask storage.

Public Interaction

Since 2012, the NRC has conducted hundreds of public meetings related to the lessons learned

from the Fukushima accident. Many NRC representatives have presented information on

Fukushima and the lessons learned to university scholars and professional scientific and

engineering societies. The NRC’s annual Regulatory Information Conferences have also

included presentations on activities associated with Fukushima lessons learned. These

meetings, interactions, and exchanges of information have been instrumental in obtaining input

from stakeholders, which has been and will continue to be factored into the NRC’s regulatory

activities and lessons learned implementation plans.

Revisions to the Petition for Rulemaking Process

In the U.S., federal law allows individuals, companies, states, local governments, and

federally-recognized Tribes to ask agencies to adopt, revise, or withdraw existing regulations.

This type of request is known as a petition for rulemaking. On October 7, 2015, the NRC

published a final rule amending its petition for rulemaking regulations in 10 CFR Part 2, “Agency

Rules of Practice and Procedure.” The final rule makes the petition for rulemaking process

more efficient and effective, while enhancing transparency and public participation in the

process. Specifically, the final rule:

expands a petitioner’s access to the NRC by allowing consultation with NRC staff both

before and after filing a petition for rulemaking

restructures and clarifies the content requirements for a petition for rulemaking

clarifies the NRC’s petition for rulemaking evaluation criteria

explains the NRC’s internal process for receiving, closing, and resolving a petition

updates information for tracking the status of petitions and subsequent rulemaking

actions

A Web site describing the NRC’s petition for rulemaking process is available on the NRC’s

public Web page at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/rulemaking/petition-rule.html. The

rulemaking process was open and transparent and members of the public were given the

opportunity to comment on the proposed rule.

Southern Exposure 2015 “Whole Community” Emergency Preparedness Exercise

The NRC, along with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), DOE, Duke

Energy, and the South Carolina Emergency Management Division, provided leadership for the

development and conduct of Southern Exposure 2015, a fully integrated exercise that

demonstrated the nation’s ability to effectively respond to a nuclear power plant event that

resulted in widespread contamination to the surrounding community. The exercise was

conducted in multiple phases over 5 days, beginning on July 21, 2015, and included simulated

“time jumps” to 14 days, 6 months, and 18 months postevent. Several workshops and seminars

were also held leading up to the exercise. Southern Exposure 2015 was the first nuclear plant

exercise to include long-term recovery elements that focused on housing, agriculture, and

economic impact from a catastrophic radiological event. During the exercise, the NRC hosted a

number of foreign regulators and observers, including visitors from our neighboring countries.

After the conclusion of the exercise on September 10, 2015, the NRC staff developed the

agency’s internal after-action report using input collected from evaluators and participants

involved in every aspect of the exercise. Key observations from the NRC’s internal after-action

report include:

The benefit of continued exercises with the licensee after completion of the inspected

portion of the scenario

The benefit of coordination between the NRC’s incident response program and a fully

integrated interagency Joint Information Center for public messaging

The benefit of interagency coordination due to the establishment, by FEMA and the

State of South Carolina, of a Unified Coordination Group in response to a nuclear power

plant scenario

The need for improvements in our understanding of, and preparedness for, the NRC’s

responsibilities in the recovery mission area and fulfillment of the provisions of the

Price-Anderson Act that facilitate financial compensation of damages caused by the

event

The need to address limitations of NRC information technology, both in the

Headquarters Operations Center and among deployed responders

The need to more clearly define the roles, responsibilities, and designation process of

the senior NRC official deployed to the Unified Coordination Group

The need to develop a more systematic method for NRC to transfer Federal coordination

functions to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (FEMA), per Federal response

and recovery guidance

The NRC staff worked closely with U.S. interagency, State, and private sector partners,

primarily FEMA, DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration, the State of South Carolina,

and Duke Energy, to write and issue a combined interagency after-action report. The

interagency after-action report and the associated improvement plan were approved and issued

on June 21, 2016. Key findings and observations from the interagency after-action report that

directly, or indirectly, involve the NRC include:

The need to define, in Federal guidance, the recommended membership for a Unified

Coordination Group established in response to a nuclear power plant incident

The need to develop a more systematic process to transition responsibility for

coordination of Federal response efforts from the NRC to FEMA

The need for improved awareness and understanding of response and recovery funding

mechanisms and methods of financial compensation (i.e., the Price-Anderson Act),

which could be available following a radiological event at a nuclear power plant

The need to improve the organization of the interagency Joint Information Center to

facilitate a coordinated message development and approval process

The fact that disposal of large quantities of radioactive waste will present short and

long-term technical and policy challenges

The value, during all three stages of the exercise, of including the Price-Anderson Act,

both as a topic of discussion and as a framework around which to base funding and

compensation discussions

The need to identify a Federal agency as the proponent of remediation in Federal

response and recovery guidance

Additional information can be found in Section 16.7 of this report.

1.4 International Peer Reviews and Missions

The United States strongly supports international peer reviews and the IAEA’s suite of missions,

including the CNS peer review activities, and the IRRS and OSART missions. This section

provides a summary of the results of the missions and peer review activities conducted since

the last U.S. National Report was issued.

1.4.1 Convention on Nuclear Safety

The United States ratified the CNS in 1999 and has been actively participating in its peer review

activities. The conclusions from the review of the 2013 U.S. National Report at the sixth CNS

review meeting in April 2014 were very positive.

Items Resulting from Country Group Session

A review of the questions raised by other contracting parties on the 2013 U.S. National Report

identified the following areas of interest:

Fukushima lessons learned

materials degradation

health physics

emergency preparedness

safety culture

risk-informed regulations and PRA

human factors

licensing and power uprates

digital instrumentation and control

OSARTs

license renewal and aging

independence

Reactor Oversight Process

decommissioning

operating experience

vendor inspection and quality

siting

assurance

The NRC’s presentation during the 2014 review meeting focused on these topics. INPO,

representing the U.S. nuclear industry, also discussed its role in maintaining and improving

nuclear safety.

The United States was a member of Country Group 1. The group participants concluded that

the United States implemented the following good practices:

extensive international and national research program in connection with the Fukushima

accident

regulatory openness and transparency

establishment of a construction experience program and construction resident inspectors

offices for new builds

reintegration of security in the Reactor Oversight Process

Country Group 1 identified the following challenges for the United States:

Fukushima-related activities (discussed in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.3 of this report)

completion of most of the Tier 1 recommendations by the end of 2016

resource constraints on implementation and verification of modifications

according to Tier 2 (external hazards)

Tier 3 long-term evaluations

risk-informed fire protection regulations requiring extensive resources for the transition to

National Fire Protection Association 805 (discussed in Section 6.3.8 of this report)

ensuring continuity during the oversight transition from plant construction to operation

(discussed in Section 1.3.2 of this report)

nuclear industry strategy (discussed in Part 3 of this report)

continuous improvement in self-awareness

‒

effective use of operating experience

‒

maintaining proficiency of the nuclear workforce

‒

sharing best practices of supplier and nonnuclear support

‒

site resiliency against external events

‒

quickly and sustainably recovering lower performing plant

reporting status of the periodic safety review gap being developed (discussed in

Sections 8.5.5 and 14.1.5.7 of this report)

status of NRC’s work on the issuance of possible license renewals to operate beyond

60 years (discussed in Section 14.1.4.3 of this report)

Country Group 1 highlighted the following planned U.S. initiatives:

Fukushima-related activities (discussed in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.3 of this report)

work conducted through NEA’s Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations

for identifying gaps that need international work

nuclear industry application of lessons learned

application of risk-informed fire protection regulations for substantial safety

improvements (discussed in Section 6.3.8 of this report)

transition from plant construction to operation (discussed in Section 1.3.2 of this report)

coordination of efforts

‒

ensure continuity during the oversight transition

results of Commission’s decision on environmental impacts on storing spent nuclear fuel

beyond the licensed life for operation (discussed in Section 1.3.3 of this report)

The current U.S. National Report addresses these issues under the relevant articles.

Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety

Since the Fukushima accident in 2011, the international community has come together to

strengthen standards and address lessons learned through a variety of efforts. Some of the

most important efforts were led by the CNS Contracting Parties, as evidenced by the work

undertaken at the CNS Extraordinary Meeting in 2012, and at the 6th Review Meeting in 2014,

to strengthen the CNS guidance documents. In addition, the Contracting Parties convened a

CNS Diplomatic Conference, which took place in February 2015. In preparation for the

Diplomatic Conference, the Contracting Parties thoroughly considered a proposal to amend

Article 18, “Design and Construction,” of the Convention. The Contracting Parties agreed not to

amend the CNS. At the Diplomatic Conference it was decided to continue moving the

Convention forward by recommitting and rededicating ourselves to a vigorous implementation of

the CNS. Rather than amending the Convention, the Contracting Parties unanimously adopted

the “Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety” to reinforce the commitment to meet the

Convention’s objective to prevent accidents and mitigate their radiological consequences,

should they occur. The Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety, which is codified in Information

Circular (INFCIRC) 872, dated February 18, 2015, states:

New nuclear power plants are to be designed, sited, and constructed, consistent with the

objective of preventing accidents in the commissioning and operation and, should an

accident occur, mitigating possible releases of radionuclides causing long-term off site

contamination and avoiding early radioactive releases or radioactive releases large

enough to require long-term protective measures and actions.

Comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are to be carried out periodically

and regularly for existing installations throughout their lifetime in order to identify safety

improvements that are oriented to meet the above objective. Reasonably practicable or

achievable safety improvements are to be implemented in a timely manner.

National requirements and regulations for addressing this objective throughout the

lifetime of nuclear power plants are to take into account the relevant IAEA Safety

Standards and, as appropriate, other good practices as identified inter alia in the Review

Meetings of the CNS.

The Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety does not establish new requirements but recommits

the Contracting Parties to the implementation of the CNS principles, in particular Articles 6, 14,

17, 18, and 19. The Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety is consistent with the CNS reporting

guidance, INFCIRC 572, Revision 5, “Guidelines Regarding National Reports under the

Convention on Nuclear Safety,” dated January 16, 2015.

The United States has consistently addressed the principles documented in the Vienna

Declaration on Nuclear Safety since the inception of the CNS. For the purpose of facilitating the

peer review to be conducted by the Contracting Parties in preparation for the 2017 CNS Review

Meeting, the NRC has included in this report a short summary discussing how the United States

addresses the principles of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety through the

implementation of its mature and robust regulatory programs in the aforementioned articles. The

Vienna Declaration is discussed in more detail in Sections 6.5, 14.4, 17.6, 18.6, and 19.9 of this

report.

1.4.2 Integrated Regulatory Review Service

The NRC regularly provides technical experts, often at a senior leadership level, to participate in

IRRS missions around the world. The NRC also hosted an IRRS mission in October 2010. The

mission report contains 2 recommendations, 20 suggestions, and 25 good practices. The NRC

hosted the followup mission in February 2014, as discussed in greater detail in Section 8.1.5.2

of this report.

1.4.3 Operational Safety Review Team

The NRC regularly provides technical experts, often at a senior leadership level, to participate in

OSART missions around the world. In August 2014, Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, hosted an

OSART mission. The OSART team concluded that the managers and the staff of Clinton Power

Station are committed to improving the operational safety and reliability of their station. A

followup OSART mission was hosted in October 2015, as discussed in greater detail in

Section 8.1.5.3 of this report. The next OSART in the United States will take place in 2017 at

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant located in Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee.

ARTICLE 6. EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the safety

of nuclear installations existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that

Contracting Party is reviewed as soon as possible. When necessary in the context of this

Convention, the Contracting Party shall ensure that all reasonably practicable

improvements are made as a matter of urgency to upgrade the safety of the nuclear

installation. If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should be implemented to shut

down the nuclear installation as soon as practically possible. The timing of the shutdown

may take into account the whole energy context and possible alternatives, as well as the

social, environmental, and economic impact.

This section explains how the United States ensures the safety of nuclear installations

in accordance with the obligations in Article 6. It covers the reactor licensing and major

oversight processes in the United States. This section also discusses programs for rulemaking,

fire protection regulation, decommissioning, research, programs for public participation, and

lessons learned from Fukushima. This section also addresses the Vienna Declaration on

Nuclear Safety, which was issued in 2015.

The U.S. NRC posts the major results of assessments on the agency’s public Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov.

6.1 Introduction

The mission of the NRC is to license and regulate the Nation’s civilian use of byproduct, source,

and special nuclear materials to protect public health and safety, promote the common defense

and security, and protect the environment. The NRC’s strategic goals are to ensure the safe and

secure use of radioactive materials. Appendix A of this report summarizes the NRC’s Strategic

Plan, which identifies the agency’s strategic goals, objectives, and strategies in more detail.

The agency achieves its safety goal by ensuring that licensee performance is at or above

acceptable safety levels. The NRC’s licensees are responsible for designing, constructing, and

operating nuclear facilities safely, while the NRC is responsible for the regulatory oversight of

the licensees.

The NRC currently uses six performance goals and indicators to track the effectiveness of its

nuclear safety regulatory programs to determine whether this goal has been met. Of these six,

the following four are related to commercial nuclear power plants:

(1)

number of radiation exposures that meet or exceed abnormal occurrence⁹ criteria I.A.1,

I.A.2, or I.A.3

(2)

number of releases of radioactive materials that meet or exceed abnormal occurrence

criterion I.B

9 Abnormal occurrence criteria are defined in Appendix A to NUREG-0090, Volume 37, “Report to

Congress on Abnormal Occurrences, Fiscal Year 2014,” dated May 2015.

(3)

number of instances of unintended nuclear chain reactions involving NRC-licensed

materials

(4)

number of malfunctions, deficiencies, events, or conditions at commercial nuclear power

plants (operating or under construction) that meet or exceed abnormal occurrence

criteria II.A - II.D

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, the NRC met all of its performance indicator targets, and thus,

achieved its safety goal strategic objective. The NRC also met its previous performance

indicators in FYs 2013 and 2014.

6.2 Nuclear Installations in the United States

Appendix D of this report lists all 100 operating nuclear installations in the United States, as

discussed in NUREG-1350, Volume 27, “Information Digest 2015-2016,” issued in August 2015,

which is available on the agency’s Web site. Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, received its

operating license on October 22, 2015. Additional information on Watts Bar, Unit 2, can be

found in Section 18.1.2 of this report.

Appendix A to NUREG-1350 also lists installations in the United States that are under active

construction or deferred plant status per the Commission’s Policy Statement on Deferred Plants.

Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, are currently in deferred status.

The combined licenses for Vogtle, Units 3 and 4, were issued in February 2012. Combined

licenses for V.C. Summer, Units 2 and 3, were issued in March of 2012. These four

Westinghouse’s Advanced Passive (AP) 1000 reactors are currently under construction. The

NRC provides regulatory oversight of their construction using its construction inspection

program for units licensed under 10 CFR Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for

Nuclear Power Plants.” Additional information on Vogtle and V.C. Summer construction

activities can be found in Articles 18 and 19 of this report.

In the Sixth U.S. National Report, the NRC reported that operations had ceased at Crystal

River, Unit 3, Kewaunee Power Station, and San Onofre Nuclear Generation Station, Units 2

and 3, in 2013. The NRC also reported that Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station would

cease power production after its current fuel cycle and move to safe shutdown in 2014. On

December 29, 2014, operations ceased at the Vermont Yankee plant.

In 2015, Entergy Corporation announced that it plans to close Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

and the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. By letter dated November 10, 2015, Entergy

Corporation informed the NRC that it will permanently cease power operations at the Pilgrim

Nuclear Power Station no later than June 1, 2019. On April 14, 2016, Entergy announced that it

would operate Pilgrim for one more fuel cycle and plans to permanently shutdown the reactor on

May 31, 2019. By letter dated November 18, 2015, Entergy informed the NRC that it will also

permanently cease operations at the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant by the projected

end of the current fuel cycle. On March 16, 2016, Entergy formally certified that FitzPatrick

would permanently cease operation on January 27, 2017. The company cited low natural gas

prices and increased operational costs as key factors in its decision to close the plants.

On June 2, 2016, Exelon Generation also announced its plans to close Clinton Power Station,

Unit 1, on June 1, 2017, and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, on

June 1, 2018. By letters dated June 20, 2016, Exelon notified the NRC that it will permanently

cease operations at these three units. The company cited deteriorating economics as the

reason for the closures.

On June 16, 2016, the Omaha Public Power District’s board voted unanimously to close Fort

Calhoun Station, Unit 1, by the end of 2016. The licensee confirmed its decision to permanently

cease operations due to financial reasons in a letter to the NRC dated June 24, 2016.

On June 21, 2016, Pacific Gas and Electric Company notified the NRC that it will not pursue

license renewal for Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, and will close the plants

in 2024 and 2025, when their existing licenses expire. The decision by the licensee was an

agreement in principle not to proceed with license renewal in support of the State of California’s

policy preference to meet the state’s future electricity needs with renewable generation

resources, energy efficiency, or storage.

6.3 Regulatory Processes and Programs

6.3.1 Reactor Licensing

To construct and operate a new nuclear reactor, an entity must submit an application to the

NRC for a license. After the NRC staff accepts the application, the staff will conduct a safety and

environmental review. The public has opportunities to participate through a hearing process.

The NRC licensed all current operating nuclear plants under the two-step process, specified in

10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,” first issuing a

construction permit and then an operating license. Since 1976, the NRC has not received any

applications to construct a new reactor under 10 CFR Part 50.

A revised, single-step process was adopted in 1989 and is specified in 10 CFR Part 52,

provides direction for issuing a combined license for construction and operation of a new

reactor. The NRC has issued seven combined licenses since 2012, authorizing the construction

and operation of seven new units at four nuclear power plant sites in the United States.

Regulations in 10 CFR Part 52 also provide for the issuance of design certifications that can be

referenced in a combined license application. To date, the NRC has issued five design

certifications and two design certification amendments. The industry has submitted applications

for three additional design certifications and two design certification renewals. As specified in 10

CFR Part 52, the NRC can also issue an early site permit to approve a site for a domestic

nuclear power plant independent of an application for a combined license. Early site permits are

valid for 10 to 20 years and can be renewed for an additional 10 to 20 years. To date, the NRC

has issued five early site permits and two limited work authorizations which allow the permit

holder to perform limited construction activities at a site. Article 18 provides more detail about

the 10 CFR Part 52 regulations.

The NRC’s reactor licensing process provides for the review and approval of changes after

initial licensing. The process allows amendments to the operating license to support plant

changes, changes of ownership and license transfer, exemptions and relief from NRC

regulations, and increases in the reactor power level (i.e., power uprates). Additional information

can be found in Articles 14, 17, and 18 of this report.

6.3.2 Reactor Oversight Process

Through its Reactor Oversight Process, the NRC provides continuous oversight of nuclear

power plant licensees to verify that they are operating safely and in accordance with the

agency’s rules and regulations. The NRC has full authority to take actions necessary to protect

public health and safety and may order immediate licensee actions, up to and including a plant

shutdown, to address declining or unacceptable safety or security performance at a domestic

nuclear power plant.

The Reactor Oversight Process monitors licensee performance in three key areas: reactor

safety, radiation safety, and safeguards. Within these three areas are seven cornerstones of

safety and security: initiating events, mitigating systems, barrier integrity, emergency

preparedness, public radiation safety, occupational radiation safety, and security. The Reactor

Oversight Process assesses performance across the seven cornerstones using both inspection

findings and performance indicators. At least two resident inspectors are stationed at each

operating nuclear power plant to monitor plant status, perform routine inspections, and provide

immediate response to events. Additional inspectors from the NRC’s regional offices and

headquarters perform more specialized inspections in areas like fire protection, operator

licensing, security, and other aspects of plant design and operation. Each nuclear plant receives

risk-informed baseline inspections, which represent the level of NRC inspection required to

adequately assess licensee performance. Baseline inspections are used to augment

performance indicator data, which is reported quarterly to the NRC to determine licensee

performance. The NRC posts plant-specific inspection findings and performance indicator

information on the agency’s public Web site.

The NRC uses the Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix to objectively and predictably

assess licensee performance and to determine its regulatory response. The Action Matrix

classifies licensee performance using five columns, ranging from Column 1, which represents all

cornerstone objectives being met, to Column 5, which represents unacceptable performance.

Using the Action Matrix, the NRC staff assess licensee performance using inspection finding

and performance indicator inputs and directs a graded NRC response to declining performance.

Identified inspection findings having more than very low safety or security significance or

performance indicators crossing an established threshold may result in supplemental

inspections and other possible regulatory actions.

The NRC conducts an annual Agency Action Review Meeting to review the appropriateness of

agency actions taken for those power reactor plants with significant performance issues and

those that have moved into the “multiple/repetitive degraded cornerstone” or the “unacceptable

performance” columns of the Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix. The Agency Action

Review Meeting is an integral part of the evaluative process used by the agency to ensure the

operational safety performance of nuclear power plant licensees, and to ensure that trends in

industry and licensee performance are recognized and appropriately addressed. After each

Agency Action Review Meeting, licensees are informed of any NRC decisions or actions that

differ from those previously conveyed (if any agency actions change as a result of the Agency

Action Review Meeting). Finally, the Commission is briefed on the Agency Action Review

Meeting results at a public meeting.

The NRC communicates its assessment of licensee performance on the public Web site, in

publicly available assessment letters to licensees, and in public meetings that are conducted

annually. Performance information and additional information about the Reactor Oversight

Process can be accessed at: http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html.

As of August 2, 2016, the Action Matrix assessment of licensee performance at nuclear reactors

was as follows:

Column 1:

89 reactor units in Licensee Response

Column 2:

8 reactor units in Regulatory Response

Column 3:

No units in Degraded Cornerstone

Column 4:

3 reactor units in Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone

The results of periodic Reactor Oversight Process self-assessments and other independent or

focused evaluations have indicated that the program remains effective. An example of the

NRC’s focused evaluations was the in-depth review of the Reactor Oversight Process

conducted in 2014. The results are documented in a report entitled “Reactor Oversight Process

Enhancement Project - Baseline Inspection Program,” dated April 4, 2014. The goals for that

review included enhancing the baseline inspection program to incorporate the inspection areas

for the current environment, eliminate redundant inspections, maximize efficient and effective

use of resources, and incorporate flexibility where appropriate. Significant outreach to internal

and external stakeholders resulted in a comprehensive set of recommendations for each

baseline IP.

The NRC temporarily suspended the annual self-assessment process for calendar year 2014 to

develop a more effective self-assessment process with more meaningful metrics, and to

address Reactor Oversight Process improvement recommendations from multiple independent

and focused assessments. In 2015, the NRC staff redesigned the self-assessment process to

better assess the effectiveness of a mature program by focusing on the efficacy of recent

changes to the program, performing indepth reviews of specific areas of interest, and verifying

agency adherence to program governance. The staff will implement the revised process for its

calendar year 2016 self-assessment.

The Reactor Oversight Process has developed into a mature oversight process since its

inception in 2000; however, the staff recognizes the value of continuous improvement and has

actively sought to improve various key program areas through the solicitations of internal and

external stakeholder feedback, lessons learned studies, and broader enhancement initiatives.

6.3.3 Industry Trends Program

The NRC staff has implemented the Industry Trends Program since 2001, to confirm safe

operation of nuclear power plants at an industry level and to increase public confidence in the

effectiveness of the NRC’s processes. The agency uses industry-level indicators to identify

adverse trends in performance. After assessing industry trends for safety significance, the NRC

responds to any identified safety issues, including adjusting the inspection and licensing

programs. Inspection Manual Chapter 0313, “Industry Trends Program,” dated

January 26, 2016, provides more detail about the program.

The Reactor Oversight Process uses both plant-level performance indicators and inspections

to provide plant-specific oversight of safety performance, whereas the Industry Trends Program

provides a way to assess overall industry performance using industry-level indicators. The NRC

evaluates the issues identified through either program using information from agency databases

and addresses those determined to have generic safety significance, including generic safety

inspections under the Reactor Oversight Process, the generic communications process, and the

generic safety issue process.

One output of the Industry Trends Program is the annual agency performance measures

reported to Congress on the number of statistically significant adverse industry trends. The NRC

Performance and Accountability Report includes this outcome measure. The latest report,

NUREG-1542, Volume 21, “Performance and Accountability Report - Fiscal Year 2015,” was

issued in November 2015.

Based on the information currently available from the industry-level indicators and the Accident

Sequence Precursor Program (discussed in Section 6.3.4 of this report), no statistically

significant adverse industry trends requiring generic action were identified in FY 2015.

In addition to long-term trending of the data to identify statistically significant adverse trends, the

NRC staff uses a statistical approach based on prediction limits to identify potential short-term,

year-to-year emergent issues before they become long-term trends. None of the indicators

exceeded its short-term prediction limits in FY 2015.

In 2008, the NRC staff implemented the Baseline Risk Index for Initiating Events (BRIIE) as part

of the Industry Trends Program. The BRIIE tracks several types of events that could initiate a

challenge to a plant’s safety systems. The number of times that each event occurs is compared

with a predetermined number of occurrences for that event. If the predetermined number is

exceeded, one can infer possible degradation of industry safety performance. This annual

tracking allows the NRC to intervene and engage the nuclear industry before any long-term

adverse trends in performance emerge. None of the initiating events tracked by the BRIIE

exceeded its prediction limit in FY 2015.

SECY-16-0044, “Fiscal Year 2015 Results of the Industry Trends Program for Operating Power

Reactors,” dated April 5, 2016, which is available on the NRC public Web site, provides more

details on the Industry Trends Program results for FY 2015.

The Industry Trends Program will be discontinued in 2016, as a result of Project Aim, which is

the NRC’s effort to develop an integrated prioritization and re-baselining of agency activities. It

has been determined that, while the Industry Trends Program provides data that has helped

validate broad industry performance trends, no regulatory action has ever resulted from its

insights. The NRC has noted that any negative trends in industry performance that the Industry

Trends Program could highlight would be self-revealing or identified through other means, such

as routine licensee performance assessment, the Reactor Oversight Process self-assessment,

end-of-cycle assessment meetings, and the operating experience program.

6.3.4 Accident Sequence Precursor Program

The Accident Sequence Precursor Program systematically evaluates U.S. nuclear power plant

operating experience to identify, document, and rank the operating events most likely to lead to

inadequate core cooling and severe core damage (i.e., precursors). This program provides a

comprehensive, risk-informed view of nuclear power plant operating experience and a measure

for trending nuclear power plant core damage risk; provides a partial check on dominant core

damage scenarios predicted by PRAs; and provides feedback to regulatory activities.

To identify potential precursors, the NRC reviews plant events from licensee event reports and

inspection reports. The staff then analyzes any identified potential precursors by calculating the

probability of an event leading to a core damage state. A plant event can be one of two types,

either (1) an occurrence of an initiating event, such as a reactor shutdown or a loss of offsite

power, with or without any subsequent equipment unavailability or degradation, or (2) a

degraded plant condition, depicted by the unavailability or degradation of equipment without the

occurrence of an initiating event.

The Accident Sequence Precursor Program considers an event with a conditional core damage

probability or an increase in core damage probability greater than or equal to 1×10^-6 to be a

precursor. The Accident Sequence Precursor Program defines a significant precursor as an

event with a conditional core damage probability or an increase in core damage probability

greater than or equal to 1×10^-3.

The NRC also uses the Accident Sequence Precursor Program results to monitor performance

against performance indicators in the agency’s Congressional Budget Justification and Industry

Trends Program, as well as in reports to Congress on events of high safety significance in

accordance with abnormal occurrence criteria. Included in the Accident Sequence Precursor

Program are the following inputs to programs and reports:

Number of significant precursor events for the annual Congressional Budget

Justification. Accident Sequence Precursor Program results are used as one of several

inputs to the performance indicator “Number of malfunctions, deficiencies, events, or

conditions at commercial nuclear power plants (operating or under construction) that

meet or exceed abnormal occurrence criteria II.A though II.D.”

Description of significant precursor events for the annual abnormal occurrence report to

Congress in accordance with Criterion II.C of NUREG-0090, Volume 37, “Report to

Congress on Abnormal Occurrences Fiscal Year 2014,” dated May 2015.

The staff completed precursor trend analyses as part of the annual Accident Sequence

Precursor Program status report provided to the Commission in SECY-15-0124, “Status of the

Accident Sequence Precursor Program and the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Models,”

dated October 5, 2015. The report provided insights such as the following:

No significant precursors were identified in FY 2014.

No statistically significant trend was identified for all precursors during the FY 2005

through FY 2014 period.

In the FY 2012 and FY 2013 annual report, statistically significant increasing trends were

identified in the mean occurrence rate of precursors with a conditional core damage

probability or Δ core damage probability greater than or equal to 1×10^-4. As reported in

SECY-14-0107, “Status of the Accident Sequence Precursor Program and the

Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Models” dated October 6, 2014, six of the seven

precursors in this group were caused by multiple electrical failures during a 3-year

period. The staff initiated a detailed study in FY 2014 to better understand the

contribution of electrical system and associated component failures on risk at U.S.

nuclear power plants. Results for this study should be available in FY 2017.

For the period of FY 2005 through FY 2014, the staff found a statistically significant

increasing trend in the mean occurrence rate of precursors resulting from a loss of offsite

power initiating event. The staff initiated a detailed study in FY 2014 to better understand

the increasing trend. Results for this study should be available in FY 2017.

6.3.5 Operating Experience Program

The NRC recognizes that the effective use of operating experience is important for the agency’s

safety mission. Under the current NRC Strategic Plan, the agency is committed to using lessons

learned from domestic and international operating experience and other sources as part of its

effort to achieve the goal of safety. As a result, the NRC’s emphasis on the effective use of

operating experience remains strong.

The fundamental aim of the Operating Experience Program is to collect, evaluate,

communicate, and apply operating experience information to achieve the NRC’s principal safety

mission of protecting people and the environment. Operating experience is reported to the NRC

in licensee event notifications and in many other reports submitted under licensee reporting

requirements, and described in reports of operating experience at foreign facilities. Sources of

foreign operating experience include events submitted under the International Nuclear and

Radiological Event Scale and reports submitted to the International Reporting System for

Operating Experience. NRC staff systematically screens nuclear reactor-related operating

experience for safety significance and generic implications. The NRC staff also determines the

need for further action and application of lessons learned related to plant operating experience.

To support its safety mission, the NRC has resources dedicated to the review of operating

experience. The NRC collects, stores, screens, and communicates operating experience;

conducts and coordinates the evaluation of operating experience; tracks the application of

operating experience lessons learned; and coordinates NRC operating experience activities with

other organizations performing related functions.

Since the program’s launch, the NRC has maintained an internal Web site to provide a

centralized source for accessing reactor operating experience information. This Web site is a

gateway to the agency’s operating experience document collections, contacts, search tools,

sources, and reference material. In addition, the Web site allows the NRC to quickly

disseminate operating experience to the appropriate technical staff. The agency’s public Web

site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/ contains all of the event

reports licensees have submitted to the NRC.

Section 19.7 of this report provides more information about this program.

6.3.6 Generic Issues Program

The U.S. Congress mandated that the NRC maintain a Generic Issues Program to address

issues that have significant generic implications related to safety or security that cannot be more

appropriately addressed by other regulatory programs or processes. Sources of proposed

generic issues include safety evaluations, operational events, and suggestions from NRC staff

members, outside organizations, or members of the general public. For emergent issues that

demand immediate attention, there are other existing NRC programs to make timely decisions,

including issuing immediately effective orders, or if necessary, requiring a plant to shut down.

The Generic Issues Program consists of three stages for processing a generic issue:

screening, assessment, and regulatory office implementation. A review panel, consisting of

NRC staff with appropriate skill sets, makes the determination if the proposed issue meets the

requirements to proceed from one stage to the next. During the screening stage, the proposed

issue is evaluated to determine if it satisfies all the following seven screening criteria:

(1)

affects public health and safety, security, or the environment

(2)

applies to two or more facilities

(3)

is not being addressed through other regulatory processes or voluntary industry

initiatives

(4)

can be resolved by new or revised regulation, policy, or guidance

(5)

risk or safety significance can be adequately determined or estimated

(6)

issue is well defined and discrete

(7)

may involve review, analysis, or action by the licensee

If the proposed issue meets all the screening criteria, it proceeds forward to the assessment

stage. In the assessment stage, the staff evaluates the potential impacts that the proposed

issue has on licensees and determines whether the risk is significant enough to warrant

additional, or changes to, regulatory requirements or guidance. In the regulatory office

implementation stage, the appropriate NRC office develops the necessary regulatory actions to

resolve the issue to ensure that adequate safety is maintained at the affected facilities.

Depending on the safety significance of the proposed issue, these regulatory actions can

include issuing generic communications (e.g., GLs), ordering facilities to backfit changes, and a

rulemaking. The Generic Issues Program staff track the status of the generic issue until all

required actions are taken and the issue is closed. Additional information regarding the Generic

Issues Program can be found in the NRC public Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/about-

nrc/regulatory/gen-issues.html, as well as a history of generic issues that is maintained in

NUREG-0933, “Resolution of Generic Safety Issues.”

6.3.7 Rulemaking

The NRC’s rulemaking process is used to impose new or to revise current requirements that

licensees must meet to obtain or retain a license or certificate to use nuclear materials or to

operate a nuclear facility. A congressional mandate, an Executive Order, a petition for

rulemaking from outside the NRC, or an internal recommendation from the technical staff may

result in the NRC staff’s decision to pursue a rulemaking. The NRC recently made changes to

enhance Commission involvement in the rulemaking process with the objective of ensuring early

Commission engagement before expending significant NRC staff resources. One of the

changes requires the NRC staff to prepare a streamlined rulemaking plan before initiating a new

rulemaking activity that is not a staff-delegated rulemaking. The Commission reviews this plan

and issues its decision (e.g., approval or denial) in the form of a Staff Requirements

Memorandum. Another change is that the NRC staff will request approval from the Commission

to discontinue or delay rulemaking activities. The staff may request that a rulemaking activity be

discontinued or delayed at any stage in the rulemaking process. As a result of recent Project

Aim rebaselining evaluations, the NRC has discontinued or delayed a number of low-priority

rulemaking activities in various stages of development.

Typically, the NRC publishes a proposed rule in the Federal Register for public comment. The

public is usually given 75 to 90 days to provide written comments for consideration. Generally,

all rules are issued for public comment. Those rules exempted from public comment deal with

agency organization, procedure, or practice; are interpretive rules or general statements of

policy; or are rules for which delaying their publication to receive comments would be contrary to

public interest, unnecessary, or impracticable. Once the public comment period has closed, the

staff analyzes the comments, makes any needed changes, and forwards the final rule for

approval, signature, and publication in the Federal Register.

The NRC uses the Web site http://www.regulations.gov to provide an easy way for members of

the public to access and comment on NRC rulemaking actions. The Web site contains proposed

and final rulemakings that have been published in the Federal Register and any comments

received, petitions for rulemaking, and other types of documents related to rulemaking

proceedings.

The Commission must approve each final rule that involves matters of policy. The Executive

Director for Operations is authorized to approve final rules that are minor, corrective, or

nonpolicy in nature. Once approved, the final rule is published in the Federal Register and

usually will become effective 30 days after the date of publication. Final rules that are

considered major (e.g., have a significant impact on the economy) become effective at least

60 days after the date of publication. Section 1.3.3 of this report summarizes the significant

nuclear reactor-related rules issued since the previous U.S. National Report.

6.3.8 Fire Protection Regulation Program

The NRC has two main foci in fire protection regulation:

(1) implementation of the new

risk-informed, performance-based fire protection licensing basis (10 CFR 50.48(c)); and

(2) resolution of the fire-induced multiple spurious operation and circuit analysis issue.

To support the implementation of 10 CFR 50.48(c), the NRC issued RG 1.205, Revision 1,

“Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection for Existing Light-Water Nuclear Power

Plants,” dated December 2009, and NUREG/CR-6850, Supplement 1, “EPRI/NRC-RES Fire

PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities,” published in September 2010, reflecting

lessons learned from the pilot application reviews. Two nuclear stations, Shearon Harris and

Oconee, volunteered as pilot plants for the transition. The NRC reviewed these license

amendment requests and issued safety evaluations in May and December 2010, respectively.

By 2010, approximately one half of the U.S. reactor units had committed to transition to

10 CFR 50.48(c). The NRC also developed guidance to conduct triennial fire inspections of

plants after they complete their transitions to the 10 CFR 50.48(c) licensing bases. As of

July 2016, 28 plants, representing 44 units submitted license applications to transition to

10 CFR 50.48(c). Nineteen license amendments have been issued, and nine are still under

review. One additional license application representing two units is expected.

Challenges associated with the completion of the 10 CFR 50.48(c) reviews include:

licensee-initiated rework, lengthy response times to requests for additional information,

licensee-initiated technical changes to their license application within the final weeks of the

review, increased technical complexity, and licensee use of new or refined methods that were

not included in previously issued regulatory guidance. The staff overcame these challenges but

they impacted the schedule for completing the safety evaluation reports.

Nuclear power plants that are not transitioning to, or have not completed, their transitions to the

risk-informed, performance-based fire protection rule are regulated under their current licensing

bases. RG 1.189, “Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants,” Revision 2, issued in

October 2009, provides regulatory guidance for licensees on fire protection issues, including the

treatment of fire-induced circuit failures in response to fire damage. The NRC staff is working

with industry stakeholders to enhance guidance regarding fire-induced multiple spurious

operations through the planned development of Volume 3 to NUREG/CR-7150, “Joint

Assessment of Cable Damage and Quantification of Effects from Fire (JACQUE-FIRE).”

Plants that are not transitioning, or have not completed their transition, to 10 CFR 50.48(c) are

inspected under IP 71111.05T, “Fire Protection (Triennial),” dated January 31, 2013. Plants that

have completed their transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c) are inspected under IP 71111.05XT, “Fire

Protection - NFPA 805 (Triennial),” dated April 19, 2011. Findings identified for licensees under

both regulatory frameworks are evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F,

“Fire Protection Significance Determination Process,” dated September 20, 2013. Fire

protection enforcement discretion has ended for sites not transitioning to 10 CFR 50.48(c).

The NRC’s fire research program develops the technical bases for ongoing and future

regulatory activities in fire protection and fire risk analysis. The NRC’s current research program

includes the following activities:

developing and improving fire risk analysis methods and tools

collecting, generating and analyzing fire-related data

verifying, validating and improving fire models for regulatory use

performing specialized fire testing on electrical cables for hot shorts and fire properties

evaluating shipping casks for beyond-design-basis fire conditions

evaluating methods to predict operator performance during fire conditions

providing specialized training on the fire PRA and fire modeling

The fire research program supports the agency’s strategic goals of safety and effectiveness and

partners with other organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology,

the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the University of Maryland, and international

groups such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Committee on

the Safety of Nuclear Installations.

6.3.9 Decommissioning

The decommissioning process consists of a series of integrated activities, beginning with the

nuclear facility transitioning from “operation” to “decommissioning” status and concluding with

termination of the license, and release of the site. The NRC has adopted extensive regulations

to ensure that decommissioning is accomplished safely and that residual radioactivity is reduced

to a level that permits release of the property for either unrestricted or restricted use (Subpart E,

“Radiological Criteria for License Termination,” to 10 CFR Part 20, “Standards for Protection

against Radiation”). The NRC reviews and approves license termination plans, conducts

inspections, processes license amendments, and monitors the status of decommissioning

activities to ensure that radioactive contamination is reduced or stabilized. In addition, the

decommissioning process includes several opportunities for public involvement.

In 2011, the NRC issued the Decommissioning Planning Rule, which updated 10 CFR 20.1406,

“Minimization of Contamination,” and 10 CFR 20.1501, “General.” The design criteria for new

facility construction discussed in 10 CFR 20.1406 requires applicants to describe how facility

design and procedures will facilitate eventual decommissioning and minimize, to the extent

practicable, the release of radioactive materials to the environment and the generation of

radioactive waste.

To strengthen future decommissioning at existing operating facilities, 10 CFR 20.1501 requires

surveys to identify contamination that would require remediation for license termination.

Guidance implementing the rule was provided in RG 4.22, “Decommissioning Planning during

Operations,” issued in December 2012. The IAEA safety standards are a useful point of

reference for future decommissioning provisions in the conceptual design of nuclear facilities.

NRC regulations and guidance (e.g., NUREG-1577, “Standard Review Plan on Power Reactor

Licensee Financial Qualifications and Decommissioning Funding Assurance,” Revision 1,

issued in February 1999) describe requirements and processes to review power reactor

licensee financial qualifications and methods of providing decommissioning funding assurance.

The regulations, as stated in 10 CFR 50.75, “Reporting and Recordkeeping for

Decommissioning Planning,” explain the requirements for decommissioning funding and

decommissioning funding assurance.

The NRC has determined that spent fuel can safely remain stored in the SFPs or in dry cask

storage facilities until a geologic repository is built and operating (see Section 1.3.3 of this report

for further details on Continued Storage). The NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 and

10 CFR Part 72, “Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel,

High-Level Radioactive Waste, Reactor-Related Greater than Class C Waste,” contain licensing

requirements to maintain spent fuel integrity.

The current NRC reactor decommissioning requirements have been safely implemented. Since

the early 1980s, 10 power reactors have been decommissioned and their licenses terminated.

However, reactors undergoing decommissioning required several exemptions from the NRC’s

regulations to reflect their decommissioning status. As discussed in Section 1.3.2 of this report,

the NRC has initiated a new decommissioning rulemaking process that may seek to provide an

efficient, open, and clear decommissioning process by reducing the need for exemptions from

existing regulations, addressing the appropriateness of maintaining these existing options for

decommissioning and the 60-year timeframe for decommissioning, evaluating the advisability of

requiring a licensee’s Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activity Report to be approved by the

NRC, and determining the appropriate role of state and local governments and non-

governmental stakeholders in the decommissioning process.

6.3.10 Reactor Safety Research Program

The NRC conducts reactor safety research to support its mission of ensuring that its licensees

safely design, construct, and operate light water nuclear reactor facilities. The agency carries

out this research program to (1) identify, evaluate, and resolve safety issues, (2) ensure that an

independent technical basis exists to review licensee submittals, (3) evaluate operating

experience and results of risk assessments for safety implications, and (4) support the

development and use of risk-informed regulatory approaches. The NRC has an office dedicated

to agency research activities that plays a similar role to a technical support organization in other

countries. In conducting the Reactor Safety Research Program, the NRC anticipates challenges

that the introduction of new technologies poses. The NRC also continues to seek out

opportunities to leverage its resources through domestic and international cooperative research

programs with other U.S. government agencies, industry organizations, and international

regulatory counterparts and technical support organizations. The NRC is careful to maintain its

independence and not cede its regulatory decisionmaking role to any external entities. The NRC

also continues to provide opportunities for stakeholder involvement and feedback on its

research program.

The NRC Reactor Safety Research Program also supports the agency’s preapplication reviews

for advanced nonlight-water reactor designs. In the preapplication phase, the NRC interacts with

prospective design certification applicants to address topics that would benefit both the

applicant and the staff in preparing for a design certification application. The Commission’s

“Policy Statement on the Regulation of Advanced Reactors,” (73 FR 60612, dated

October 14, 2008), encourages early interactions on such advanced designs to facilitate the

resolution of safety issues early in the design process. In addition, the agency will conduct

research to address technical issues that it anticipates will arise during its review of advanced

reactor designs.

6.3.11 Public Participation

The NRC believes that nuclear regulation should be conducted as openly as possible. Ensuring

appropriate openness explicitly recognizes the public must be informed about, and have a

reasonable opportunity to participate meaningfully in, the NRC’s regulatory processes.

The NRC extends opportunities to participate in the agency’s regulatory process to a diverse

body of stakeholders, including the general public, Congress, other Federal agencies, States,

local governmental bodies, Indian tribes, industry, technical societies, the international

community, and citizen groups. Numerous NRC programs and processes provide the public

with accessibility to NRC staff and other resources; seek to make communication with

stakeholders more clear, accurate, reliable, objective, and timely; and help to ensure that the

reporting of nuclear power plants’ performance is open and objective. The agency has

developed Web sites and has used other electronic social media (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, and

the NRC blog) to disseminate timely, accurate information on issues of interest to the public or

events at nuclear facilities. The NRC seeks public involvement early in the regulatory process to

promptly address any safety concerns. In addition to the formal petition and hearing processes

integrated into the licensing program, the agency also uses feedback forms at public meetings

to obtain public input. Section 7.2.2 of this report provides more information about the NRC’s

hearing process. Section 8.1.7 provides more information on the tools that the NRC uses to

ensure openness and transparency in its work.

The NRC manages its rulemaking dockets using the Federal Docket Management System, a

tool that provides a single point of access at http://www.regulations.gov across the Federal

Government. Through this Web site, the public can access thousands of documents related to

rulemaking actions that the NRC has conducted from May 1996 to the present. The

documents featured on this Web site include public comments, petitions for rulemaking,

Federal Register notices, and their supporting materials. The public is also able to search the

NRC’s official records with ease by using the NRC’s ADAMS, which can be accessed at

http://adams.nrc.gov/wba/.

Fostering an environment in which safety issues can be identified openly without fear of

retribution is of paramount importance to the NRC. The agency has established tools that the

public, industry, and NRC employees can use to raise safety concerns (as discussed in

Section 10.4.2 of this report), including the NRC’s petition process under 10 CFR 2.206,

“Requests for Action under this Subpart”; safety conscious work environment guidance

documents and related regulatory programs; and the Allegation Program.

The NRC’s petition process regulations in 10 CFR 2.206 allow any member of the public to raise

potential health and safety concerns and ask the agency to take specific enforcement actions

against an NRC licensee. If warranted, the NRC can modify, suspend, or revoke a license, or

take other appropriate enforcement action, to resolve a problem identified in the petition.

The NRC’s procedures governing this petition process emphasize a timely response to the

petitioner and encourage increased, direct involvement of the petitioner (in addition to

involvement of the licensee) by allowing the petitioner to address the petition review board

personally and comment on the agency’s decision.

Additionally, any member of the public may petition the NRC to develop, change, or rescind a

rule under 10 CFR 2.802, “Petition for Rulemaking.” Upon receiving the petition, the NRC

evaluates whether the petition meets the threshold requirements in 10 CFR 2.802(c). If it does,

the NRC dockets the petition and assigns it a petition number. If the petition does not meet the

threshold requirements, the NRC sends a letter to the petitioner explaining why the petition does

not meet those requirements. If the petition for rulemaking meets the NRC’s requirements for

docketing, then the NRC usually publishes a notice of docketing of the petition in the Federal

for rulemaking, that notice of docketing offers a public comment period. The NRC evaluates the

petition and any comments received and may either determine to consider the petition in a

current or future rulemaking (“enter the issues into the rulemaking process”) or deny the petition

(in its entirety or in part). If the NRC denies a petition, the NRC publishes a notice of denial in

the Federal Register. This notice of denial addresses any public comments received on the

petition and the reason for denying the petition.

If the NRC decides to enter the issues into the rulemaking process, the NRC then addresses the

issues in the same manner and using the same criteria (e.g., risk significance, costs and

benefits as evaluated in a regulatory analysis, backfitting and issue finality) as any other issue

that is the subject of rulemaking. If the NRC believes that rulemaking action is justified, then the

NRC publishes a proposed rule addressing the issues raised in the petition. This action is

followed by a public comment period and publication of a final rule. If, as a result of the

rulemaking process, the NRC decides not to take action addressing some or all of the issues in

the petition for rulemaking, then the NRC publishes a notice setting forth the reasons for

deciding not to take action on those issues originally raised in the petition; this constitutes the

“final denial” of the petition for rulemaking with respect to those issues.

In addition to these formal processes, the NRC encourages workers in the nuclear industry to

take their concerns directly to their employers. The agency is vigilant about fostering a

safety-conscious work environment both within the NRC and within the nuclear industry that

encourages reporting of safety and regulatory issues. The NRC expects licensees and other

employers subject to NRC authority to establish and maintain a work environment in which

employees do not fear retribution by a licensee for raising concerns about safety or regulatory

issues. Within the NRC, the agency emphasizes the importance of fostering and maintaining an

open, collaborative work environment that encourages all NRC employees and contractors to

promptly share concerns and differing views without fear of negative consequences. These

expectations are communicated through the NRC’s Safety Culture Policy Statement

(76 FR 34773, dated June 14, 2011), safety conscious work environment guidance documents,

and other related regulatory tools such as safety culture case studies.

10 In some circumstances, the NRC may determine that the issues raised in the petition for rulemaking should be

immediately considered in a rulemaking. In such cases, the NRC places the petition’s issues in the rulemaking

process without opening a petition for rulemaking docket, and publishes a notice of that action in the Federal

Additionally, workers and members of the public may bring their concerns about safety or

regulatory issues directly to the NRC. The agency maintains a tollfree safety hotline for reporting

such concerns. NRC management, staff, and inspectors, including the resident inspectors at

plant sites, are trained and available to receive such concerns. Workers and members of the

public also may report concerns by email to the NRC’s Allegation Program.

Historically, industry workers or members of the public report approximately 500 potential

allegations directly to the NRC Allegation Program each year. The NRC developed the

Allegation Program to establish a formal process for evaluating and responding to each issue.

The program’s primary purpose is to provide an alternative method for individuals to raise safety

or regulatory issues and have them addressed. About 70 percent of the issues reported to the

NRC are from licensee employees, employees of contractors to licensees, or former employees

of licensees or contractors. The NRC staff evaluates each issue to determine whether it can

verify the issue and, if so, the effect of the issue on public safety. This evaluation process

involves an engineering review, inspection, or investigation by the NRC staff, or an evaluation

by the licensee that is independently assessed by the NRC staff. Historically, the NRC has been

able to substantiate about 20 percent of the allegations received. If the evaluation reveals a

violation of regulatory requirements, the agency takes appropriate enforcement action.

Additionally, the NRC informs, in writing, the individual who raised the issue of the results of its

evaluation, except in limited instances when sensitive security-related matters are involved.

6.4 Fukushima Lessons Learned

The flexibility of the existing NRC regulatory processes has enabled the United States to

effectively implement lessons learned from the accident. The NRC has the authority to take

necessary actions to protect public health and safety, and may demand immediate licensee

response, including plant shut down, if necessary. The NRC took prompt action following the

Fukushima accident through the issuance of orders, implementation of focused inspections,

development of INs to the industry, and issuance of bulletins to confirm that there were no

imminent safety concerns at American nuclear facilities. Because no imminent safety issue

existed, no nuclear power plants in the United States were shut down as a result of the accident

in Japan.

The NRC continues to implement Fukushima lessons learned within existing regulatory

processes that include review of industry response to orders, requests for information,

inspections, use of operating experience, rulemaking, and conducting additional research.

6.5 Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety

The mission of the NRC is to protect public health and safety, and the environment. The NRC’s

primary goals are ensuring the safe and secure use of radioactive materials. The agency

achieves this goal by ensuring that licensee performance is at or above acceptable safety

levels. As discussed in Section 6.1, the NRC’s licensees are responsible for designing,

constructing, and operating nuclear facilities safely, while the NRC is responsible for the

regulatory oversight of the licensees to:

Prevent and mitigate accidents and ensure radiation safety

Ensure protection of nuclear facilities and radioactive materials

Nuclear power plants must meet the NRC’s safety, security, technical and financial qualification

requirements codified in 10 CFR Chapter I. These regulations serve to prevent accidents and

mitigate adverse consequences in a manner that effectively minimizes the potential for (and

therefore addresses the risk of adverse consequences associated with) unintended releases of

radioactive materials. Because NRC requirements protect public health and safety through

prevention of accidents and by mitigating releases in the event of an accident, the risk of offsite

contamination is rendered acceptably low as an indirect benefit, rather than as a direct

performance goal.

The NRC uses deterministic, risk-informed, performance-based, and defense-in-depth

requirements to achieve this goal. The NRC’s defense-in-depth philosophy includes:

(1) the

need to prevent accidents from occurring and mitigating accidents if they occur, (2) the concept

of multiple barriers against radioactive releases, and (3) the application of the principles of

independence, redundancy and diversity, which is implemented through requirements such as

the “single failure” assumption. Thus, the NRC’s current regulatory approach provides

reasonable assurance that an accident resulting in long-term offsite contamination is unlikely.

Section 18.1 of this report discusses the NRC’s defense-in-depth philosophy in more detail.

As described in Section 14.1.5.1 of this report, the NRC carries out many regulatory activities

that, when considered together, constitute a process providing ongoing reasonable assurance

that the licensing bases of nuclear power plants provide adequate protection of public health

and safety. This process includes inspections (both periodic regional inspections as well as daily

oversight by the resident inspectors), audits, investigations, evaluations of operating experience,

regulatory research, and other regulatory actions to resolve identified issues.

In light of the Fukushima accident, the NRC has taken many actions to strengthen the protection

of U.S. nuclear plants against events that could exceed a plant’s design basis. For example, the

NRC issued regulatory requirements, in the form of three orders, based on the lessons learned

from Fukushima. The three orders required safety enhancements of operating reactors,

construction permit holders, and combined license holders. These orders required nuclear

power plants to implement safety enhancements related to:

(1) mitigation strategies to

respond to external events resulting in the loss of all AC power at plants, (2) ensuring reliable

severe accident capable hardened containment vents for Mark I and II boiling-water reactors

designs, and (3) enhancing SFP instrumentation. Operating plants were required to begin

implementation of the safety enhancements promptly and complete implementation within two

refueling outages or by December 31, 2016, whichever came first. In the case of the

containment vents, the NRC revised its original order for hardened vents for BWRs with Mark I

and II containments to include additional requirements for those vents to have capabilities to be

operated under severe accident conditions. This revision resulted in a change to the required

date for full implementation to be achieved. The NRC has taken other actions to address the

adequacy of nuclear power plant design with respect to natural hazards (e.g., seismicity, and

flooding). The NRC is continuing its post-Fukushima activities through the development of a

new regulation for mitigating beyond-design basis events. The NRC’s response to Fukushima

reflects the NRC’s regulatory approach of promptly addressing potentially significant safety

issues at the time they are discovered, and taking appropriate action in a timely fashion, rather

than awaiting a periodic review. Section 1.3.1 of this report provides a complete description of

NRC post-Fukushima activities.

Additionally, as described in Section 16.5 of this report, the NRC’s Reactor Oversight Process

specifically addresses emergency preparedness, and the NRC’s enforcement program, which is

described in Section 9.3 of this report, ensures that safety improvements are implemented

promptly. Furthermore, at each license renewal of a nuclear power plant, the NRC performs a

safety review of systems, structures and components that the NRC has concluded require a

formal review. A description of the NRC’s license renewal program is discussed in

Section 14.1.4 of this report. Furthermore, a detailed description of the NRC’s regulatory

approach in ensuring that adequate protection continues to be provided by nuclear power plants

on a continuing basis throughout operation is set forth in NUREG-1412, “Foundation of the

Adequacy of the Licensing Basis,” issued in December 1991.

Finally, the NRC actively participates in the development of the IAEA safety standards. The

NRC is represented at the IAEA Commission on Safety Standards and all IAEA Safety

Standards Committees by senior executive managers. The NRC also ensures that NRC

regulations are consistent with IAEA safety standards. In addition, the NRC reviews IAEA safety

standards when revising guidance in regulatory guides, to gain insights. Additional information

about how the IAEA safety standards are used at the NRC can be found in Section 8.1.5.1 of

this report.

ARTICLE 7. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory

framework to govern the safety of nuclear installations.

The legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:

(i)

the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and

regulations

(ii)

a system of licensing with regard to nuclear installations and the

prohibition of the operation of a nuclear installation without a license

(iii)

a system of regulatory inspection and assessment of nuclear installations

to ascertain compliance with applicable regulations and the terms of

licenses

(iv)

the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of licenses,

including suspension, modification, or revocation

This section explains the legislative and regulatory framework governing the U.S. nuclear

industry. It discusses the provisions of that framework for establishing national safety

requirements and regulations and systems for licensing, inspection, and enforcement.

The United States did not change the legislative framework governing the U.S. nuclear industry

as a result of the Fukushima accident. The U.S. NRC has taken the necessary regulatory

actions in response to the accident, as described in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.3 of this report,

under the existing framework.

7.1 Legislative and Regulatory Framework

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, passed by Congress and signed into law by the President,

established the Atomic Energy Commission and the legal framework for all subsequent

regulation of nuclear installations. However, as is generally the case with most laws, this act

provided general principles and concepts and left the regulatory body (now the NRC) to address

the details through specific regulations. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, likewise

passed by Congress and signed into law by the President, abolished the Atomic Energy

Commission and created the NRC to regulate commercial nuclear activities and the U.S. Energy

Research and Development Administration (ERDA) to continue Government-sponsored nuclear

activities. ERDA was subsequently incorporated into the U.S. DOE. The Administrative

Procedure Act provides the general rules and procedures through which the Atomic Energy Act

is implemented.

The United States has also ratified various international conventions that affect nuclear safety:

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ratified in 1970, governs the

NRC’s export licensing activities.

The U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, ratified in 1980, requires eligible facilities in the

United States to report material accounting data on declared nuclear material. The

Agreement further requires eligible facilities to submit to IAEA inspections. The

Additional Protocol to the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, ratified in 2004,

strengthened IAEA reporting and access rights for eligible facilities.

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, ratified in 1982, requires

NRC licensees to take steps to protect nuclear material during international transport.

The Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,

ratified in 2015, strengthens obligations for the physical protection of nuclear material in

domestic use, storage, and transport, and for the protection of nuclear material and

nuclear facilities from sabotage.

The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, ratified in 1988, requires the

NRC to help the U.S. Department of State report significant accidents to IAEA and any

State affected by a transboundary radioactive release.

The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological

Emergency, ratified in 1988, requires the NRC to help the U.S. Department of State

respond to requests for assistance in the event of a foreign nuclear accident or

emergency.

The Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), ratified in 1999, calls for periodic review

meetings of all the Contracting Parties. Before the review meeting, the CNS requires the

United States to submit a National Report that details the U.S. commitment to nuclear

safety.

The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of

Radioactive Waste Management (“Joint Convention”), ratified in 2003, requires the

United States to take steps to ensure that individuals and the environment are protected

against radiological hazards at all stages of radioactive waste and spent fuel

management. The Joint Convention further calls for periodic review meetings of all the

Contracting Parties. Before the review meeting, each Contracting Party must submit a

national report that addresses measures taken to implement the obligations under the

Joint Convention.

The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, ratified in 2008,

requires the United States to ensure that adequate compensation exists in the event that

“nuclear damage” results from a nuclear incident.

7.2

Provisions of the Legislative and Regulatory Framework

7.2.1 National Safety Requirements and Regulations

In addition to the Atomic Energy Act, several statutes (listed in previous U.S. National Reports

and briefly described in Section 8.1.2.1) have substantial bearing on the Commission’s practices

and procedures. Furthermore, various U.S. Presidents have issued executive orders and

directives that affect nuclear safety. For example, President Reagan issued Executive Order

12656, “Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities,” on November 18, 1988.

This Executive Order assigned certain emergency preparedness responsibilities to the NRC in

case of a national emergency. Likewise, in the wake of the Three Mile Island accident,

President Carter directed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to direct all offsite

emergency activities and review emergency plans in States with operating reactors. As another

example, the NRC has voluntarily complied with President Clinton’s Executive Order 12898,

“Federal Actions To Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income

Populations,” dated February 11, 1994, which requires Federal agencies to consider whether

their programs or policies have a disproportionately adverse health or environmental effect on

minority populations.

The NRC has implemented these statutes and executive orders through regulation and

guidance. Specifically, 10 CFR, Chapter I, governs, among other things, the licensing of nuclear

installations. The NRC established these regulations through informal, “notice-and-comment”

rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act. In short, these rulemaking

procedures typically include:

(1) publishing a proposed rule for public comment; (2) after

considering comments, providing public notice of the issuance of the final rule and an effective

date for the final rule; and (3) including a statement of the rule’s basis and purpose. Once

these final rules are in place, they are binding on the applicable regulated entities (including

operators of nuclear installations) and can be substantively revised only through a new notice-

and-comment rulemaking. This ensures that interested parties remain both informed of, and

involved with, any changes to the NRC’s regulatory scheme.

7.2.2 Licensing of Nuclear Installations

The NRC is responsible for licensing of all commercial and industrial nuclear production and

utilization facilities or installations, including nuclear power reactors, in the United States. As

discussed in Section 8.1.2.1 of this report, Federal Government facilities that are operated by or

for DOE are not subject to NRC licensing under the Atomic Energy Act and the Energy

Reorganization Act except where specifically provided by law. The Atomic Energy Act, Chapter

10, Section 101, prohibits possession and operation of a production and utilization facility

without a valid license issued by the NRC. Section 103, which applies to facilities for industrial

or commercial purposes, also states that such licenses are subject to conditions that the NRC

may establish by rule or regulation to carry out the purposes and provisions of the Atomic

Energy Act.

The Atomic Energy Act, Section 189a, provides interested parties with an opportunity for

hearing in proceedings for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of licenses

(including renewed operating licenses and construction permits for facilities). Hearings are

conducted under procedural rules stated in 10 CFR Part 2, “Agency Rules of Practice and

Procedure,” and, in particular, Subpart C, “Rules of General Applicability: Hearing Requests,

Petitions to Intervene, Availability of Documents, Selection of Specific Hearing Procedures,

Presiding Officer Powers, and General Hearing Management for NRC Adjudicatory Hearings,”

in conjunction with the subpart of 10 CFR Part 2 that governs the particular proceeding. The

NRC staff participates as a party in almost all hearings. Hearings are usually held before a

three-member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, which is generally comprised of one lawyer

and two technical members, but hearings also may be conducted by a single licensing board

member (i.e., presiding officer) or the Commission.

Two alternative approaches for NRC licensing of nuclear reactor facilities exist. The original

licensing approach, under 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization

Facilities,” requires two steps. In the first step, the NRC reviews a preliminary application and

decides whether to grant a construction permit. In the second step, the agency reviews the final

application and decides whether to grant an operating license. The NRC licensed all current

operating nuclear power plants in the United States according to this process.

In 1989, the Commission established an alternative licensing system, published in

10 CFR Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” which

provides for combined licenses that resolve all safety issues before construction, and early site

permits that can resolve most siting issues separate from a license application. The basic

concept underlying 10 CFR Part 52 is to provide for early resolution of licensing issues by

approving nuclear reactor designs through generic rulemaking (design certification). Once the

designs are approved (i.e., certified), an applicant can reference them in applications for

permission to build and operate nuclear power plants without needing to relitigate, in individual

hearings, the issues resolved in the design certification rulemaking.

Under the combined license process in 10 CFR Part 52, the NRC determines and approves,

before construction, the criteria that will be used to evaluate, after construction, whether the

plant has been built as specified in the design. Before authorizing operation, the Commission

must determine that these criteria have been met. The determination of whether a specific plant

meets the acceptance criteria is subject to hearing rights.

The initial license for a nuclear power plant may be renewed for up to an additional 20 years.

The NRC provides the licensing system for license renewal under 10 CFR Part 54,

“Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power Plants.”

7.2.3 Inspection and Assessment

Under the Atomic Energy Act, the NRC has the authority to inspect nuclear power plants in its

role of protecting public health and safety and the common defense and security. The NRC staff

inspects power reactors under construction, in test conditions, and in operation to ascertain

compliance with regulations and license conditions. Through its inspection program, the NRC

assesses whether activities are properly conducted and equipment is properly maintained to

verify that the licensee is safely operating the facility. The agency integrates inspection results

into its overall evaluation of licensee performance, as discussed in Article 6 of this report. As

described in Section 7.2.4 of this report, the NRC may take enforcement action to address

safety and security concerns and/or violations of NRC requirements.

All inspection findings are recorded, and the NRC typically issues inspection reports for a

specific power plant quarterly. Additionally, senior agency managers review plants that have

performance issues during the annual Agency Action Review Meeting and report these results

in a public Commission meeting. This meeting provides another opportunity to discuss

significant events, licensee performance issues, trends, and actions to mitigate recurrences.

This is further discussed in Section 6.3.2 of this report.

7.2.4 Enforcement

The NRC draws its jurisdiction for enforcement from the Atomic Energy Act and the Energy

Reorganization Act.

The Atomic Energy Act, Section 161, authorizes the NRC to conduct inspections and

investigations and to issue orders as may be necessary or desirable to promote the common

defense and security, protect health, or minimize danger to life or property. Section 186

authorizes the NRC to revoke licenses under certain circumstances (e.g., for material false

statements, for a change in conditions that would have warranted NRC refusal to grant a license

on an original application, for a licensee’s failure to build or operate a facility in accordance with

the terms of the permit or license, and for a violation of an NRC regulation). Section 234

authorizes the NRC to impose monetary civil penalties not to exceed $100,000 per violation per

day; however, that amount is adjusted every 4 years by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation

Adjustment Act of 1990, as amended by the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, and is

currently $140,000. In addition to the provisions mentioned in Section 234, Sections 84 and 147

authorize the imposition of civil penalties for violations of the regulations that implement those

provisions. Section 232 authorizes the Attorney General to seek injunctive or other equitable

relief for violations of regulatory requirements.

The Atomic Energy Act, Chapter 18, provides for varying levels of criminal penalties

(i.e., monetary fines and imprisonment) for willful violations of the Act, or of regulations or orders

issued by the NRC under Sections 65, 161b, 161i, or 161o of the Act. Section 223 allows the

imposition of criminal penalties on certain individuals who are employed by firms constructing or

supplying basic components of any utilization facility if the individual knowingly and willfully

violates NRC requirements in a way that could significantly impair a basic component.

Section 235 allows the U.S. government to impose criminal penalties on persons who interfere

with nuclear inspectors. Section 236 allows the imposition of criminal penalties on persons who

cause, or attempt to cause, sabotage at a nuclear facility or to nuclear fuel. The agency refers

alleged or suspected instances of criminal violations of the Atomic Energy Act to the U.S.

Department of Justice for appropriate action.

The Energy Reorganization Act, Section 206, authorizes the NRC to impose civil penalties on

licensees and individuals or responsible persons for knowing and consciously failing to provide

the agency with certain safety information.

Subpart B, “Procedure for Imposing Requirements by Order, or for Modification, Suspension, or

Revocation of a License, or for Imposing Civil Penalties,” of 10 CFR Part 2 specifies the

procedures that the NRC uses in exercising its enforcement authority. The scope of Subpart B

includes the following procedures:

10 CFR 2.201, “Notice of Violation,” outlines the procedure for issuing notices of

violations.

10 CFR 2.202, “Orders,” explains the procedure for issuing orders. In accordance with

this section, the NRC may decide to issue an order to institute a proceeding to modify,

suspend, or revoke a license or to take other action against an NRC licensee or other

person subject to the NRC’s jurisdiction. The licensee or any other person adversely

affected by the order may request a hearing. The NRC is authorized to make orders

immediately effective if necessary to protect public health, safety, or interest, or if the

violation is willful.

10 CFR 2.204, “Demand for Information,” specifies the procedure for issuing a demand

for information to a licensee or other person subject to the NRC’s jurisdiction to

determine whether an order should be issued or other enforcement action should be

taken. Because the agency is only seeking information, demands for information are not

subject to hearing rights. A licensee must answer a demand for information. An

unlicensed person may answer a demand either by providing the requested information

or by explaining why the NRC should not have issued the demand.

10 CFR 2.205, “Civil Penalties,” describes the procedure for assessing civil penalties.

The NRC initiates the civil penalty process by issuing a notice of violation and proposed

imposition of a civil penalty. The agency provides the person charged with the civil

penalty with an opportunity to contest in writing the proposed imposition of a civil

penalty. After evaluating the response, the NRC may mitigate, remit, or impose the civil

penalty. If the agency imposes a civil penalty, it provides an opportunity for a hearing. If

a civil penalty is not paid following a hearing, or if a hearing is not requested, the agency

may refer the matter to the U.S. Department of Justice to institute a civil action in

Federal district court to collect the penalty.

The NRC’s enforcement process is also discussed in Section 9.3 of this report.

ARTICLE 8. REGULATORY BODY

Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted

with the implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in

Article 7, and provided with adequate authority, competence, and financial and

human resources to fulfill its assigned responsibilities.

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure an effective

separation between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other

body or organization concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear

energy.

This section explains the establishment of the U.S. regulatory body (i.e., the U.S. NRC). It also

explains how the functions of the NRC are separate from those of bodies responsible for

promoting research, development and advancement of nuclear energy (e.g., the U.S. DOE). It

discusses financial and human resources aspects, the regulatory body’s international

responsibilities, its ethics rules, and its policy for maintaining openness and transparency.

The United States did not change the legislative framework governing the U.S. nuclear industry

as a result of the Fukushima accident. The NRC has taken the necessary regulatory actions in

response to the accident, including the creation of the Japan Lessons Learned Division, as

described in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.3 of this report.

8.1 The Regulatory Body

This section explains the NRC’s mandate, authority and responsibilities, structure and position

in the Government, its financial and human resources, as well as its international responsibilities

and activities, such as those related to international standards and Integrated Regulatory

Review Service (IRRS) and Operational Safety Assessment Review Team (OSART) missions.

8.1.1 Mandate

As discussed in Article 7, the U.S. Congress created the NRC as an independent regulatory

agency in January 1975, with the passage of the Energy Reorganization Act. In giving the NRC

an exclusively regulatory mandate, the statute reflected (in part) a congressional judgment that

the expanding commercial nuclear power industry (which was expected to continue to grow)

warranted the full-time attention of an exclusively regulatory agency. In creating the NRC, the

U.S. Congress also addressed a developing public concern that regulatory responsibilities were

overshadowed by the promotion of nuclear power at the Atomic Energy Commission.

8.1.2 Authority and Responsibilities

8.1.2.1 Scope of Authority

The NRC’s mission is to ensure that the civilian uses of nuclear energy and materials in the

United States are conducted with proper regard for public health and safety, national security,

and environmental concerns. The Atomic Energy Act provides the charter for most of these

regulatory responsibilities. In the Atomic Energy Act, the U.S. Congress created a national

policy of developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The U.S. Congress has amended the

statute over the years to address developing technology and changing regulatory needs. Other,

more specialized, statutes prescribe the NRC’s duties with regard to high-level radioactive

waste, low-level radioactive waste, mill tailings, environmental reviews, nonproliferation,

antiterrorism, and import and export of nuclear materials and equipment. In addition, the

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, imposes broad environmental

responsibilities on all Federal agencies, including the NRC.

The NRC’s licensing authority extends to other Government organizations (such as the

Tennessee Valley Authority, which operates nuclear power plants) and to the military’s use of

radiopharmaceuticals in its hospitals. But the NRC’s licensing authority does not extend to the

military’s or DOE’s nuclear weapons programs and facilities, nor to DOE’s test and research

reactors. Section 8.2 of this report provides specific information on the scope of the agency’s

limited jurisdiction over DOE nuclear installations. The NRC’s responsibilities include ensuring

both the safety and the security of commercial nuclear facilities and materials.

8.1.2.2 The NRC as an Independent Regulatory Agency

The Commission’s status as an independent regulatory agency within the Executive Branch of

the Federal Government means that the President cannot ordinarily direct the agency’s

regulatory decisions. There are two statutory sources of the Commission’s independence from

presidential direction. First, the President can remove an NRC Commissioner only for

cause - namely, “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” The President can,

however, designate one member of the Commission as Chairman to serve as such at the

pleasure of the President. Second, the Commission has the statutory right to defend itself

whenever its adjudicatory or rulemaking decisions are challenged in U.S. appellate courts.

Congress cannot override the Commission’s decisions, except by duly enacted legislation. The

courts are likewise limited in reviewing the NRC’s factual safety findings. Although a Federal

appellate court can overturn a Commission decision, judicial review of Commission decisions is

limited. Courts generally defer to the Commission’s legal and factual determinations, particularly

where they fall within the agency’s responsibility for and expertise in nuclear safety.

The independence of the NRC’s decisionmaking process implies a responsibility on the part of

the Commissioners and their personal staff to keep the process free from improper outside

influence. This is especially important in the case of adjudications. When the Commissioners

take part in adjudications, they ordinarily act in the role of appellate judges (reviewing the

decisions of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board judges) and, in general, are bound by the same

kinds of strictures that apply to Federal court judges.

8.1.3 Structure of the Regulatory Body

This section explains the structure of the NRC. It covers the Commission, component offices

and their responsibilities, and advisory committees and their functions. It also explains recent

changes in NRC organization.

8.1.3.1 The Commission

The NRC is headed by a five-member Commission appointed by the President and confirmed

by the U.S. Senate. The President designates one member to serve as Chairman and official

spokesperson. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980 strengthened the executive and

administrative roles of the NRC Chairman, particularly in emergencies, while providing that all

policy formulation, policy-related rulemaking, and orders and adjudications would remain vested

with the full Commission. The Commission as a whole formulates policies and regulations

governing safety and security, issues orders to licensees, and adjudicates legal matters brought

before it. The Executive Director for Operations carries out the policies and decisions of the

Commission and directs the activities of the program offices.

8.1.3.2 Component Offices of the Commission

The following offices report directly to the Chairman or the Commission:

Office of the Executive Director for Operations. The Executive Director for Operations is

the chief operational and administrative officer of the Commission and is authorized and

directed to discharge licensing, regulatory, and administrative functions, as well as other

actions necessary for day-to-day agency operations. The Executive Director for

Operations supervises and coordinates the policy development and operational activities

of the NRC program and regional offices, and implements Commission policy directives

pertaining to these offices.

Office of the Chief Financial Officer. The Office of the Chief Financial Officer leads the

agency in planning, acquiring and ensuring the appropriate use of financial resources,

and provides financial services to support the agency’s mission.

Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication. The Office of Commission Appellate

Adjudication is responsible for assisting the Commission in the exercise of its

quasi-judicial functions, including the resolution of appeals of decisions made by the

Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards. The office provides the Commission with an

analysis of adjudicatory matters that may merit a Commission decision, and drafts

adjudicatory decisions under the Commission’s guidance. The office also supports the

Commission when it conducts mandatory hearings associated with certain applications

(for example, combined license applications).

Office of Congressional Affairs. The Office of Congressional Affairs reports solely to the

Chairman and is the primary point of contact for all communications between the NRC

and Congress. This office provides advice and assistance to the Chairman, the

Executive Director for Operations, and NRC staff on congressional matters; monitors

legislative proposals, bills, and hearings; informs the NRC of the views of Congress on

NRC policies, plans, and activities; provides timely responses to congressional requests

for information; and provides the information necessary to keep appropriate members of

Congress and congressional staff fully and currently informed of NRC actions. The NRC

Protocol Office and the Federal and External Affairs program also reside in the Office of

Congressional Affairs.

Office of the General Counsel. The Office of the General Counsel directs matters of law

and legal policy, providing opinions, advice, and assistance to the agency on all of its

activities.

Office of International Programs. The Office of International Programs coordinates the

NRC’s international activities and provides recommendations to the Chairman, the

Commission, and the NRC staff on international policy and outreach activities. It plans,

develops, and implements programs to carry out statutorily mandated activities in the

international arena, including implementation of relevant U.S. treaty obligations and

export and import licensing responsibilities. It also establishes and maintains working

relationships with individual countries and international nuclear organizations, as well as

other involved U.S. Government agencies.

Office of Public Affairs. The Office of Public Affairs reports solely to the Chairman and

administers the agency’s public affairs program, advising agency officials and

developing key strategies that help increase public confidence in NRC policies and

activities. This includes keeping top management informed of public interest in and news

coverage of the NRC’s regulatory activities, as well as providing timely, clear, and

accurate information on NRC activities to the public and the media who call or email the

agency and through news releases, fact sheets, brochures, interviews, Web postings,

and social media.

Office of the Secretary of the Commission. The Office of the Secretary of the

Commission provides executive management services to support the Commission and

to carry out Commission decisions. It assists with the planning, scheduling, and conduct

of Commission business; maintains historical paper files of official Commission records;

administers the NRC Historical Program; and maintains the Commission’s official

adjudicatory and rulemaking dockets.

8.1.3.3 Offices of the Executive Director for Operations

The offices reporting to the Executive Director for Operations ensure that the commercial use of

nuclear materials in the United States is safely conducted. Since the issuance of the previous

U.S. National Report, the following major office reorganizations have taken place:

consolidation of the Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental

Management Programs into the currently existing Office of Nuclear Material Safety and

Safeguards

consolidation of the Computer Security Office and the Office of Information Services into

the newly created Office of the Chief Information Officer

The NRC offices are briefly described below.

Office of Administration. The Office of Administration provides centralized services in the

areas of contracts, facilities management, personnel and facilities security, property

management, and administration, including support for rulemaking and agency

directives, transportation, parking, translations, audiovisual needs, food services, mail

distribution, labor services, furniture and supplies, and other areas.

Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer. The Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer

provides overall management of the agency’s human capital planning and training and

development programs. Accordingly, this office is responsible for implementing human

resource policy and operations agencywide. This includes overseeing the development

and implementation of human resources management and information systems for

staffing, strategic workforce planning, and other corporate activities to support a skilled

and dynamic workforce. The office’s training and development programs are designed to

establish, maintain, and enhance the skills employees need today and to meet the

agency’s future skill needs.

Office of Enforcement. The Office of Enforcement oversees, manages, and directs the

development and implementation of policies and programs for enforcing NRC

requirements. It oversees the agency’s allegations management program and the

allegations review process. The office is responsible for safety culture policy matters, the

agency’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Program related to enforcement matters, and

the agency’s internal Differing Views Program.

Office of the Chief Information Officer. The Office of the Chief Information Officer plans,

directs, and oversees the resources to ensure the delivery of information technology and

information management services that are critical to support the mission, goals, and

priorities of the agency. In addition, it plans, directs, and oversees the implementation of

a comprehensive NRC information technology security program, and also coordinates

and oversees the development and update of agencywide information resources

management policy.

Office of Investigations. The Office of Investigations develops policy, procedures, and

quality control standards for investigations of licensees, applicants, and their contractors

or vendors, including conducting investigations of all allegations of wrongdoing by other

than NRC employees and contractors. The Office of Investigations may self-initiate

investigations. It makes referrals of substantiated criminal cases to the U.S. Department

of Justice for prosecution consideration and coordinates with other agencies and

organizations to ensure timely exchange of information of mutual interest. In addition,

the Office of Investigations maintains current awareness of inquiries and formal

investigations and keeps the Commission informed of matters under investigation as

they affect public health and safety, the common defense and security, and the

environment.

Office of New Reactors. The Office of New Reactors is responsible for accomplishing

key components of the NRC’s nuclear reactor safety mission for new commercial reactor

facilities licensed in accordance with 10 CFR Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and

Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” including small modular reactor and advanced

reactor facilities. As such, the office conducts regulatory activities in the primary program

areas of siting, licensing, and oversight of construction for new commercial nuclear

power reactors.

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. The Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards is responsible for regulating activities that provide for the safe and

secure production of nuclear fuel used in commercial nuclear reactors; the safe storage,

transportation, and disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel; the

transportation of radioactive materials regulated under the Atomic Energy Act; the safe

and secure use of radioactive materials in medical, industrial, and academic applications

for beneficial civilian purposes; the safe management and disposal of low-level waste;

implementing safe materials, power and nonpower reactor decommissioning programs,

and the cleanup of contaminated sites; and uranium recovery activities.

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation is

responsible for accomplishing key components of the NRC’s nuclear reactor safety

mission to protect public health and safety and the environment. To do so, the office

conducts a broad range of regulatory activities in the four primary program areas of

rulemaking, licensing, oversight, and incident response for commercial nuclear power

reactors and test and research reactors.

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

plans, recommends, and conducts research programs and technical safety reviews that

support the resolution of ongoing and future safety issues identified as regulatory needs

by offices with regulatory functions or through its own long-term research program.

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. The Office of Nuclear Security and

Incident Response develops overall agency policy and provides management direction

for evaluating and assessing technical issues involving security and emergency

preparedness at nuclear facilities. The office is the agency’s security, emergency

preparedness, and incident response interface with other Federal agencies.

Office of Small Business and Civil Rights. The Office of Small Business and Civil Rights

is responsible for facilitating equal employment opportunity for all NRC employees,

applicants for employment, and business partners through an ongoing affirmative

employment and diversity management process, implementation of civil rights statutes,

execution of outreach and compliance coordination mandates, and employment of

maximum small business participation in acquisitions.

Regional Offices. The four regional offices conduct inspections, and execute established

policies related to licensing and construction, allegation, enforcement, emergency

response, and Government liaison programs in the U.S.-licensed nuclear facilities. The

regional offices also manage decommissioning activities.

8.1.3.4 Advisory Committees

The three principal advisory committees for NRC programs are the Advisory Committee on

Reactor Safeguards, the Advisory Committee on the Medical Uses of Isotopes and the

Committee to Review Generic Requirements.

x Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. The Advisory Committee on Reactor

Safeguards has statutory responsibilities as described in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,

as amended. The Committee reviews and reports on safety studies and reactor facility

license and license renewal applications, advises the Commission on the hazards of

proposed and existing reactor facilities and the adequacy of proposed reactor safety

standards, advises the Commission on issues associated with nuclear materials and

waste management, initiates reviews of specific generic matters or nuclear facility

safety-related items, and reviews the NRC’s research activities.

Advisory Committee on the Medical Uses of Isotopes. The Advisory Committee on the

Medical Uses of Isotopes advises the NRC staff on policy and technical issues that arise

in the regulation of the medical uses of radioactive material in diagnosis and therapy.

Committee to Review Generic Requirements. The Committee to Review Generic

Requirements ensures that proposed generic backfits to be imposed on NRC-Iicensed

power reactors and selected nuclear materials licensees are appropriately justified,

based on the backfit provisions of applicable NRC regulations and the Commission’s

backfit policy.

8.1.3.5 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel

In addition to the advisory committees, the NRC has an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Panel. Administrative judges and administrative law judges who are members of this panel

—either as a single presiding officer or in three-judge boards— conduct hearings for the

Commission. Additionally, the panel performs such other regulatory functions as the

Commission authorizes. The panel’s Chief Administrative Judge develops and applies

procedures governing the activities of boards, administrative judges, and administrative law

judges. The Chief Administrative Judge also makes appropriate recommendations to the

Commission concerning the rules governing the conduct of hearings.

8.1.3.6 Office of the Inspector General

The Inspector General provides leadership and policy direction in conducting audits and

investigations to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the NRC and to prevent

and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in agency programs and operations. The

Inspector General recommends corrective actions to be taken, reports on progress made in

implementing those actions, and reports criminal matters to the U.S. Department of Justice. The

Inspector General analyzes and comments on the impact of existing and proposed legislation

and regulations on the economy and efficiency of NRC programs and operations. The Inspector

General operates with personnel, contracting, and budget authority independent of that of the

NRC.

8.1.4 Position of the NRC in the Governmental Structure

This section explains the relationship of the NRC to the Executive Branch, the States, and

Congress.

8.1.4.1 Executive Branch

The components of the Executive Branch that have the most frequent contact and interaction

with the NRC are the White House, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), U.S. Department

of State, DOE, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. Department of Homeland

Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Department of

Labor, U.S. Department of Transportation, and U.S. Department of Justice. Section 8.2 of this

report discusses the NRC’s relationship to DOE. The following summarizes the agency’s

relationships with the other identified components of the Federal Government:

The White House. As noted in Section 8.1.2.2 of this report, as an independent

regulatory agency, the White House cannot directly set NRC policy. It may, however,

influence NRC policy by (1) appointing Commissioners and a Chairman in whose

outlook and judgment it has confidence and (2) making its views known on

nonadjudicatory matters. In certain areas, such as national security policy, the

Commission has declared its intent to give great weight to the views of the Executive

Branch. In informal policy matters, such as rulemaking, White House and Executive

Branch officials may properly try to influence NRC decisions. Ultimately, however, the

NRC must make the decision and accept responsibility for it.

Under the aegis of the White House, the National Security Council is tasked with

coordinating Executive Branch policies and activities. Through the Interagency Policy

Coordinating committee structure, the NRC and other agencies are able to ensure that

program activities are aligned with U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Federal Emergency Management Agency. FEMA assists the NRC’s licensing process by

preparing reviews and evaluations and by presenting witnesses to testify at licensing

hearings. FEMA also participates with the NRC in observing and evaluating emergency

exercises at nuclear plants. FEMA findings are not binding on the NRC, but they are

presumed to be valid unless controverted by more persuasive evidence. FEMA is part of

DHS.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The NRC routinely interfaces with DHS

regarding infrastructure protection and cyberspace issues. The mission of DHS is to

secure the nation from threats.

U.S. Department of Justice. As mentioned in Section 8.1.2.2, the NRC has independent

litigation authority, which allows it to defend itself in U.S. appellate courts. However,

under the Administrative Orders Review Act (commonly called the Hobbs Act), the

United States is a party to petitions for review challenging NRC licensing decisions or

regulations. Thus, NRC litigation almost always requires coordination with the U.S.

Department of Justice.

In addition, the NRC’s Office of Investigations investigates alleged wrongdoing by NRC

licensees, certificate holders, permit holders, or applicants; contractors, subcontractors,

and vendors of such entities; and employees of these entities who may have committed

violations of the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy Reorganization Act. All substantiated

criminal cases are referred to the U.S. Department of Justice for prosecution

consideration.

The NRC’s Office of the Inspector General provides information to the Department of

Justice whenever it has reasonable grounds to believe that an NRC employee or

contractor has violated Federal law. The Inspector General refers cases for review for

possible criminal prosecution to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the area in which the

potential violation occurred. When the Department of Justice desires support from the

Office of the Inspector General for investigations or grand jury work, it makes the request

directly to the Inspector General.

U.S. Department of Labor. The NRC monitors discrimination actions related to

NRC-licensed activities filed with the U.S. Department of Labor under Section 211 of the

Energy Reorganization Act. The NRC also develops enforcement actions when there are

properly supported findings of discrimination, either from the NRC’s Office of

Investigations or from U.S. Department of Labor adjudications.

U.S. Department of State. By law, the NRC licenses the export and import of commercial

nuclear equipment and material. For significant license applications, the Commission

requests the U.S. Department of State to provide Executive Branch views on whether

the license should be issued.

The NRC supports the U.S. Department of State during negotiation of international

agreements in the nuclear field and coordinates a number of interactions with IAEA and

other international organizations of the United Nations, as well as the NEA of the

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. In general, these

interactions serve to develop policy on international nuclear issues that are under NRC

domestic purview and to plan and coordinate programs of nuclear safety and safeguards

assistance to other countries.

U.S. Department of Transportation. The NRC and the U.S. Department of Transportation

share responsibility for the control of radioactive material transport. U.S. Department of

Transportation regulations cover all aspects of transportation, including packaging,

shipping and carrier responsibilities, and related documentation.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The responsibilities of the NRC and EPA

intersect or overlap in areas in which EPA issues generally applicable environmental

standards for activities that are subject to NRC licensing actions. Examples include

general standards for high-level waste repositories, uranium milling facilities,

decommissioning standards, and standards for public and worker protection. EPA has

the ultimate authority to establish generally applicable environmental standards to

protect the environment from radioactive material.

U.S. Office of Management and Budget. The NRC submits its annual budget requests,

including proposed personnel ceilings, to OMB for approval.

8.1.4.2 The States (i.e., of the United States)

The Atomic Energy Act confers on the NRC preemptive authority over health and safety

regulation of nuclear energy and radioactive materials. As a result, the general rule is that

nuclear power plant safety, like airline safety, is the exclusive province of the Federal

Government and cannot be regulated by the States. The courts would thus void a State law that

attempted to set nuclear safety standards. However, the courts will not overturn a State law that

regulates nuclear energy for purposes other than health and safety, such as economics, unless

it conflicts with an NRC requirement. Similarly, the courts will not ordinarily question a State’s

declared purpose in enacting legislation.

However, the Atomic Energy Act did not entirely exclude States from the regulation of certain

nuclear matters. Section 274 of the Act created the Agreement State Program, under which the

NRC may relinquish its authority over most nuclear materials to those States willing to assume

that authority. The NRC may not relinquish its regulatory authority over such facilities as

reactors, fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, imports and exports, critical mass quantities

of special nuclear material, high-level waste disposal, or certain other excepted areas.

Thirty-seven States have signed formal agreements with the NRC and have assumed regulatory

responsibility over certain byproduct, source, and small quantities of special nuclear materials.

Agreement States receive no Federal funding to support the operations of their regulatory

programs. However, the NRC does provide technical training to Agreement State staff in order

to ensure a more consistent and robust National Materials Program. The NRC conducts

performance-based reviews of Agreement State programs to ensure that they remain adequate

to protect public health and safety and are compatible with the NRC materials program.

Some States have shown a desire to participate in matters relating to nuclear power plants.

In response, the NRC issued a policy statement in February 1989 declaring its intent to

cooperate with States in the area of nuclear power plant safety by keeping States informed of

matters of interest to them and considering proposals for State officials to participate in NRC

inspection activities, in accordance with a memorandum of understanding between the State

and the NRC. The policy statement makes clear that States must channel their contacts with the

NRC through a single State Liaison Officer, whom the Governor appoints. States are authorized

only to observe and assist in NRC inspections of reactors; they cannot conduct their own

independent health and safety inspections.

The NRC works in cooperation with Federal, State, and local governments; interstate

organizations; and Native American Tribal Governments to maintain effective relations and

communications with these organizations and to promote greater awareness and mutual

understanding of the policies, activities, and concerns of all parties involved as they relate to

radiological safety at NRC-licensed facilities.

8.1.4.3 Congress

The following oversight committees and subcommittees in the U.S. Senate and U.S. House of

Representatives have jurisdiction over aspects of the NRC’s activities. These committees and

subcommittees are listed below.

Senate Oversight. In the U.S. Senate, the Committee on the Environment and Public

Works has jurisdiction over domestic nuclear regulatory activities. Within the committee,

the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety is responsible for regulation and

oversight of the NRC. The Energy and Natural Resources Committee and the

Environment and Public Works Committee share jurisdiction over nuclear waste issues.

House Oversight. In the U.S. House of Representatives, the Committee on Energy and

Commerce has jurisdiction over domestic nuclear regulatory activities. Within the

committee, the Subcommittee on Energy and Power and the Subcommittee on

Environment and the Economy have responsibility for regulation and oversight of the

NRC.

Other Relevant Committees. In addition to the committees and subcommittees

mentioned above, the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Energy and

Water Development play a key role in approving the Commission’s annual budget. A

number of other committees frequently interact with the NRC on international affairs,

research, security, and general Governmental operations.

8.1.5 International Responsibilities and Activities

The NRC conducts international activities related to statutory mandates, international treaties

and conventions, international organizations, bilateral relations, and research.

U.S. law or international treaties and conventions mandate several NRC international activities;

other activities are discretionary. In particular, the NRC is statutorily mandated to serve as the

U.S. licensing authority for exports and imports of nuclear materials and equipment.

The NRC supports U.S. foreign policy in the safe and secure use of nuclear materials and in

guarding against the spread of nuclear weapons. The agency actively participates in

implementing a variety of legally binding treaties and conventions that create an international

framework for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NRC provides technical and legal

advice and assistance to international organizations and foreign countries as they work to

develop effective regulatory organizations and rigorous safety and security standards. Some

activities are carried out within the programs of the IAEA, the NEA, or other international

organizations. The NRC conducts other activities directly with counterpart agencies in other

countries under technical information exchange cooperation arrangements.

International Treaties. Treaties that legally bind the U.S. Government’s peaceful uses of nuclear

energy and nuclear applications include the 1970 Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons, the 1987 Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the 1996 CNS, the

1986 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the 1987 Convention on

Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and the 2001 Joint

Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste

Management. NRC staff members regularly participate in implementation activities related to

these conventions and have held a variety of leadership positions at meetings of Contracting

Parties. In its bilateral work with regulatory counterparts worldwide, the NRC seeks to exchange

experience and good practices to further the goals of these international instruments, including

urging ratification by new states.

In addition to these legally-binding obligations, the United States has agreed to comply with

certain activities to enhance the safe and secure uses of nuclear applications. For example, the

United States has made a political commitment to implement the IAEA Code of Conduct on the

Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. This commitment has been codified in U.S. statute

in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and is reflected in the NRC’s export and import regulations.

Export-Import. The NRC’s key international responsibility is licensing the export and import of

nuclear materials and equipment for civilian use, such as low-enriched uranium fuel for nuclear

power plants, high-enriched uranium for research and test reactors, nuclear reactors, certain

nuclear reactor components (such as pumps and valves), and radioisotopes used in industrial,

medical, agricultural, and scientific fields. The NRC ensures that such exports and imports are

consistent with the goals of the safe and peaceful use of these materials and equipment, limiting

the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and promoting the Nation’s common defense and security.

The Atomic Energy Act, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, and 10 CFR Part 110,

“Export and Import of Nuclear Equipment and Material,” detail the standards and procedures for

issuing export and import licenses. The NRC also coordinates closely with other U.S.

Government agencies, including the National Security Council, U.S. Department of State, U.S.

Department of Commerce, and DOE, on export- or import-related matters that fall within these

agencies’ jurisdictions.

International Organizations and Associations. In consultation with the Executive Branch

agencies, the NRC actively participates in the full scope of programs of the two major

international nuclear organizations, IAEA and NEA. In addition to staff participation in more than

200 IAEA and NEA meetings each year, the United States has participated in more than

30 OSART missions. Some experts on these teams come from the NRC, while others come

from industry. The NRC coordinates closely with INPO in this process. In 2017, the United

States will host an OSART mission at the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. The United States intends to

continue to plan for hosting an OSART mission every 3 years.

Since 1999, the NRC has supported the IRRS program. In recent years, given the increased

emphasis on peer reviews following the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, the NRC has participated

in about 10 IRRS missions per year. In October 2010, the United States hosted an IRRS

mission, focused on the U.S. operating reactor program. The NRC has devoted significant

resources to addressing the mission’s findings and implementing the team’s recommendations.

A followup mission was completed in February 2014. Additional information about the 2014

IRRS followup mission’s findings can be found in Section 8.1.5.2 of this report.

The NRC actively participates in the IAEA Commission on Safety Standards and all of the IAEA

Safety Standards Committees, including the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee. In

November 2015, the U.S. Government was appointed chair of the new Emergency

Preparedness and Response Standards Committee. These activities, together with regular NRC

staff participation in IAEA meetings to draft and revise safety standards and security guidance in

coordination with other U.S. Government agencies, enable the NRC to use its broad regulatory

experience to contribute to the safe and secure use of nuclear and radioactive materials in IAEA

Member States.

The NRC also participates in the NEA Steering Committee and serves on NEA’s Committee on

the Safety of Nuclear Installations, the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities, the

Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health, and the Radioactive Waste Management

Committee. Furthermore, the NRC is represented on many of the NEA committee-chartered

working groups. These activities provide diverse forums for nuclear regulators and research

organizations to share information and work together to leverage resources for mutual benefit.

The NRC continues to participate in the Multinational Design Evaluation Program, with the goal

of leveraging the experience of international counterparts in the review of new reactor designs.

Through this program, the NRC is (1) sharing information with other regulatory authorities in the

reviews of the AP1000, Korea Electric Power Corporation and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power

Co., Ltd.’s APR1400, and AREVA Nuclear Power’s U.S. Evolutionary Power Reactor (US EPR)

designs, (2) cooperating in vendor inspections, and (3) pursuing possible convergence of

regulations, codes, and standards associated with the design reviews of new reactors.

Since the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, the U.S. Government has augmented its coordinated

program of international nuclear safety activities. Some existing activities have been expanded

to address lessons learned from the accident, while certain initiatives were created specifically

to address the accident and its implications. In both cases, the objectives of U.S.

representatives in international meetings have been to expand their understanding of the

accident and others’ approaches to learning its lessons; to share relevant experience and

lessons learned; and to minimize duplication of effort and leverage financial and human

resources. In addition to contributing to the U.S. Government’s direct cooperation with, and

support of, the Government of Japan, the NRC has actively supported numerous

post-Fukushima international activities, both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis. Through

regular communication with its foreign Government counterparts, particularly in the regulatory

area, and participation in international meetings, the United States has gained valuable

information to enhance its domestic nuclear safety program and has contributed to the

development of a stronger global nuclear safety regime. In particular, the NRC has worked

closely with the IAEA in support of the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, including participating in

the various international experts’ meetings, working through the IAEA Safety Standards

Committees to address potential revisions to the safety standards, and providing consultants’

advice on improving and enhancing the IAEA’s suite of peer review services. The NRC’s

activities associated to the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety is discussed in Section 1.3.1 of

this report.

In addition, the U.S. Government supported at a high level both nuclear safety Ministerial

Conferences, the first in Vienna in June 2011, and the second in Tokyo in December 2012. The

U.S. Government also participated in the drafting of the IAEA’s report, “The Fukushima Daiichi

Accident,” published in 2015, which summarizes both the accident events and actions taken

globally to enhance safety. Details of the NRC’s evaluation of Fukushima lessons learned can

be found in Section 1.3.1 of this report.

The NRC has also continued its work both with the IAEA and on a bilateral basis in support of

countries seeking to develop new nuclear power programs or expand small or dormant

programs. The NRC staff has been active in guidance document development and has

participated in numerous workshops and training activities to provide so-called “new entrant”

countries with information and experience on building a robust, independent regulatory

infrastructure. To that end, the NRC has participated actively in the IAEA’s Regulatory

Cooperation Forum. In consultation with the IAEA, the NRC has coordinated its International

Regulatory Development Partnership program. The International Regulatory Development

Partnership provides training in nuclear orientation (codes and standards, fundaments of reactor

regulation and safety, PRA quality, and quality assurance), agency infrastructure development

(nuclear executive workshop and safety culture), regulatory program development (construction

permit application review and site application review), and regulatory process (construction and

vendor inspection practices, licensing review methodology and power uprates).

Members of the Commission travel internationally to engage in bilateral exchanges of technical

information and attend conferences to deliver keynote remarks, participate in panel discussions,

and otherwise share insights on a variety of topics with diverse technical and political

audiences. The NRC’s annual Regulatory Information Conference also provides a forum for the

Commission and NRC staff to hold technical exchanges and high-level bilateral meetings, with

more than 30 countries represented each year, many at senior levels.

Bilateral Relations. The NRC has arrangements to exchange technical information with nuclear

safety agencies in 45 countries, Taiwan, and the European Atomic Energy Community. In

addition, the NRC works with many other countries either bilaterally or regionally on a limited

basis where there is not yet a formal bilateral arrangement in place. The NRC and its foreign

counterparts routinely exchange operational safety data and other methodological regulatory

information. The NRC provides advice, training, and other assistance to countries that seek U.S.

help to improve their regulatory programs.

Combined with the NRC’s export/import licensing outreach activities and work through the

various conventions and treaties, the NRC’s information exchange arrangements serve as

communication channels with foreign regulatory authorities, establishing a framework for the

NRC to gain access to non-U.S. safety information that can (1) provide the U.S. Government

with insights into whether national export/import licensing regimes will ensure the safe and

secure use of nuclear facilities and materials, (2) alert the U.S. Government and industry to

potential safety problems, (3) help find possible accident precursors, and (4) provide accident

and incident analyses, including lessons learned, which could be directly applicable to the safety

of U.S. nuclear power plants and other facilities. The arrangements also serve as a vehicle for

the assistance the NRC provides to countries to establish and improve their regulatory

capabilities and infrastructure. Thus, the suite of international activities - treaty implementation,

export/import licensing and arrangements - facilitate the NRC’s strategic goal to support U.S.

interests in the safe and secure use of nuclear materials and in nuclear nonproliferation.

Since the Fukushima accident, the NRC and its regulatory counterparts have shared a variety of

information under the framework of these technical information exchange arrangements,

including results from the NRC’s lessons learned activities which are further addressed in

Section 1.3.1 of this report. As the NRC’s work in this area progresses and conclusions continue

to develop, the NRC will continue to provide information about its activities and welcomes open,

frequent exchanges of information to learn from its international counterparts.

International Assistance Programs. Since the early 1990s, the NRC has continued to expand its

program of assistance to countries developing nuclear power programs. The NRC began

offering assistance to nuclear regulatory programs in several former Soviet states, focusing on

countries in which Soviet-designed reactors were operated. After the September 11, 2001,

terrorist attacks, the NRC expanded its assistance efforts specifically to include regulatory

oversight assistance to countries that were considering or building new reactors, and assistance

to improve regulatory oversight of radioactive sources. These efforts continue to expand under

the International Regulatory Development Partnership, a collaborative program under the

auspices of the NRC, consistent with international legal commitments, IAEA standards

guidance, and coordinated with other states. The NRC provides technical assistance, training,

and generic documents covering a broad range of topics relevant to organizational infrastructure

and regulatory programs relating to nuclear power programs.

Research Programs. The NRC conducts confirmatory regulatory research through the

implementation of more than 100 bilateral and multilateral agreements in partnership with

nuclear safety agencies and institutes in more than 30 countries. This research supports

regulatory decisions on emerging technologies, aging equipment and facilities, and various

other safety issues. The NRC and other nuclear regulatory and safety organizations carry out

cooperative research projects to achieve mutual research needs with greater efficiency.

8.1.5.1 International Standards

The NRC actively participates in the development of the IAEA’s safety standards. Where

appropriate, the NRC also references the safety standards in NRC regulations and regulatory

guidance.

NRC senior managers represent the agency at the IAEA Commission on Safety Standards and

all IAEA Safety Standards Committees. Additionally, the NRC provides senior expert assistance

to the IAEA to support further development of the safety standards through the provision of cost-

free experts, consultants, extrabudgetary support, and studies designed to advance the safety

standards program.

The manner in which safety standards are used to inform and guide NRC regulations and

regulatory guidance varies among the NRC’s technical programs. For example, the IAEA’s

safety standards are used as reference documents to inform the development of requirements

and guidance in the NRC’s reactor, radiation protection, and waste management programs.

Because of U.S. Government international legal commitments, the transportation safety

documents are used directly in the U.S. transportation requirements.

Many of the differences in how the safety standards are applied to NRC regulations stem from

the fact that NRC regulatory guidance predates most IAEA safety standards. Furthermore, the

NRC requirements were written with a greater level of detail than the IAEA’s safety standards.

Despite these differences, the NRC agreed with recommendations from the 2010 IRRS mission

to further harmonize requirements and guidance in the NRC’s operating reactor program with

IAEA safety standards.

The NRC is actively working to implement these recommendations as NRC regulations and

RGs are updated. The NRC has revised its policy guidance and now directs staff to consider

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IAEA standards as a point of reference when drafting or revising RGs, and to consider direct

endorsement of the IAEA standards where appropriate. Because of this guidance, the NRC has

published 13 new or revised RGs that harmonize with or reference IAEA safety standards in the

past 2 years.

8.1.5.2 Integrated Regulatory Review Service Mission

The NRC hosted an IRRS mission in October 2010 focused on the U.S. operating power reactor

program. The 2010 mission identified 2 recommendations, 20 suggestions, and 25 good

practices. Subsequently, the NRC developed an action plan to address the team’s findings and

hosted a followup mission in 2014. The followup mission also reviewed the NRC’s response to

the Fukushima accident.

One of the mission’s suggestions relates to the conduct of periodic safety reviews. In

preparation for the 2010 IRRS mission, the NRC correlated its regulatory programs to the

14 safety factors identified in IAEA Specific Safety Guide SSG-25, “Periodic Safety Review of

Nuclear Power Plants Safety,” published in 2013. The NRC’s objective was to demonstrate

clearly that the agency’s programs robustly meet the intent of the periodic safety review. The

IRRS team concluded that “… the NRC has in place a number of programmes (the analysis of

the operating experience, the Reactor Oversight Process, the generic upgrades and regulatory

changes, the use of risk informed regulation and the license renewal rule) that are intended to

ensure that the goals of the periodic safety review are met and that provide adequate protection

to the health and safety of the public, as required by the Atomic Energy Act.” Furthermore, the

report states:

“Although the NRC utilizes an alternate approach to meet the [periodic safety

review] PSR safety factors, NRC should incorporate lessons learned from Periodic Safety

Reviews performed in other countries as an input to the NRC’s assessment processes.” To

address this, the NRC began a limited scope pilot study that reviewed several periodic safety

review reports from other countries to identify areas that could potentially inform the NRC’s

regulatory processes.

During the 2014 IRRS followup mission, the team closed this item based on progress made by

the NRC in the evaluation and incorporation of periodic safety review lessons learned. Upon

completion of the pilot study the NRC issued a report entitled, “Findings from the Staff’s

Evaluation of Periodic Safety Reviews from Other Countries,” dated April 24, 2015. The report

concluded that it is reasonable to expect that the U.S. regulatory approach would be sufficient

for detecting and correcting the plant-specific issues addressed by other countries’ periodic

safety reviews if they were to occur in U.S. plants. Hence, changes to the existing regulatory

processes were deemed unnecessary. Additional information on the periodic safety reviews can

be found in Section 14.1.5 of this report.

Relative to the NRC’s response to the Fukushima accident, the followup mission concluded in

its report that the NRC has “acted promptly and effectively in the interests of the public health

and safety in both the U.S. and Japan.” The team said the NRC’s NTTF report was “a source

of inspiration for many regulatory bodies worldwide.” The team also reviewed how the NRC

inspected U.S. reactors on Fukushima related issues, and called that work “exemplary.”

The 2014 IRRS followup mission also closed 1 of the 2 recommendations and 18 additional

suggestions for a total of 19 closed suggestions. One new suggestion was opened concerning

transition of operating reactor plants to decommissioning. The NRC has continued to make

strides on the one recommendation and two suggestions that were outstanding. On

April 13, 2016, the United States sent a letter to IAEA that served as the final update regarding

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the 2010 and 2014 IRRS missions. In summary, the letter, which is available in the NRC’s public

Web site (ADAMS Accession No. ML16106A037), provided the status of the three outstanding

items as follows:

(1)

Recommendation 2 —Develop a Methodology and Implement a Holistic Management

System Review. The NRC is continuing the development of the remaining process maps

for the Operating Reactor Program. After the completion of the process map, the NRC

will establish and implement a process for periodic, holistic reviews of the effectiveness

of the management system.

(2)

Suggestion 7 —Direct Implementation of the term “As Low as Reasonably Achievable

(ALARA).” The Commission directed the NRC staff to examine regulations that contain

dose criteria and the NRC staff issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on

July 25, 2014, which discusses ALARA planning. The staff is continuing to evaluate the

effectiveness of ALARA planning and will evaluate the public comments on the program

to update the guidance documents and determine if other changes to the regulatory

framework are appropriate. This initiative is further discussed in Section 15.1 of this

report.

(3)

Suggestion Followup 1 —Develop a Consolidated Rulemaking and Corresponding

Guidance to Facilitate the Orderly Transition from Plant Operation to Plant

Decommissioning. The Commission directed the staff to proceed with a rulemaking on

reactor decommissioning and set an objective of early 2019 for completion of this

rulemaking. The staff has entered into the regulatory basis development stage for the

proposed rulemaking entitled “Regulatory Improvements for Power Reactors

Transitioning to Decommissioning.” This initiative is further discussed in Section 1.3.2

of this report.

The report, IAEA-NS-2014/01, “Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) Follow-up Mission

to the United States of America,” published in 2014, is available in the NRC’s public Web site

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14265A068).

8.1.5.3 Operational Safety Assessment Review Teams

The NRC coordinates with INPO to implement the hosting of an OSART mission in the United

States every 3 years. The United States welcomes the international views and knowledge

exchanged through OSART, and to support and encourage this international program, the NRC

licensees that host OSART missions have some reduced NRC inspections under the Reactor

Oversight Process.

In August 2014, Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, in Illinois hosted an OSART mission. As written in

the report; “The OSART team concluded that the managers and the staff of Clinton Power

Station are committed to improving the operational safety and reliability of their station.”

Several proposals for improvement were made including, “Improve the backlog management

tool and methodology so as to ensure timely completion of maintenance work orders even for

lower priority work.” The IAEA “Draft Report of the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)

Mission to Clinton Power Station,” published in December 2014, and is available in the NRC’s

public Web site (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A115).

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Subsequently, Clinton hosted a followup OSART mission in October 2015. The Clinton OSART

report for the followup mission is publicly available in the NRC’s Web site (ADAMS Accession

No. ML16105A282). The NRC reviewed both reports and did not identify issues pertaining to

either the plant or to the NRC’s requirements that necessitate NRC program changes.

The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant in Tennessee will host an OSART mission in 2017.

8.1.6 Financial and Human Resources

8.1.6.1 Financial Resources

As of September 30, 2015, the NRC had sufficient funds to meet program needs and adequate

control of these funds in place to ensure it did not exceed budget authority. The FY 2015

enacted budget was $1.0153 billion, including the budget for the Office of the Inspector General.

This is a decrease of $40.6 million when compared to the FY 2014 enacted budget of

$1.0559 billion.

The NRC FY 2015 budget was financed with $895.5 million from user fees and $119.8 million

from the U.S. Government’s General Fund.

8.1.6.2 Human Resources

The NRC has developed a comprehensive human capital management system that is

consistent with the agency’s core values; reflective of its mission, strategic goals, and

organization excellence objectives; clear in its purposes; and flexible in its implementation.

The NRC regularly solicits feedback in an effort to gain independent and diverse perspectives

on ways to improve NRC’s work environment. In view of that, the agency often explores various

channels that seek to provide meaningful insights about employees and their work experience.

One such mechanism is our workforce surveys. The NRC participates in two workforce surveys

measuring employee perceptions of the work environment: the U.S. Office of Personnel

Management Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey and the NRC Safety Culture and Climate

Survey. The Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey is mandated by Office of Personnel

Management’s regulations and is conducted annually. The Safety Culture and Climate Survey is

administered by NRC’s Office of the Inspector General approximately every three years. These

surveys provide unique, but also overlapping, insights on the NRC workplace that together build

a comprehensive picture of employees’ experiences with their job, supervisors, and work units.

The Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey and the NRC Safety Culture and Climate Survey were

administered for the first time in the same year beginning in 2012. The most recent surveys

were administered in 2015. Both surveys have consistently revealed that the NRC is a top

performing organization within the public sector and ranks competitively against private sector

benchmarks.

Although the survey questions on the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey differ from that of the

Safety Culture and Climate Survey, the overall objectives and reason for doing these surveys

remain the same: to create an engaging work environment where employees feel that they

have opportunities to excel.

Top positive results for the 2015 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey include willingness to put

in the extra effort to get a job done, supervisors talking with staff about performance, and

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continually looking for ways to do a better job. Opportunities for improvement remain in the

areas of paying raises depending on how well employees perform their jobs, steps taken to deal

with poor performers, and opportunities to get a better job in your organization.

Strengths from the 2015 Safety Culture and Climate Survey were noted in the areas of mission

and objectives, training, and supervision. Areas for improvement included the differing views

processes, empowerment and respect, and senior management.

The agency will focus action planning on areas identified in both surveys, along with reinforcing

the existence of a positive environment for raising concerns and valuing human differences.

Recruitment and Hiring Process. The NRC is focused on hiring the most critical skill sets, while

still emphasizing governmentwide programs such as hiring of the disabled, employment of

veterans, enhancing diversity, and supporting the agency’s Comprehensive Diversity

Management Plan. A number of internal and external factors are driving change at the NRC,

including flat or decreasing agency budgets and lower than projected numbers of new reactors.

To meet current and future skill needs, the NRC is actively recruiting for its Nuclear Safety

Professional Development Program, which has a history of graduating technically strong,

diverse candidates. In addition, the NRC has maintained its recruitment activities at targeted

universities and professional society conferences and career fairs. The agency advertises in

trade journals and on Web sites to attract professionals in specialized technical disciplines.

The agency continued to make prudent, targeted use of recruitment, relocation, and retention

incentives and pension offset waivers (rehiring annuitants without reduction of salary or

pension) to hire and retain employees in mission critical positions. Such incentives are

particularly useful for unusual occupations or highly specialized disciplines for which candidates

may be scarce. The NRC continues to strengthen its programs for developing and hiring

students in critical specialties through programs such as partnerships with colleges and

universities that include university scholarship and fellowship grants, cooperative education

programs, and payment of transportation and lodging expenses for student employees.

Retaining Staff. The NRC works to retain experienced staff. The NRC relies on all aspects of its

human capital management system to retain staff. These include providing comprehensive

training and development, constructive performance management, awards and recognition,

opportunities for career growth, financial incentives when needed, and a range of benefits

including health, wellness, and worklife programs. These worklife programs include flexible and

alternative work schedules, as well as a robust flexiplace or telework program, which allows the

staff members to work remotely and reduce their commute times. The agency strives to create a

positive organizational culture with an emphasis on a strong safety culture where people feel

valued and challenged and where employees and leaders at all levels model the NRC’s core

values: integrity, service, openness, commitment, cooperation, excellence, and respect.

Training and Development. The NRC strives to maintain a learning culture where knowledge is

shared throughout the organization. Such a culture supports the NRC’s objective of sustaining a

learning environment that provides continuing improvement in performance through knowledge

management, performance feedback, training, coaching, and mentoring.

The NRC uses an integrated approach to learning to provide new employees with consistent

information when it is needed. To assist new employees, the NRC implements a robust

onboarding program, including an online employee orientation toolkit. This orientation toolkit

allows new hires to access information about the NRC organization, its mission, and employee

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benefits before starting their first day of work. Additionally, new hires receive position-specific

training. The program offices have developed qualification programs that consist of three parts:

general requirements, position-specific requirements, and oral qualification boards, for groups

such as inspectors, technical reviewers, and project managers.

As an example, an increase in development of risk-informed licensing and regulatory

applications has created a demand for PRA analysts at both the licensees and the regulator.

The NRC responded to the challenge of development and retention of new analysts by initiating

an in-house recruitment and training program. This Grow Your Own PRA Analyst Program is

tailored to meet NRC staffing and training needs by building and maintaining a pool of qualified

Reliability and Risk Analysts to address future risk assessment regulatory requirements. The

program is designed to take internal candidates with diverse technical backgrounds, preferably

with regulatory, nuclear power engineering, or operations backgrounds, and provide requisite

training in various topics within PRA. The program is now in its fourth year of application at the

NRC.

The NRC continues to implement blended learning strategies in the training program. Blended

learning is defined as using a combination of educational techniques to optimize knowledge

transfer and delivery using both formal and informal approaches. Examples of various

educational techniques used at the NRC include classroom instruction, videos, Web sites,

virtual classrooms, discussion boards, modeling and simulation, webinars, communities of

practice, and hands-on application of knowledge and practice of skills with the support and

guidance of a mentor. Benefits of incorporating blended learning include the ability for learners

to gain or improve knowledge at any time and incorporate skills practice on the job, which

directly decreases the time to competency for employees while saving the agency money by

reducing travel costs associated with training attendance, and improving staff productivity by

reducing their time away from work.

Leadership and Knowledge Management. The NRC has organized its leadership development

programs into the Leaders’ Academy, consisting of competency-based training, assessment,

and development programs for all levels of leadership, from individual contributors to senior

executives. The NRC also continues its executive succession planning process, through which it

identifies skills needed and potential successors for senior leadership positions, determines

development that would benefit executives to prepare them for such NRC positions, and

considers strategies for filling positions for which the NRC has few potential successors. This

process informs selections for NRC positions and the establishment of executive development

plans for all executives.

Knowledge management remains a top priority and is an integrated part of the agency’s

Strategic Plan to ensure we capture and preserve knowledge to assist with employee

development and performance. There are four contributing activities:

(1)

Provide innovative agency support structures for knowledge management.

(2)

Create communities of practice that enable the sharing of relevant knowledge and

critical skills among employees who perform the same job function.

(3)

Capture operating experience, new information on safety and security issues, and

knowledge gained from inspection, research, and licensing activities in regulatory

guidance.

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The United States of America Seventh National Report for the Convention on Nuclear Safety (2016) - page 2